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On the never-ending road to Brexit:
perspectives for the European Union –





At the time of  publication of  this special issue, 17 months have passed since UK PrimeMinister Theresa May notified the European Council of  the UK’s intention to
withdraw from the EU. This decision was based on less than 52 per cent majority of  votes
cast for leaving the EU, in a non-binding referendum, which represented about 37 per cent
of  the votes of  those entitled to participate. For reasons entirely particular to the UK voting
system, this moved a Parliament with a majority for remaining in the EU before the
referendum to consistently supporting the government in its aspiration to leave the EU.1
However, when it comes to how exactly the UK should leave the EU there is less
agreement. The government has drawn stark lines in the sand, of  course. One, ‘Brexit’
does not, actually, mean Brexit as a shorthand for ‘British exit from the EU’. Instead, the
UK government plans to withdraw those parts of  the UK whose population has
endorsed remaining in the EU out of  the EU as well – this includes Northern Ireland,
rendering ‘Brexit’ a misnomer. Second, withdrawal from the EU will also mean
withdrawal from the Internal Market – or at least the part where people gain rights to
move and be treated equally in the UK – as well as the liberation from the jurisdiction of
the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU). While this so-called ‘hard Brexit’
will harm the UK citizens economically, especially in the North of  England, Scotland,
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*     The special issue resulted from the conference ‘Brexit – 15 Months On’ in September 2017 at Queen’s
University Belfast. This conference was funded by the project Tensions at the Fringes of  the European 
Union – Regaining the Union’s Purpose (TREUP), through Jean Monnet Centre of  Excellence 
by the European Commission (Project Number 564869-EPP-1–2015–1-UK-EPPJMO-CoE). For 
some more immediate impressions of  the conference, consult
<https://blogs.qub.ac.uk/tensionatthefringes/2018/02/01/academic-conference-brexit-15-months-on-
socio-legal-perspectives-for-the-eu-and-europe>.
1     For example, the government had no difficulty in securing a majority for the European Union (Notification
of  Withdrawal) Act, (2017) <www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/9/pdfs/ukpga_20170009_en.pdf> only
days after the UK Supreme Court found that Parliament, not government, must take this decision (R (Miller)
v Secretary of  State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5), nor failed to win parliamentary approval for
the EU Withdrawal Act, which ends the viability of  EU law in the UK as supranational law along with the
authority of  the CJEU and subjects most EU law to withdrawal by government regulation, reserving a
parliamentary decision for only a few elements. 
Wales and Northern Ireland,2 this is unlikely to stop Brexit. For many, leaving the EU has
become an emotional necessity,3 partly related to a perceived English or British identity
imagined as alien to ‘Europe’ or resulting from peculiar imaginations of  sovereignty.4
The overall rationale of this issue
There is, of  course, a good chance that the UK, after experiencing the reality outside the
EU, returns to the fold in the future. However, this will depend on whether the EU
emerges stronger from this withdrawal, which is closely connected to its recurrent crises
over the last decade. Next to the UK’s idiosyncratic reasons to withdraw from the EU,5
those voting in favour of  withdrawal also voiced more general concerns. Research
frequently highlights a general discontent with underfunding of  municipal services,
deterioration of  the economic situation and high unemployment or insecure employment
conditions in certain regions, as well as anxiety around migration, estrangement from the
EU institutions, and a perception that EU integration is an elite project, responsible for
many ills of  everyday life.6
Some of  these sentiments are partially owed to the unique situation in the UK, which
does not as a rule allocate tax income to regions in relation to tax revenue or necessary
expenditure for public services.7 If  coupled with longstanding austerity politics, this may
result in more negative impact on public services than in other Member States. Some of
the sentiments are not, however, unique to the UK, even though they do not prompt
citizens in other EU Member States to reject continued EU membership for their country.
For example, anxieties around arrival of  EU citizens from abroad are part of  a growing
unease with migration in a number of  EU Member States, resulting in a surge of  support
for right-wing populist parties in many. Some Member States’ governments, notably
Poland and Hungary, have already started to dismantle guarantees conventionally
associated with liberal justice.8
Further, the EU’s reactions to the global economic crisis, which mainly resulted in
demanding that Member States reduce spending, preferably for social policy, and reform
their employment laws, have resulted in an increase of  socio-economic hardship in many
Member States. Whether this hardship is rightly or wrongly blamed on the EU, its increase
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2     See the detailed references in John Doyle and Eileen Connoly, ‘Brexit and the Northern Ireland Question’, in
Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law and Politics of  Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017).
3     See Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres, ‘A Qualitative Change in the Process of  European Integration’,
in Nazaré da Costa Cabral, José Renato Gonçalves and Nuno Cunha Rodrigues (eds), After Brexit: Consequences
for the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 102–27, 105–8, who relentlessly expose how the British
electorate (minus the Scottish, and of  course the Northern Irish) drifted towards supporting an ever harder
Brexit between the referendum and the 2017 election.
4     Marlene Wind, ‘Brexit and Euroscepticism. Will “Leaving Europe” be Emulated Elsewhere?’ in Fabbrini (n 2)
219–46, 229–33.
5     See, for example, Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter, ‘Brexit, Initial Reflections’ (2016) 92(6) International
Affairs 1297–318; Wind (n 4); Joseph H H Weiler, ‘Brexit: No Happy Endings’ (2015) 26 European Journal
of  International Law 1–7.
6     For an early post-referendum overview, see Sara Hobolt, ‘The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided
Continent’ (2016) 23 Journal of  European Public Policy 1259–77; with hindsight, see John Curtice, ‘Why
Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum’ (2017) 55 Journal of  Common Market Studies 19–37.
7     For a comparison of  redistribution through taxes in the EU, see Anna Iara, Wealth Distribution and Taxation in
EU Member States (European Commission 2015); for an assessment of  whether free movement of  persons
actually results in strains on public services (and exposing that such strains are notoriously overestimated in
the public), see Klára Fóti, Social Dimension of  Intra-EU Mobility: Impact on Public Services (Eurofund 2015).
8     Laurent Pech and Kim Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of  Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19
Cambridge Yearbook of  European Legal Studies 3–47.
constitutes a challenge to the EU’s raison d’être: the creation of  the Internal Market (alias
Common Market between 1957 and 1992) was never an aim in itself. Instead, the all-
dominant economic integration served the purpose of  improving the living and working
conditions throughout Europe. If  significant parts of  the EU citizenry perceive EU law and
politics as failing in this endeavour, the Union itself  suffers from a serious crisis of  identity.9
All this indicates that Brexit can be viewed as a symptom for a substantive crisis of
the EU. This view contrasts with the presentation of  the EU’s perils as three successive
crises:10 the first of  those was the global economic crisis emerging from volatile
governance of  the financial sectors in the USA (epitomised by the Lehmann Brothers
bank crash in 2007), as well as some EU Member States, including the UK and Ireland.
The second one was triggered by the surge in persons seeking refuge in Europe as a
consequence of  the ‘Arab Spring’ and the subsequent war in Syria from 2015, which again
resulted from US and UK interventions in the region. Brexit is partially portrayed as an
independent third crisis of  potential escalating disintegration. The global financial crisis
had repercussions in the EU of  necessity, which exposed – depending on one’s political
standpoint – the weaknesses of  the Eurozone based on the diversity of  its constituent
economies (lack of  ‘optimal currency area’) or based on the incompleteness of  economic
and political integration achieved by the Maastricht Treaty due to hesitancy, among others,
of  the UK.11 The surge of  refugees culminating in 2015 has exposed the difficulty of  the
EU to command Member States’ solidarity within the framework of  EU law.12 Instead of
portraying Brexit as a crisis in its own right,13 it can also be viewed as but one expression
of  Euroscepticism caused cumulatively by the Eurozone crisis and the surge in
refugees.14 While all these debates on individual crises have merit, we suggest that the
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9     See on this Dagmar Schiek, ‘Towards more Resilience for a Social EU: The Constitutionally Conditioned
Internal Market’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 611–40.
10   Often referred to as ‘triple crisis’, e.g. James Caporaso, ‘Europe’s Triple Crisis and the Uneven Role of
Institutions: The Euro, Refugees and Brexit’ (2018) 56 Journal of  Common Market Studies 1345–61.
11   See on this from socio-legal and interdisciplinary perspectives, Dagmar Schiek (ed), The EU Economic and Social
Model in the Global Crisis: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Ashgate 2013); Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone
Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2014); from the perspective of  political economy,
see Peter Hall, ‘Varieties of  Capitalism in Light of  the Euro Crisis’ (2018) 25 Journal of  European Public
Policy 7–30; from the perspective of  political science integration theory, Arne Niemann and Ioannou
Demosthenes, ‘European Economic Integration in Times of  Crisis: A Case of  Neo-Functionalism?’ (2015)
22 Journal of  European Public Policy 1–23. There are a number of  recent expositions of  macro-economic
critique of  the Eurozone law and practice, for example, Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan, ‘Introduction: Is
the European Union Capable of  Integrating Diverse Models of  Capitalism?’ (2018) 23 New Political
Economy 145–59 and further articles in this special issue (guest eds Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan). 
12   See from legal perspectives recently Christina Molinari, ‘The EU and its Perilous Journey through the
Migration Crisis: Informalisation of  the EU Return Policy and Rule of  Law Concerns’ (SSRN 2018)
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171983>; from international human rights perspectives see Rachael
McNeilly, ‘Common European Asylum System: Contradictions and Crises’ (2017) 4 Carleton Review of
International Affairs 54–65; from sociological perspectives, see Nick Dines, Nicola Montagna and Elena
Vacchelli (guest eds), ‘Special Issue: Migration and Crisis in Europe’ (2018) 52 Sociology 439–625; from the
perspective of  political science on both those crises, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘From the Euro to the
Schengen Crises: European Integration Theories, Politicization, and Identity Politics’ (2018) 25 Journal of
European Public Policy 83–108 and Philippe Schmitter and Zoe Lefkofridi, ‘Using Neo-functionalism to
Understand the Disintegration of  Europe’ in Hideko Magara (ed), Policy Change under New Democratic Capitalism
(Routledge 2016) 171–200. 
13   Ben Rosamond, ‘Brexit and the Problem of  European Disintegration’ (2016) 12 Journal of  Contemporary
European Research 865–71.
14   Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of  the Eurozone and
Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States’ (2018) 25 Journal of  European Public
Policy 1194–214.
withdrawal of  a Member State – even a notoriously reluctant one – illustrates that the
individual crises of  the EU add up to more than their sum, and suggest a deeper crisis of
the EU,15 relating to its substantive constitutional aims. If  that is the case, the EU not
only needs to administer the first ever withdrawal of  a Member State in a measured
manner, not impacting more than necessary16 on relations with its stroppy North-
westerly neighbour poised to enhance perceived competitiveness through a deregulation
campaign.17 There is also a necessity of  reacting more fundamentally, and to refocus the
EU on facing the future challenges of  ecological and socio-economic sustainability while
also re-engaging with its citizenry. Since the EU remains a project based on integration
through law,18 the medium and long-term plans for responding to this situation will have
to be grounded in its legal order, without neglecting the societal and political
embeddedness of  law. This special issue tackles this challenge with a focus on the
substantive law of  the EU, asking whether and how the EU should react to Brexit. It does
so based on the idea that it is from the fringes of  the EU that the need for change can
best be observed. Accordingly, the issue assembles authors from Ireland (North and
South), Finland, Poland and the UK (although with origins in Germany and Greece).
Alongside debates on the future of  EU citizenship, and environmental and social policy,
the articles also discuss aspects of  the rule of  law crisis in Poland and perspectives of  the
EU’s break-up for the island of  Ireland. This selection is far from eclectic, as it addresses
core aspects of  the future of  the EU as well as the challenges emanating from its Eastern
and Western fringes. 
The never-ending flood of Brexit literature – socio-legal scholars
Brexit has been a godsend for academia in the UK and beyond, as it created the
opportunity for intensive research and publication activities. As a result, much ground has
been covered already. Nevertheless, we humbly submit that we add to the existing socio-
legal literature. 
Initially, socio-legal reflections were justifiably focused on the consequences that
Brexit will have for the UK, summarising the consequences of  severing the bonds
resulting from more than 40 years of  legal integration. Considering whether the slogan
‘Britain Alone’ could become viable in the twenty-first century,19 the crème of  British and
Irish constitutional and public lawyers delivered the verdict that it would become very
complicated, to say the least, and pose severe constitutional problems. At the same time
the collection reflects on potential causes of  Brexit, identifying the ‘often haughtily
detached decisions’20 of  the CJEU and the ‘Death of  Social Europe’21 as particular
problems. This book does address the substantive law of  the EU, but is mainly focused
on the reflections within the UK prior to and beyond its withdrawal. Similarly, the 2016
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15   This is also indicated by Ben Rosamond, ‘Brexit and the Problem of  European Disintegration’ (2016) 12
Journal of  Contemporary European Research 865–71; Schmitter and Lefkofridi (n 12).
16   As demanded by those supporting the liberal project of  free trade, e.g. Jo Weiler, ‘The Case for a Kinder,
Gentler Brexit’ (2107) 15 International Journal of  Constitutional Law 1–8, 1–4.
17   Thomas Sampson, ‘Brexit: The Economics of  International Disintegration’ (2017) 31 Journal of  Economic
Perspectives 163–83.
18   See the contributions in Daniel Augenstein, ‘Integration through Law’ Revisited: The Making of  the European Polity
(Ashgate 2012). For a critical assessment, see further Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge
University Press 2015).
19   Patrick Birkinshaw and Andrea Biondi (eds), Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of  United Kingdom
Exit from the EU (Kluwer 2016).
20   Maria Kendrick, ‘Judicial Protection and the UK’s Opt Outs: Is Britain Alone in the CJEU?’ in ibid §9.01
21   The title of  Keith Ewing’s chapter in ibid. 
collection of  short sections on Brexit by the European Law Review22 mainly focuses on
consequences for the UK internal order, while identifying that the EU will need to engage
in some fundamental reflection.23 Also, the consequences of  Brexit on Economic and
Monetary Union, alongside the role of  austerity policies triggered by the EU’s handling
of  the Eurozone crisis are reflected upon.24 A 2017 edited collection is explicitly
dedicated to identifying legal and policy challenges in the UK after Brexit, offering a wide-
ranging presentation and analysis of  relevant areas.25 It should be added that all three
publications also expose specific considerations for the UK’s devolved regions: Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.26 The elevated position of  EU citizenship rights, both in the
perception by the EU and UK courts before any referendum was ever announced, and in
the EU negotiation strategy, have been brilliantly analysed by Elspeth Guild, pursuing the
hypothesis that a rights-based conceptualisation of  citizenship must seem as a
monstrosity to those used to the status-based concept of  British nationality. Again, this
book is firmly based on an UK-centred perspective.27 A critical internal perspective is also
taken up in monographic length, but through a series of  short essays in Brexit Time,28
attempting to explain to the legally informed reader ‘what the hell is happening next’.29
Armstrong expands his approach later towards predicting in how far the UK will pursue
the contrasting policies of  regulatory alignment with or diversification from the EU.30
With the Brexit process moving on, socio-legal analysis proceeds as well, starting to
go beyond the focus on the UK itself. Da Costa Cabral et als’ collection of  contributions
by legal, political science and economic scholars31 explores the consequences of  Brexit
for the EU, not the UK. Bongardt and Torres urge the reader to accept Brexit as a reality,
and forgo indulgence in phantasies that it may not happen.32 The main ambition of  this
volume is to predict the pragmatic legal consequences, such as regarding Brexit as a force
majeure in relation to contractual obligations and to pragmatically develop different
scenarios that could play out, such as developing models for social security coordination
with the UK in the future.33 There are also some normative elements, such as demanding
a serious discussion of  which society the EU integration process should promote. 
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22   See the introduction by Jukka Snell, ‘Editorial – Brexit: The Age of  Uncertainty’ (2016) 41 European Law
Review  445–6.
23   Anthony Arnull, ‘Broken Bats’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 473–4.
24   Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Brexit and the Euro Area’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 478–80.
25   Michael Dougan (ed), The UK after Brexit. Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia 2017).
26   See the chapters by Gordon Anthony on Northern Ireland, Stephen Tierney and Katie Boyle on Scotland, and
Mike Varney on Wales in Birkinshaw and Biondi (n 19). See also David Edwards and Niamh Nic Shuibhne,
‘“While Europe’s Eye Is Fix’d on Mighty Things”: Implications of  the Brexit Vote for Scotland’ (2016) 41
European Law Review 481–3, on Scotland, alongside Dougan’s chapter on the Irish border and Hunt’s chapter
on devolution in Dougan (n 25).
27   Elspeth Guild, Brexit and its Consequences for UK and EU Citizenship: Or Monstrous Citizenship (Brill & Nijhoff
2016).
28   Kenneth Armstrong, Brexit Time. Leaving the EU – Why, How and When? (Cambridge University Press 2017).
29   ‘Brexit – What the Hell Is Happening Now?’ is the title of  a journalistic exposure of  the Brexit phenomenon
aimed at a lay audience which has already seen its second edition: Ian Dunt, Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now?
(2nd edn, Canbury Press 2018).
30   Kenneth Armstrong, ‘Regulatory Alignment and Divergence after Brexit’ (2018) 25 Journal of  European
Public Policy 1099–117.
31   Da Costa Cabral et al (n 3).
32   Bongardt and Torres (n 3).
33   Yves Jorens and Grega Strban, ‘New Forms of  Social Security for Persons Moving between the EU and the
UK?’ in da Costa Cabral et al (n 3) 268–313.
Similarly, a 2018 University College London publication34 strives to rethink the future
of  Europe in shorter contributions by legal and political science scholars. Eight chapters
address the consequences of  Brexit for the UK and some other Member States and
dependencies; four confront the future of  the EU institutions; and six address EU
constitutional questions, including how EU citizens will fare in the UK and vice versa, and
the future of  EU democracy. Further chapters attempt to predict the impact of  Brexit on
the euro area, and the EU’s governmentality at large, while three more cover the EU’s
external policies. The three concluding chapters address the idea of  Europe, and thus go
to the ideational future of  the EU. 
Federico Fabbrini’ s 2018 edited collection35 constitutes a combination of  fact-finding
chapters and those pursuing a classical liberal vision of  the future EU. Based on
intergovernmental liberalism, Kalypso Nicolaïdis36 sets the tone in theorising Brexit as
yet another (legitimate) move of  the UK to defend its control in a narrow conservative
sense, a move which ultimately safeguards equilibrium. Catherine Barnard37 carries this
over into the realm of  the Internal Market, scolding the EU for refusing to grant the UK
a permanent exception from applying free movement of  workers while still being part of
the Internal Market. Uwe Puetter38 proposes that the EU reconsiders the institutional
balance, ensuring that the political weights are readjusted in order to achieve the ‘control
and equilibrium’ proposed by Nicolaïdis. Member States, writes Puetter, ‘cannot escape a
paradoxical attitude towards integration, namely that they seek closer integration without
supranational empowerment’,39 rendering Franco-German leadership as demonstrated
during the Euro crisis40 as problematic in the future in the absence of  a British
counterweight. Fabbrini41 adds in his own chapter that the EU should take Brexit as an
opportunity to ‘fix . . . problems’,42 and proposes institutional reforms to enhance the
democratic legitimacy of  the Eurozone alongside the creation of  a Eurozone budget.43
The contribution of this issue
While at first sight it seems a daunting enterprise to endeavour adding anything to this
rich literature, on closer inspection, some gaps emerge. As we have seen, the Brexit debate
is frequently focused on the UK and the future special relationship between this state and
the EU. Even the two collections which, as per their titles, aspire to develop perspectives
for the EU,44 contain a substantive amount of  debate focusing on how the UK can cope
in the end with leaving the EU. While this certainly is very relevant, Bongardt and Torres
refreshingly state a simple truth: ‘Brexit is a priority for the UK. For the EU, it is a major
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34   Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger (eds), Brexit and Beyond. Rethinking the Futures of  Europe (University College
London 2018).
35   Fabbrini (n 2).
36   Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘The Political Mantra: Brexit, Control and the Transformation of  the European Order’ in
Fabbrini (n 2) 25–48.
37   Catherine Barnard, ‘Brexit and the EU Internal Market’ in Fabbrini (n 2) 201–18.
38   Uwe Puetter, ‘Brexit and EU Institutional Balance: How Member States and Institutions Adapt Decision-
making’ in Fabbrini (n 2) 247–66.
39   Ibid 252.
40   Ibid 254.
41   Federico Fabbrini, ‘Brexit and EU Treaty Reform: A Window of  Opportunity for Constitutional Change?’ in
Fabbrini (n 2) 267.
42   Ibid 268.
43   The views on Brexit and Economic and Monetary Union have also been published in Federico Fabbrini,
‘Brexit and the Reform of  Economic and Monetary Union’ in da Costa Cabral et al (n 3) 128–47.
44   Da Costa Cabral et al (n 3); Martill and Staiger (n 34).
and costly distraction from important common challenges.’45 This truth must not,
however, distract from the fact that the UK’s withdrawal must be used as an chance to
improve. Most importantly, the Union should use the opportunity to address popular
discontent with its integration project on the one hand, and on the other hand tackle the
thorny problem of  coordinating policies which cannot stop at geographical borders
through constructive engagement with the UK as a non-integrated close neighbour. 
Both these necessities require engagement with the EU’s substantive policies, rather
than merely addressing institutional and governance issues. Because the EU continues to
be a community of  law, those socio-economic and political challenges should be
addressed in socio-legal categories rather than exclusively as policy issues. The mission of
this special issue is thus highly relevant, and not yet completed in other publications. In
line with the main discontent with the EU, and the major problems which defy
governance within the convenient constraints of  secured borders, three partly interrelated
themes emerge. EU citizenship is the first of  these, followed by social and labour law and
policy, and by realising environmental protection. Over all three of  these themes, tensions
between EU-wide rights guarantees and legal frames of  integration on the one hand and
regional policies and national closure movements on the other emerge. These tensions are
epitomised by the EU’s rule of  law crisis and the challenges of  maintaining hybrid
territories and identities on the island of  Ireland after Brexit. 
Three articles engage with EU citizenship: as no other institutions, its introduction
evoked the question of  whether the peoples of  Europe – the category referred to in
Article 2(1) TEU – identify with the Union, and whether any such identification is
justified by the granting of  stable, consistent and reliable rights. 
Stephen Coutts asks which possible avenues for the future direction of  Union
citizenship remain open after the UK’s withdrawal, inter alia, on the grounds that ‘citizens
of  nowhere’ (Theresa May) were no longer countenanced. Instead of  focusing on the
individual fates of  the many citizens who relied on citizenship rights and moved to the
UK, the article asks the question whether Union citizenship as an additional category to
national citizenship is viable or rather contradicts ‘certain forms of  national social life’. It
contrasts communitarian with cosmopolitan citizenship concepts, finding that this
outworn dichotomy does little to resolve the dilemmas of  a multidimensional concept
such as Union citizenship. He finds the dichotomy to be useful in so far as it illuminates
the danger of  Union citizenship being of  use only for the privileged few.
Counterintuitively, he concludes that more rather than less citizenship will be needed to
overcome its social hollowness and inherent threat to national citizenship as an
institution. 
Massimo Fichera uses citizenship and free movement rights of  economically active
citizens as a case study for his hypothesis that the EU is fundamentally a security project.
In his conceptual definition of  security, the concept embraces the existential identity of
a polity. Guaranteeing the rule of  law, democracy and human rights thus become pure
instruments to safeguarding semantic, spatial, temporal and epistemic dimensions of
security. Applying these categories to the specific problems of  Union citizenship, Fichera
concludes that the EU as a security project requires differentiated integration. Extending
the options available under the concentric circles paradigm would in his view prevent
further disintegration as epitomised by Brexit. However, the challenge remains as to how
to ensure that differentiation does ‘not come at the expense of  the economic and social
constitution’, and in particular not at the expense of  social rights.
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45   Bongardt and Torres (n 3) 121.
Konstanze von Papp takes up the challenges of  also guaranteeing social citizenship
rights for those citizens who are frequently accused of  ‘benefit tourism’, a concept whose
empirical validity she rejects. Nevertheless, she recognises that Member States may find
difficulty in integrating EU citizens who are ‘economically inactive’ when they enter their
territory. She frames the question under which circumstances EU citizens from other
Member States must be granted equal treatment rights in relation to benefits as one of
federalism. This leads her to an extensive comparison of  case law (and legislation) in the
USA and the EU around the free movement rights of  the poor. This leads her to criticise
the much-debated Dano judgment of  the CJEU from a new angle. Concluding that there
is, indeed, the potential of  transnational solidarity in the EU, even in the alleged absence
of  a European ‘demos’, she nevertheless explores limits of  transnational financial
solidarity, concluding that EU-level ‘social engagement’ is required to overcome the
economic hurdles against integration of  poor movers. 
This line of  argument leads to the next theme, EU social and labour policy, which is
discussed in two articles. Konstantinos Alexandris Polomarkakis discusses the question of
whether the removal of  the UK as a veto player in social policy must be viewed as the
silver lining of  the Brexit cloud. Applying Tsebelis’ analytical framework, he explores the
UK’s veto player role in detail, distinguishing ideological, party policy-related and
Eurosceptic reasons for using a veto. Unsurprisingly, he comes to the conclusion that
there may well be other Member States stepping into the void left by the British veto.
Specifying his examination in relation to the diverse elements pursued under the Social
Pillar implementation, he comes to a sobering conclusion. On the positive side, he does
not find the same level of  ideologically supported social policy veto in other Member
States. However, states as different as Hungary, France and Germany are viewed as having
good reasons to veto some social policy measures on the basis of  party policy or
Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, the conclusion is cautiously optimistic in favour of  a slow
and steady realisation of  the Social Pillar, as long as abrupt changes of  national social
policy are not required of  Member States.
Łukasz Pisarczyk takes up the challenge of  discussing the future of  EU labour and
employment law from the perspective of  Poland as an Eastern EU country. His question
is similar to that asked by Polomarkakis: will social policy accelerate post-Brexit? His
prediction is that the Eastern Member States may well step into the alleged void left by
the UK as a veto player. In his view, this is due to the political perception of  comparative
(economic) advantage in these countries: often, the lower costs of  labour are still
perceived as decisive for remaining competitive. This, in turn, can lead to a reluctance to
embrace EU social standards which require change at national level. However, he also
notes that, as a result of  free movement rights for Polish workers, the government has
felt compelled to promote the return of  those highly skilled workers who were the first
to find better pastures in other EU countries. Among other strategies, the improvement
of  central employment conditions, such as the level of  the minimum wage at national
level, has been used to achieve that goal. Brexit may be perceived as a blessing in disguise
in this situation as Polish workers in the UK may no longer feel welcome there and
consider returning to Poland, while also weighing other options. 
Roderic O’Gorman discusses the challenges of  environmental protection through EU
law and policy post-Brexit. As pollution and other environmental problems do not tend
to stop at geographical borders, this is an area where the EU will be challenged to find a
new relationship with the UK which prevents undercutting of  standards and
transnational import of  environmental problems. Preferably, that regime would be as
efficient as EU membership itself  – but this option seems excluded. O’Gorman carefully
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develops the relevance of  oft-rehearsed relationship models such as ‘Swiss’, ‘Norwegian’,
Customs Union-only, and existing Association Agreements with neighbouring and other
non-EU countries. After duly highlighting the complex legal problems, he suggests that
an Association Agreement modelled upon the deep and comprehensive free trade
agreements with neighbourhood countries offers the best perspective of  respecting the
UK’s ‘red lines’ while not requiring the EU Member States to endure unregulated
pollution through water, air and land. The conclusion is bleak in that we must recognise
that no alternative to EU membership allows the same level of  protection as EU
membership itself. 
The last two articles in the issue take up the specific issue arising at the fringes of  the
EU in the wake of  Brexit. Robert Grzeszczak and Stephen Terrett explore the EU’s role
in policing the rule of  law, reflecting on the current Article 7(1) TEU procedure pending
against Poland. Maintaining functioning rule of  law institutions in Member States may
not appear immediately related to Brexit. However, as the Brexit vote has been viewed as
one expression of  right-wing populism’s successes, the connection is not at all far-
fetched. The dismantling of  judicial protection, and thus the precondition of  the
protection of  rights, seems eerily reminiscent of  one of  the UK government’s red lines
relating to judicial protection. Grzeszczak and Terrett argue that the current legal
framework for protecting the rule of  law in existing Member States is insufficient due to
structural inability of  the EU institutions to engage effectively with the threat to limit
membership rights. They illustrate their claim through a detailed account of  how the
Polish government has ‘debilitated’ the Polish Constitutional Court, concluding slightly
depressingly that the only hope is that, while the EU ‘waits the problem out’, Polish civil
society manages to challenge the government effectively. 
Dagmar Schiek takes up a problem at the Western fringe of  the EU, where Brexit is
discussed as a ‘border problem’ on the island of  Ireland, with additional challenges to the
protection of  human rights and equality rights. She challenges this perspective, identifying
instead that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will hinder the hybridity of  identities and
territories on the island of  Ireland. Further, the focus on avoiding physical infrastructure
at the border overlooks the preconditions for socio-economic improvement in the lives
of  people in Northern Ireland, which depend on functioning legal frames for economic
and civic cooperation. Those rely on maintaining the direct effects of  EU economic
freedoms and citizenship rights. Identifying that the Protocol on Ireland/Northern
Ireland does not maintain all the economic freedoms, and relegates the citizenship rights
to the Common Travel Area, she concludes that the EU Commission, in focusing on the
physical infrastructure on the border and the formula of  ‘no diminution of  rights’, has
offered to give up the indivisibility of  the Internal Market for Northern Ireland alone.
This has not only reinforced the demand of  the UK to be allowed membership in the
Internal Market without free movement of  persons, but also does not satisfy the needs
of  Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
In debating the demands of  Brexit for the EU, a common thread of  the special issue has
emerged. Maintaining the EU’s social legitimacy requires taking citizenship rights as
seriously as the realisation of  the Pillar of  Social Rights. EU citizenship rights so far
encompass free movement of  workers underpinned by equal treatment rights – a concept
that today is challenged even by academics who have based their careers on defending it
prior to Brexit. Areas as different as environmental protection, rule of  law and the
situation on the island of  Ireland further underline the importance of  maintaining judicial
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enforceability of  EU rights after Brexit. From socio-legal perspectives, all this sounds like
squaring a number of  circles. On a positive note, this offers extensive opportunities for
socio-legal research, not only up to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, but also beyond
this point in relation to redefining citizenship rights, as well as social dimensions of
economic freedoms, the safeguarding of  efficient environmental protection and social
and employment rights in the post-Brexit EU. 
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Abstract
This article seeks to determine the extent to which the communitarian form of  life expressed in the Brexit
vote is compatible with Union citizenship. It is argued that, amongst other things, Brexit expressed a desire
for a communitarian form of  life, broadly speaking. Union citizenship is presented as a constitutionalised
transnational status embodying values of  integration and autonomy and displaying certain cosmopolitan
features. Union citizenship thus conceived poses problems for a communitarian political community as
expressed in Brexit. The conclusion reflects on broader global trends in citizenship and on possible avenues
for the future direction of  Union citizenship. 
Keywords: Union citizenship; communitarianism; Brexit; immigration; cosmopolitanism;
citizenship; integration; autonomy; transnational
The issue of  citizens’ rights is to form one of  the three pillars of  the Brexit withdrawalagreement. Without a doubt, it is one of  the more difficult and sensitive issues to be
dealt with during the Article 50 negotiations, and one with real human significance. At the
current stage in the negotiations it would appear that some form of  ‘settled status’ will be
available to the 3 million non-UK EU nationals resident in the UK and the 1.3 million UK
nationals resident in the remaining 27 Member States. However, as with the withdrawal
agreement more generally, contentious institutional questions, including above all the role
of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU in policing the withdrawal agreement and the situation
of  such ‘legacy citizens’, remain to be resolved.1
The purpose of  this article is not to address the precise situation and possible
solutions for individuals that might be advanced and eventually adopted during the
Article 50 negotiations.2 Its purpose is to take a somewhat broader perspective and to
view Union citizenship, its past development and its current shape through the prism of
Brexit; to use Brexit and the underlying political and quasi-philosophical fault-lines it
reveals to reflect on the nature of  Union citizenship and whether it is or can be made
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compatible with certain forms of  national social life. The argument is that Brexit reflects
in part a desire for a particular form of  social life, communitarian and rooted with a
socially constituted individual at its heart. This traditional, if  not nostalgic view of  the
community, has been undermined and hollowed out in recent years. Moreover, another
figure has arisen in the popular imagination and is presented as the antithesis of  the
rooted individual that emerges from this communitarian-styled community; the rootless
cosmopolitan. Union citizenship can be said to both represent and contribute towards
both of  these developments – the hollowing of  national citizenship on the one hand and
the rise of  the cosmopolitan as a threatening alternative on the other. Thus the article
presents the manner in which Union citizenship can be said to epitomise at least some of
the concerns at play in Brexit. These negative consequences of  Brexit and in particular
the characterisation (if  not caricaturisation) of  EU citizenship as a ‘bad’ cosmopolitan
citizenship flow from its overly transnational and market-based character.
The paper shall proceed in the following steps. Firstly, I will outline the political–
philosophical view of  society and the individual that appears to be revealed in Brexit,
namely communitarianism, arguing that Brexit constituted, amongst other things, a
rejection of  cosmopolitanism or at least an expression of  a communitarian preference.
Secondly, I will outline the manner in which Union citizenship can be conceived as having
cosmopolitan features, addressing the core characteristics of  Union citizenship. It is
important here to point out that Union citizenship differs from cosmopolitan citizenship,
but nonetheless does display some cosmopolitan features. In the third and fourth sections
I will argue that Union citizenship played into the Brexit debate and ultimately the Brexit
vote. Section three will address the perception that Union citizenship undermined key
elements of  the solidaristic national community. Section four will argue that the
incompatibility between Union citizenship and the forms of  life epitomised in a closed
solidaristic community is not only of  a political or practical kind but also of  a conceptual
kind, with the rootless, cosmopolitan, rights-bearing and unencumbered Union citizen
presented as the antithesis of  the rooted, encumbered, socially constituted citizen located
in a bounded national community. Brexit in a sense therefore constitutes the most acute
manifestation of  a broader phenomenon of  national retrenchment in the face of
globalising tendencies, in the field of  citizenship and community as much as in other
dimensions of  social and economic life. It will be argued that within citizenship today
there are two parallel developments; the hollowing of  national citizenship and the rise of
the cosmopolitan citizen, both of  which played a background role in Brexit. Union
citizenship can be said to be both the expression of, and have contributed to, these
developments. A conclusion will locate this analysis in current global trends in citizenship
underlining the questions that Brexit poses for Union citizenship today. 
Union citizenship is a largely judicial construction, developed over time by a
supranational court in the absence of  significant popular demand.3 As signs of  a political
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backlash emerge, and the Court of  Justice adjusts its jurisprudence accordingly,4 it is
necessary to connect the legal and judicial construction of  Union citizenship with
political realities and reflect on its relationship with broader socio-political trends in the
Union. This article therefore adopts a socio-legal approach in a broader sense, attempting
to analyse the relationship between a particular legal construction and the form of  life it
represents and a particular socio-political phenomenon, namely Brexit. 
A citizen of somewhere: Brexit and the communitarian ideal
Brexit means many things to many people and is the result of  a myriad of  different social,
economic and political forces. Above all it is perhaps a result of  a deep and pervasive
insecurity understood in its broadest sense. Foremost is surely the economic dislocation
in the new international political economy of  growing inequality, reduced economic
security and an undermining of  the traditional welfare state, all of  which have been
radically exacerbated by the recent economic crisis and the subsequent politics of
austerity it introduced.5 The result is an increasing feeling of  insecurity amongst citizens
and downgrading of  the status of  modern Marshallian social citizenship.6 This trend
must also be placed in the context of  a worldwide crisis in representative democracy.
Peter Mair in a prophetic essay, published posthumously in 2013, noted the increasing
distance between political elites and in particular their institutional form – the political
party – and the public at large.7 The rejection of  the political establishment in the Brexit
referendum can plausibly be linked to this broader, longer-term political trend, and indeed
within this there is a special role for the EU in this hollowing-out of  political space.8
Finally, from the historical perspective of  European integration, it should be noted that
the UK has always been a somewhat reluctant partner in the EU. Its reasons for joining
the Union have always been pragmatic and rather transactional in nature, a characteristic
contributing towards the absence of  British citizens’ identification with and support for
the European project.9
There are therefore no doubt many social, economic, historical and political causes of
Brexit. There is another reason for Brexit, on which this article will focus. Brexit also
perhaps represented an appeal for a return to a particular, more traditional form of  social
life of  stable social structures and closer bonds of  community, a form of  life that is
threatened intensely by the forces of  economic and social dislocation that have been
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unleashed by globalisation and recent decades of  a liberal political economy and one with
which, rightly or wrongly, the EU has tended to find itself  associated.10 In reaction to
Brexit, a number of  sociologists situated Brexit in the context of  globalisation and the
financialisation of  the UK economy and the significant economic and social disruption
this has entailed. Brexit was, in their view, a reaction to this trend, which had generated a
degree of  frustration and alienation amongst significant sections of  the population who
had failed to benefit from these economic transformations.11 Social and cultural
transformations also figured in this general sense of  alienation and frustration, and
reasons to do with immigration as well as economic well-being ranked as the most
important reasons leave voters cited as motivating their choice.12 It is important to note
that it is the perception of  immigration and the threat it poses to the social fabric that is
important rather than the reality. Thus, how the manner is presented by political elites and
by the media is perhaps as important as the empirical reality of  migration and attendant
frustrations. Above all Brexit is presented as a rejection of  a new national narrative
fashioned by political elites over the past 20 years of  a global, cosmopolitan Britain at
home with economic globalisation abroad and multiculturalism at home. As put by
Calhoun:
Brexit was manifestly a vote against multiculturalism and for English nationalism.
A large part of  the British population felt as though their country was slipping
away from them . . . [this] also reflected globalisation, immigration, international
conflict and perhaps above all economic transformation. And the Brexit vote
made clear that the cosmopolitan elites who shaped the new Britain failed to
generate a new narrative, a new national self-understanding to make sense of  the
changes and membership in the transformed country.13
In philosophical terms Brexit could be said to be a reaffirmation of  a rooted or closed
community in which the individual is embedded in social structures that form and give
meaning to his or her life. This is a gradually changing community, whose norms and
values arise organically over time, reflecting a form of  Burkean conservatism.14 There is
a solidity and sociality to this form of  life that is linked to a tightly woven and rooted
community giving rise to national and intergenerational solidarity. Values are transmitted
and evolve over time in a quasi-organic fashion establishing social links and a collective
sense amongst the community at large.15
This vision of  Britain, while not radically nationalist in a narrow, ethnic and rigidly
exclusionary sense, is nationalist in the broader, liberal sense16 depicted by Anderson17
and advocated by Miller.18 This is the nation as ‘an imagined community’19 in which
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members feel a natural affinity with other members and with the community as a whole
and who are bonded by certain core, shared characteristics which are moreover known to
be shared by other members, hence giving rise to an interpersonal sense of  reflexive
identity.20 Together these shared characteristics and collective, reflexive identity constitute
a shared normative, social universe for these individuals, generating a sense of  identity-
security and interpersonal bonds that can in turn provide the foundations for
interpersonal trust21 allowing the creation of  a political community and a community of
solidarity. 
Two aspects of  this form of  community need to be highlighted to understand the
impact of  Union citizenship on Brexit; its bounded nature and its link with solidaristic
communities on which the modern welfare state has been founded. Firstly, such
communities are generally conceived as being necessarily bounded and limited to insiders,
with a clear distinction being drawn between insiders and outsiders.22 Trust implies a
sense of  identification with others, which in turn is generally based on ongoing
interactions and/or a sense of  shared characteristics.23 Identity – a we-feeling – is
necessarily juxtaposed to alterity – the others. 
Secondly, membership and the bonds of  allegiance that it sustains are key to
maintaining the relationship of  collective solidarity that underpins national welfare
systems for both practical and political reasons. This is solidarity in the ‘communitarian’
sense as outlined by de Witte; solidarity as ‘the normative texture of  a society; [it
expresses] the moral commitments binding a certain group of  people in a certain place in
time on a certain territory’.24 It is ‘both social and relational and speaks to the
commitments between citizens who are engaged in the creation, elaboration and
reproduction of  a certain community that reflects communal norms, values and modes
of  interaction’.25 Philosophically, redistribution of  wealth is justified by common
membership of  society and hence some form of  common ownership over the goods
produced by that society.26 There are difficulties in extending solidarity towards
individuals not forming part of  the national community, as constructed by centralised
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state institutions during the twentieth century.27 As put by Ferrera, ‘[b]oundaries are
essential for constructing special purpose communities ready to share risk’.28
These aspects of  the community ideal, epitomised in the reaction to Brexit and the
post-Brexit turn in British politics, have been challenged by Union citizenship in a
practical manner but also in a broader conceptual sense. For, if  Brexit is supposed to be
an affirmation of  the ‘citizen of  somewhere’, the rooted, bounded citizen, socially
constituted and allowing for social and political bonds amongst membership, Union
citizenship represents perhaps its antithesis – the cosmopolitan citizen.29 While there a
myriad of  reasons for Brexit, some of  which were explored above, the remainder of  this
article will highlight this particular aspect of  Brexit; the affirmation of  a communitarian
ideal in opposition to the EU and perhaps to globalised modernity in general. Brexit, in
this view provides us with the opportunity, and indeed necessity, to reflect on the
compatibility of  the Union and especially Union citizenship with the form of  life
expressed in this ideal. 
Citizens of elsewhere and everywhere: the cosmopolitan face of Union citizenship
Union citizenship is primarily a transnational citizenship. If  citizenship is a status that
confers rights upon individuals, the rights that are associated with Union citizenship are
generally exercised not against the Union as a whole but rather vis-à-vis other Member
States. The rights are to equal treatment and free movement. These do not per se generate
specific substantive rights guaranteed at a Union level. Rather they ensure that rights
created under national law are extended to certain categories of  non-nationals, primarily
Union citizens. They are ‘national rights guaranteed by supranational law’.30 The
supranational dimension to Union citizenship, namely citizenship of  the Union itself,
generating substantive, independent rights exercisable or guaranteed by Union law, while
certainly emerging in recent years, remains in an embryonic stage.31
The two core transnational rights contained in Union citizenship, namely freedom of
movement and non-discrimination, give rise in turn to two separate dimensions of  Union
citizenship, namely citizenship as a status of  integration and citizenship as a status of
autonomy. These two dimensions – at times complementary, at times in tension – in turn
reflect different elements of  Union citizenship.
CITIZENS OF ELSEWHERE: UNION CITIZENSHIP AS A STATUS OF INTEGRATION
Union citizenship is best known for being a status of  integration.32 Through the
operation of  the principle of  non-discrimination on the basis of  nationality, Union
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citizenship allows individuals to move to and to integrate within societies of  other
Member States. The principle of  integration interacts with the principle of  non-
discrimination and equal treatment in a dual sense. On the one hand integration is seen
as the goal of  the rights of  equal treatment found in the Citizenship Directive and in the
case law of  the Court of  Justice. On the other hand, further rights and a greater degree
of  equal treatment are seen as a reward in some sense for a degree of  integration in the
host Member State.33 It is therefore a progressive status with an initial right of  residence
and (limited) equal treatment providing a seed of  integration which in turn feeds back and
strengthens the legal position of  the individual the longer his or her residence has lasted
and the extent to which he or she is integrated.34 The effect of  this, as Kostakopoulou
has pointed out, is to render the borders of  national communities within the Union more
porous and open to others.35 It challenges the exclusivity of  national communities and
opens them to nationals of  other Member States. Strumia in turn identifies a ‘mutual
recognition of  belonging’ as lying at the core of  Union citizenship.36 There is a
presumption of  belonging elsewhere inherent in Union citizenship, a presumption that
can become a reality in light of  equal treatment and social integration.37
A CITIZEN OF EVERYWHERE: UNION CITIZENSHIP AS A STATUS OF AUTONOMY
But there is another side to Union citizenship, one that reflects the second part of  Union
citizenship: free movement. For, if  Union citizenship grants rights for individuals to settle
and become in a certain sense members of  a host society, to become quasi-nationals, it
also provides another set of  rights; not to settle and make a life within another host
society within the EU but rather to move around the Union, to build one’s life across a
number of  Member States and in a number of  places.38
In particular, a number of  cases of  Union citizenship associated with the principle of
free movement emphasise the right to move around the Union, to enjoy rights and
moreover to carry rights acquired in one Member State to another or back to one’s
original Member State. These vested or acquired rights,39 passportable throughout the
Union, reflect a broader overarching right; the right to build one’s life in different
Member States and carry that life throughout the Union. Judgments of  the Court of
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Justice in relation to family reunification40 and in relation to civil status, in particular the
right to carry one’s name,41 throughout the Union clearly reflect this logic, allowing
individuals who have acquired certain rights (to family reunification or to have one’s name
recognised in a particular format) in one Member State to be recognised in other Member
States, including one’s home Member State. In legislation, Regulation 883/2004/EU on
the coordination of  social security42 also reflects this image of  a citizen on the move,
carrying with him or her the rights, here financial, acquired in particular Member States. 
Union citizenship is in this sense ‘a bundle of  options within a physically broadened
and functionally more differentiated space’.43 The individual is thus an individual
characterised by choice and autonomy and is provided with a series of  life opportunities
across a broader geographic space. It is not the individual who settles and builds a life
among a particular defined community, integrating within that community, adopting its
norms and forming ties towards other individuals within that space. Rather it is the free,
liberal and autonomous individual moving around, independent from societal ties. 
The result of  the two dimensions of  this transnational citizenship is to render Union
citizenship into something quite unique in the world today; a form of  post-national44
citizenship displaying certain cosmopolitan features.45 Union citizenship is post-national
in the sense that it is explicitly not tied to any pre-political forms of  (national)
identification, be they in political, cultural or ethnic terms. In fact, the rejection of  a
substantial or thick supranational dimension to Union citizenship is precisely a rejection
of  a refounding of  national citizenship at a Union level and an acknowledgment perhaps
that a federal ‘people’ as such does not exist at a Union level. Rather what is at stake in
Union citizenship is the right of  individuals to move beyond their home state, to enjoy a
constitutionally protected status of  quasi-insider in other states, namely a right to belong
‘elsewhere’.46 However, the cosmopolitan characteristics of  Union citizenship are
broader and reflect not just individuals who wish to make their lives in another society,
but who wish to make their lives across different societies and perhaps in none and to
have that choice recognised by states and other authorities: that is to belong everywhere47
– to exist within a broader multiplicity of  political communities and to a certain extent to
belong to all of  them and to none. 
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It is important to point out that, while Union citizenship displays features of
cosmopolitan citizenship, it is not itself  a form of  cosmopolitan citizenship.
Cosmopolitan citizenship entails a particular normative ideal, founded on a principle of
liberal equality amongst individuals operating at a global level.48 The cosmopolitan citizen
therefore represents an ideal of  the individual existing in a global political or normative
society.49 Two distinctions between this and Union citizenship can be identified. Firstly,
while Union citizenship does contain free movement and equal treatment at its heart,
these are a consequence of  its origins in a transnational, constitutionalised market.50
Thus, while Union citizenship displays features of  cosmopolitan citizenship, these are
merely incidental to its transnational market origins rather than any cosmopolitan ideal of
a global society. Secondly, in addition to being an outgrowth of  the internal market,
Union citizenship has been used as a vehicle for the construction of  a specifically
European identity51 and carries with it its own boundaries and exclusions. At best, Union
citizenship represents a status with certain features of  cosmopolitan citizenship that
nonetheless remains bounded in space and as a community. 
Citizens of nowhere: Union citizenship in the Brexit debate
Both dimensions of  Union citizenship played a part in the Brexit phenomena, at different
levels. On the one hand, Union citizenship and Union citizens – and in particular their
rights to social services and social assistance – appear within the migration debate which
seems to have been a major factor in the ‘No’ result on 23 June 2016.52 On the other
hand, it is argued that Union citizenship also reflects a related but broader opposition to
what might be termed ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’, which in a certain sense is epitomised
in the philosophy of  Union citizenship.53
THE HOLLOWING-OUT OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: UNION CITIZENSHIP
IN THE MIGRATION DEBATE
On a practical but an extremely important level, Union citizenship and the immigration
associated with it played an important role in the Brexit debate and the ultimate ‘No’
result on 23 June 2016. While in a certain sense this is a classic migration debate, with the
usual concerns regarding social cohesion and welfare tourism, Union citizenship is
perhaps particularly problematic from the classic national or communitarian position that
appeared to animate much of  the anti-immigrant debate in the UK. Union citizenship can
be seen as a migration status, and indeed in its integration dimension this is perhaps
appropriate. However, if  it is a migration status it is one that is remarkably extensive in
terms of  rights and more legally entrenched than almost any other immigration status. 
Firstly, Union citizens enjoy a status that comes close to that of  nationals with an
extraordinarily broad range of  rights. There is a general right to enter visa-free extended
to all Union citizens and a basic right of  residence, condition-free initially and
subsequently subject to limited financial or work-related conditions. Once legally resident
Union citizens enjoy extensive rights to equal treatment across all areas that ‘fall within
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the scope of  the Treaties’ a scope that in turn (in a rather circular manner) can be defined
in terms of  free movement.54 All workers have rights to social assistance and other social
benefits. In the 1990s and early 2000s these rights were extended to non-economically
active individuals (subject to certain conditions),55 obliging Member States to extend a
certain degree of  solidarity to needy Union citizens from other Member States. This
extension of  social assistance rights in particular entailed the rendering of  boundaries
between national communities of  solidarity more porous and subject to penetration.
Finally, and not unimportantly, these rights are extended to family members, even those
who are not already resident in the Union, opening these rights to a potentially much
greater group of  individuals and opening Union citizenship to accusations of  abuse.56 In
more recent years, the Court of  Justice has been engaged in a process of  reasserting
national boundaries in this area, especially in the field of  social assistance to economically
inactive migrant Union citizens. In a series of  cases57 it has significantly limited the rights
enjoyed by the non-economically active to access social benefits, allowing Member States
to apply criteria of  lawful residence to filter access to social benefits, where lawful
residence is defined as residence on the basis of  economic activity or self-sufficiency.
While this move has certainly been in reaction to the broader political context of
resistance and growing public frustration with perceived problems of  EU migration,58 it
is evident this late turn in the Court’s jurisprudence has not been sufficient to alter the
public narrative on Union citizens. In any event, even with the rights of  non-economically
active Union citizens restricted, the fact remains that the thresholds of  economic activity
remain low and once exercising an economic activity or even a (relatively low) degree of
economic self-sufficiency, Union citizenship offers an impressive status in terms of  the
range of  rights and their constitutional quality. 
Member States are obliged to extend a wide range of  rights to non-citizens, in this
case Union citizens and their families, individuals who are not part of  the national
community. The result is a certain denationalisation of  the rights of  citizenship on the
one hand and a devalorisation of  citizenship as a status on the other hand. Prevented
from delimiting the social rights on the basis of  nationality early in the history of  the
Union, Member States increasingly used residency as an alternative criteria on the basis
of  which to allocate rights to individuals.59 The result, as pointed out by Davies in the
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context of  the EU, is a replacement of  nationality with residence as the basis for
allocating rights, including rights to social benefits.60 Thus thicker social bonds founded
on the notion of  community bonds, which, as pointed out above, are essential for the
political and normative justification for welfare states and social citizenship, are replaced
with a temporary and transient criteria for membership and extension of  rights and
responsibilities between individuals.61 It is questionable whether mere ‘being here’ is
sufficient to provide the deep bonds of  community necessary for the underpinning of
national welfare programmes.62 It can be argued that the Court of  Justice (and indeed the
legislature) has tried to balance this by introducing the principle of  integration, seeking to
ensure that, while national communities remain open to Union citizens, extending
financial solidarity can be conditioned by that citizen demonstrating some level of
belonging with the host Member State.63 However, this has been difficult to apply in
practice and conditioned by the operation of  the proportionality principle.64
In turn (national) citizenship is devalorised; the range of  rights that are distinct to the
status of  nationals is shrunk significantly, especially in the social realm.65 Citizenship as a
membership status carrying with it some kind set of  rights, exclusive to the members of
that community, is undermined. Citizenship no longer carries with it significant added
value, on top of  the status of  Union citizen. Firstly, human rights and civil rights, and now
social rights and rights to social assistance, have been extended beyond the community of
national citizens.66 There is a strong argument to be made that national citizenship only
matters now in the political realm.67
However, it is not only the substance of  Union citizenship and the rights it is
associated with that are important in the impact of  Union citizenship on the Brexit
debate; it is also the constitutional nature or form of  Union citizenship. For Union
citizenship is a constitutionally guaranteed status that escapes control of  national
governments and actors. Migration rights are typically something in the gift of  the state
and are an area of  maximum state discretion.68 Although arguable, there is no legal right
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to migrate.69 An individual’s presence and the extent of  the rights he or she enjoys in any
particular state are something to be determined by that state. Union citizenship escapes
this logic and thus escapes control by the Member State. A classic distinction made
between citizens – governed by a system of  rights and whose status is guaranteed – and
foreigners – governed by a system of  privileges and existing in a space of  state discretion
– is eliminated in the context of  Union citizenship.70 Union citizens, simply put, enjoy a
rights-based status, constitutionally guaranteed by a supranational legal order that enjoys
primacy over national law. 
Union citizenship therefore also involves a significant loss of  sovereignty on the part
of  Member States in relation to their immigration policy,71 a point that could not have
been more salient in the context of  the Brexit debates (think ‘take back control’ of  both
migration and of  sovereignty).72 Moreover, it is a status the rights of  which have been
substantially fleshed out, not by the legislature (although this has certainly played its
part)73 but by a judicial actor: the Court of  Justice. This is not an irrelevant detail in the
context of  Brexit. Sovereignty has always been a concern of  the UK in relation to
European developments. However, the nature of  that concern has shifted. Gee and
Young have described how, in contrast to the initial debate concerning the entry of  the
UK into the then European Economic Community, which focused on parliamentary
sovereignty, discussions of  sovereignty in the Brexit debate tended to concern judicial
sovereignty (both in relation to the Court of  Justice, and it must also be said, the
European Court of  Human Rights).74
Citizens of nowhere: Union citizenship as a cosmopolitan figure
However, the antipathy between Union citizenship and the communitarian ideal
epitomised in Brexit goes further than the role played by Union citizenship as a
supercharged status of  migration, with all the problems that poses for the coherence of
national communities of  solidarity and welfare and its denationalising and devalorising
impact on national citizenship. There is a deeper conceptual incoherence between the
form of  life epitomised by Union citizenship and the form of  life reflected in the Brexit
debate. In contrast to the rooted, socially constructed citizenship, embedded in a
community of  values and of  trust, in which membership has an inherent and constituent
value for individuals, Union citizenship can be said to represent a cosmopolitan figure and
symbolises the fears and insecurities reflected in the choice of  Brexit. This, however, is
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not the positive, idealised version of  cosmopolitan citizenship of  the stoics, the citizen of
the world that is at home and welcome everywhere. Rather it is the denuded, rootless
cosmopolitan detached from the national community and, moreover, that undermines the
national community;75 Theresa May’s ‘citizens of  nowhere’. In this caricature, Union
citizenship is rootless, instrumental, individualistic and exclusive. 
Union citizenship in this sense is seen as a disembedded citizenship; it is rootless. It is
not founded in any particular community at a supranational level and, moreover,
deliberately seeks to avoid integration or assimilation in any national community, be it the
home national community or the host national community. It is liberal and individualistic.
It is the individual of  autonomous choice, who is self-constituting and who is capable of
making use of  the myriad of  opportunities offered by Union citizenship throughout the
Union. Note, for example, the use made by the Garcia Avello family not to seek equal
treatment with Belgian children in Belgium, but rather to seek different treatment to avoid
national regulations and national norms in relation to naming; to seek some form of
special and individualised treatment on the basis of  their transnational life.76 Interestingly,
the Belgian government argued that equal treatment was necessary in such a case to ensure
integration: an argument that was rejected by the Court of  Justice, which preferred to
privilege the choice made by the Garcia Avello parents in how they wished their children’s
names to be registered. See also the attempt made by Ms Sayn-Wittgenstein to avoid
national constitutional norms relating to the use of  noble titles in Austria, seeking to
ensure both the use of  her chosen name and the pursuit of  her cross-border business.77
It should be pointed out that there is a countervailing tendency in the jurisprudence
of  the Court of  Justice to stress the social integration dimension of  Union citizenship
explored in the previous section. It is certainly true that these two aspects of  Union
citizenship are at times in tension with an emphasis on personal freedom and autonomy
that is resistance to the locking-in of  individuals in any particular national communities.
More recent cases have seen an attempt by the court to reconcile these two dimensions;
allowing the mutual recognition of  acquired rights but only after an initial period of
‘genuine residence’ in the state in which those rights are acquired.78 The concern is to
avoid forum-shopping, with individuals moving briefly to other Member States to acquire
rights and insisting they be recognised upon their return to their home Member States. 
However, these very cases – whereby individuals sought to acquire rights in other
Member States in the absence of  integration – point to the second and perhaps more
troubling aspect of  Union citizenship that is to some extent built into its DNA and one
that displaces any attempt to build a sense of  community, let alone political community
attached to it; its instrumental quality. Union citizenship, having developed from the
internal market and the market freedoms associated with it, has, since its inception, been
accused of  being a ‘market citizenship’, one in which individuals were seen merely as
factors of  production (and also consumption) to be put in the service of  the construction
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of  the internal market. Union citizenship is still a status that is conditioned79 primarily by
economic activity and, moreover, its benefits are offered to those who are willing to move
and make use of  the economic opportunities offered by Brexit. In another, more
subjective sense, Union citizenship is seen as instrumental: the holders of  Union
citizenship as a status may not necessarily see it as inherently valuable as a form of
membership in a political community but rather see it simply as a bundle of  rights to be
used to advance private interests. 
And, indeed, the interests promoted and protected by Union citizenship are precisely
that: private and individual. The Union citizen is an inherently individualist character and
the rights he or she deploys – to work, to study to participate as a service provider or
consumer – are all related, if  no longer to the market, certainly to the private sphere.
Union citizenship is a status which enables its users to advance personal life plans, only
now across the Union and the various possibilities it offers. It is a private and rights-based
citizenship.80 By contrast, it is not a political or public citizenship, seeking to link
individuals to a broader group which can collectively exercise power. The identity and
political dimensions of  Union citizenship are notoriously underdeveloped from a
sociological, institutional and legal point of  view.
Finally, not only is the Union citizen a rootless, individualist character – in the words
of  Everson ‘instrumental’ and ‘instrumentalised’81 – intensely private and mostly devoid
of  a public dimension, but Union citizenship is a status that is instrumental and useful for
a distinctly privileged section of  society. The benefits accruing from Union citizenship
(and indeed European integration more generally) are perceived and to a certain extent in
fact tend to flow towards more advantaged sections of  society; the educated, the mobile,
the wealthy and those with social and economic capital. This is true for EU law more
generally but is perhaps best epitomised in its individual status – Union citizenship.
Fligstein has demonstrated that the social groups who benefitted most from European
integration, economically, politically, culturally and socially have been those groups with
the linguistic, economic and social capital to make use of  the integration dynamic.82 On
the other hand, lower socio-economic groups have not seen the same benefit from
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European integration and in fact in certain cases have seen their relative position
deteriorate generating a backlash against the European project.83
Conclusion
Aside from being a seismic event in the history of  the EU and in the recent history of
the UK, Brexit is an event with many complex endogenous and exogenous causes. The
purpose of  this paper is not to identify all of  these causes or to draw some direct causal
links between particular events, processes or institutions and the vote on 23 June 2016. It
does not intend in any sense to ‘explain Brexit’. Rather it is an attempt to address the
question of  the manner in which the figure of  the Union citizen and Union citizenship
as a legal construct can be located within the Brexit debate and the underlying socio-
political context within which Brexit took place. Ultimately, it is to question whether the
social life reflected in the choice for Brexit is compatible with Union citizenship as it is
currently constructed. Within the Brexit process there appears to be a call for a return to
or a reassertion of  a way of  life that is rooted in the community, that is bounded and one
that is associated with clear social ties that underpin a solidaristic and normatively
coherent community. Union citizenship, in its operation and in the form of  life it projects,
appears to be at least in tension with or to ask questions of  that communitarian form of
social life. It operates on national communities to open them up to (certain categories of)
outsiders, effacing the distinction between nationals and non-nationals and in the process
undermining the links that underpin solidaristic communities, denationalising
membership and devalorising national citizenship. Moreover, it can be made to represent
a contrary ideal or even antithesis of  the rooted, communitarian citizenship that the
Brexit vote reflects. A certain view (perhaps caricature) of  Union citizenship is that of  the
rootless cosmopolitan – the infamous ‘citizen of  nowhere’ – individual, individualist,
pursuing private interests and shunning or even undermining the public sphere; the
extreme liberal, valuing autonomy, choice, personal interests and actively repudiating
values of  community.84
Two phenomena have been witnessed on the global stage in relation to citizenship and
membership. On the one hand there is a hollowing-out and an undermining of  the
traditional role of  national citizenship and an evolution in its meaning. Its
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that, on balance, European integration and Union citizenship in particular have benefitted particular, more
privileged sectors of  society. More importantly, however, is the fact that both of  these phenomena exist in
reality and that both also exist in the imagination and in particular in the popular political imagination
displayed in the Brexit debate and vote. 
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denationalisation has led to a weakening of  the link between citizenship and identity and
rendered it a more instrumental and functional attribute rather than inherently valuable as
a mark of  membership and identity. The extension of  human rights and, more recently,
social rights to non-citizens within particular states reduces the number of  exclusive
citizenship rights to a core of  political rights. Finally, duties – such as they were – are now
either non-existent or are imposed on all legal residents. There is a distinct ‘lightening of
citizenship’.85 At the same time, social citizenship, a major achievement of  the post-war
social settlement as described by Marshall, has been seriously undermined in recent years,
leading Turner to declare – and not in a positive manner – that ‘we are all denizens
now’.86 The result is a certain crisis in citizenship, having had its identify function
undermined, its rights rendered general and the social inclusion promised by citizenship
eroded. People feel a social, economic and identitarian insecurity. Secondly, in contrast has
been the elevation of  a new figure, an almost mirror image of  the national, rooted and
communitarian citizenship; the rootless cosmopolitan. Empowered by processes of
globalisation and the economic and social opportunities it offers, this figure is educated,
privileged and escapes national constraints and frequently national duties, including taxes.
It is liberal, private, driven by individual choice and personal interests.
Union citizenship can be said to operate within this narrative and emerges from and
contributes to both trends. On the one hand, the significant levels of  migration, and the
image of  the ‘welfare tourist’ swamping local services and undermining social
cohesiveness, contribute to the social insecurities reflected in Brexit and are the visible
face of  the hollowing-out of  national citizenship as a meaningful status and the
disruption to local communities. On the other hand, the privileged, mobile Union citizen,
for whom the Union is his or her playground and who rejects national constraints and
bonds of  community, tends to both act as a representative figure, opposed to, and to a
certain extent undermining, the national communitarian vision of  citizenship expressed
in the Brexit vote. For better or worse the cosmopolitan features of  Union citizenship can
be said to undermine this particular view of  social life. If  Union citizenship can be said
to be in some sense an ideal of  cosmopolitan citizenship, allowing citizens to be at home
elsewhere, as privileged guests in other communities or indeed to be at home everywhere,
to be citizens of  the world, then Brexit is clearly a rejection of  this ideal on the part of
the British public, who instead seek a different form of  social life, one more rooted and
socially constituted.
Citizenship is a multidimensional concept; there is certainly more to Union citizenship
than a naked market-driven, transnational citizenship denuded of  any social or political
dimension. However, it is certainly the case that it is this side of  Union citizenship that
has been privileged in its construction and, moreover, that is a side of  Union citizenship
that has contributed to the disruption of  national communities. At its heart, as Strumia
notes, is a mutual recognition of  belonging between political communities that have
decided to share their political destinies and foster a closer Union amongst the peoples
of  Europe. It represents a valuable political ideal that tames the destructive and
exclusionary tendencies of  classic nationalism and national citizenship.87 Perhaps
counterintuitively more, not less, Union citizenship may be necessary in order to render
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85   Joppke (n 44). 
86   Turner (n 6).
87   For the role of  the EU in ‘taming the nation-state’, see Will Kymlicka, ‘Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan
Justice’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed), Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford University Press 2006) and, specifically in
relation to Union citizenship, see Joseph Weiler, ‘To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilisation’ in Joseph
Weiler (ed), The Constitution of  Europe (Cambridge University Press 1999). 
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it more compatible with national citizenship and the values national citizenship
represents. Two interconnected strategies spring to mind: firstly, the further development
of  a supranational dimension to Union citizenship and, in particular, a set of
supranational rights;88 secondly, the development of  the non-market or social aspect of
Union citizenship. Together they represent the development of  a supranational, non-
market citizenship. This may appear as something directly opposed to the heretofore
dominant picture of  Union citizenship as a market-based, transnational status, and indeed
it is true that it is, structurally and substantively, its opposite. However, in order to
underpin and support the transnational dimensions of  Union citizenship and all the
virtues that are associated with that status – openness of  national communities to others,
a choice and greater degree of  autonomy for individuals in order to fashion their own
concept of  the good from a broader set of  ‘spheres of  justice’ – a social and political
Union citizenship needs to be fashioned at a supranational level. The supranational is
explicitly envisaged as a complement and support for the transnational. While space
precludes any detailed discussion of  the future development of  Union citizenship, if
nothing else is clear from Brexit, it is the need to ask questions about the current state of
the Union and of  Union citizenship and the manner it can be adapted to respond to the
deep concerns reflected in the Brexit vote within the context of  an ever closer Union
between the peoples of  Europe. 
Citizens of elsewhere, everywhere and . . . nowhere? 
88   In this vein, see, for example, the recent contribution of  Daniel Sarmiento and Eleanor Sharpston, ‘European
Citizenship and its New Union: Time to Move On?’ in Kochenov (ed) (n 72). 
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Abstract
The article makes use of  the notion of  security as a heuristic device providing a descriptive and normative
conceptual framework for the purposes of  interpreting the events associated with Brexit. It claims that
security can be identified as a meta-constitutional rationale of  the European project. In particular, two
discourses of  power (security and fundamental rights) have been constitutive of  the process of  European
polity-building, although they are characterised by ambiguities and contradictions. Brexit, and in particular
the complex issues relating to free movement and citizenship rights, confirms such contradictions and enables
us to consider more carefully the nature of  the EU polity and the reasons underpinning its development. In
other words, security emerges at the same time as an opportunity for growth and as a threat for the European
project. The article suggests that, in order to safeguard EU integration, a move from a self-referential to a
heterarchical form of  security is necessary.
Keywords: discourses; EU citizenship; free movement; rights
1 Introduction
Following the start of  the Brexit negotiations on 29 March 2017,1 many scenarios of  therelationship between the EU and the UK are being discussed. At this stage, virtually all
of  them, from the ‘no deal’ to the ‘second referendum’ scenarios, seem possible. A
considerable degree of  uncertainty and controversy permeates the public debate.
This article aims to take stock of  the ongoing negotiations between the UK and the
EU: in particular, the way a Member State’s withdrawal affects citizens’ rights reflects a
broader impact on the nature of  the EU as a polity and the reasons for its existence. Does
Brexit suggest that EU citizenship has never really existed as a ‘fundamental status of
nationals of  the Member States’, but is rather a contingent status, as citizens and workers
may at any time be converted into ‘bargaining chips’? In other words, Brexit is considered
as ‘yet another crisis’,2 a litmus test – one among many recently – for the EU. As some
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1     On this date, the UK served its withdrawal notice to the European Council, in accordance with Article 50
TEU.
2     N Nugent, ‘Brexit: Yet Another crisis for the EU’ in B Martill and U Steiger (eds), Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking
the Futures of  Europe (UCL Press 2018) 54.
scholars argue, this event may either encourage other states to leave the EU (the
centrifugal perspective) or promote further integration among the remaining countries
(the centripetal perspective).3 As free movement and citizenship are among the main aims
of  the EU, the loss of  related rights casts doubt on the viability of  the European project.
In order to illustrate the argument above, this article maintains that European
constitutionalism is informed by the security meta-constitutional rationale, a ‘superior reason’
supporting the existence of  the EU. The descriptive and normative conceptual framework
employed in the article may thus serve as a guideline for future research in the field. 
Security is interpreted here broadly, as a concept that goes beyond the mere notion of
stability. It is associated with the identity of  a polity and thus acquires an existential
connotation.4 In other words, this ‘superior reason’ is pursued by the EU beyond and
sometimes even against the constitutional aims and principles that are set out in the
Treaties and becomes particularly evident when the EU needs to adapt to or is challenged
by events that undermine or endanger its existence.5 One of  the fundamental features of
the EU is self-preservation in the face of  threats and the emergence of  such threats –
whether real or purely imaginary – is a powerful self-justifying tool. The development of
the EU is thus a process, in which European integration, security and crisis are closely
interrelated: in this process, two ambiguous and contradictory discourses can be detected:
security and ‘fundamental’ or ‘individual’ rights.6 Security is expressed, for example, by
important principles of  EU law, such as the principles of  autonomy and
effectiveness/uniformity,7 which have been employed by the Court of  Justice of  the
European Union (CJEU) to assert the authority of  EU law and manage conflicts.
Correspondingly, the so-called Melloni doctrine conveys the idea that, whenever the
application of  national constitutional standards of  protection of  fundamental rights
might compromise the primacy, effectiveness and unity of  EU law, national courts ought
to refrain from using them.8 Yet, security is also an ambiguous notion which is
characterised by tensions and contradictions. In particular, when the security meta-
constitutional rationale becomes self-referential, namely when European integration is
pursued for its own sake, the risk is that the European project may be unable to deliver
what it promises. Brexit, which is an effect of  self-referential security, is indeed likely to
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3     M Cini and A Verdun, ‘The Implications of  Brexit for the Future of  Europe’ in Martill and Steiger (n 1) 63,
66. See also P Mindus, European Citizenship after Brexit: Freedom of  Movement and Rights of  Residence (Palgrave
Macmillan 2017) 29.
4     For further details, see M Fichera, The Foundations of  the EU as a Polity (Edward Elgar 2018), where this
conceptual framework is used to analyse several ‘crises’ of  the EU. This notion is thus different from
traditional characterisations of  security in the field of  public order, or as national security. See e.g. J Richards,
A Guide to National Security: Threats, Responses and Strategies (Oxford University Press 2012); H K Koh, The
National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran Contra Affair (Yale University Press 1990); K Tuori, ‘A
European Security Constitution?’ in M Fichera and J Kremer (eds), Law and Security in Europe: Reconsidering the
Security Constitution (Intersentia 2013) 39.
5     This concept is thus akin to the idea of  ‘raison d’Etat’ employed by Machiavelli, although the legal and historical
context is very different. See N Machiavelli, The Prince (Clarendon Press 1891). One example of  this is the
adoption of  measures during the Eurozone crisis, which were not always in line with EU law.
6     On this particular aspect see M Fichera, ‘Security Issues as Existential Threat to the Community’ in Fichera
and Kremer (n 4) 85. I distinguish here between ‘fundamental’ rights and ‘human’ rights: see e.g. G Palombella,
‘From Human Rights to Fundamental Rights: Consequences of  a Conceptual Distinction’ (2007) 93 Archiv
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 396. The EU cannot of  course be compared to a human rights
organisation. For the purposes of  this article, I use the notions of  ‘fundamental’ and ‘individual’ rights, or
simply rights, interchangeably, as embracing both fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms.
7     See e.g. Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (No 2) ECLI:EU:C:1976:56; Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office
ECLI:EU:C:1974:133; Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich v Italy ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
8     Case C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107.
cause a ‘dramatic loss of  rights’,9 especially considering that the UK began the two-year
time limit prescribed by Article 50 of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU) without a
clear agenda.10
It is argued here that the EU should escape the trap of  self-referential security and
avoid the fragmentation of  the internal market in the face of  differentiated integration.
The EU has followed a model of  integration which has systematically sidetracked concern
for the social embeddedness of  transnational norms. Brexit suggests that, in order for the
European project to persist, a move towards a heterarchically oriented security must be
encouraged, by being responsive to the demands of  the complex and diversified
European society/ies and enhancing the economic and social constitution.
As will be seen below, Article 50 TEU11 is an illuminating expression of  the security
meta-constitutional rationale, precisely because it was created with the aim of  managing
potential crises. As is well known, British diplomat John Kerr12 drafted the text that sets
out the procedure for leaving the EU as part of  an embryonic EU constitutional treaty in
the early 2000s. At that time, the Austrian Coalition government, which included the far-
right Freedom Party of  Austria, led by Jörg Haider, was a cause for concern for the
European institutions. The idea was thus to have a procedure allowing a government to
leave the EU at any time, in order to avoid the legal chaos deriving from not being able
to strike an agreement. Whether such a procedure – as a result of  the type of  agreement
struck between the countries involved – effectively protects the rights of  EU citizens as
free movers remains to be seen.
The following pages will: (a) sketch the essential features of  the withdrawal process;
(b) illustrate the relevance of  the security meta-rationale; and (c) draw some conclusions
relating more specifically to the consequences of  Brexit as regards citizenship and free
movement. 
2 The procedure for the negotiation of a withdrawal agreement
This section aims to emphasise those aspects of  the withdrawal process in which
citizenship rights are prioritised. As is well known, Article 50 TEU sets out a procedure
for the conclusion of  a withdrawal agreement between the EU and the UK, taking into
account the framework for the UK’s future relationship with the Union. 
As far as the negotiations are concerned, the European Council guidelines (adopted
one month after the UK notification of  withdrawal)13 envisaged a ‘two-phased approach’
to the withdrawal negotiations. 
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9     D Kochenov (2016) ‘Brexit and the Argentinisation of  British Citizenship: Taking Care Not to Overstay Your
90 Days in Rome, Amsterdam or Paris’ (VerfBlog, 24 June 2016) <https://verfassungsblog.de/brexit-and-the-
argentinisation-of-british-citizenship-taking-care-not-to-overstay-your-90-days-in-rome-amsterdam-or-
paris/>.
10   Scholars have had no hesitation in pointing out that the UK’s departure from the EU might cause ‘the most
substantial loss of  rights in Europe since the break-up of  Yugoslavia in the 1990s’: J Shaw, ‘Citizenship and
Free Movement in a Changing EU: Navigating an Archipelago of  Contradictions’ in Martill and Steiger (n 1)
156.
11   See Consolidated Version of  TEU and TFEU [2012] OJ C 326.
12   See e.g. G Campbell, ‘Article 50 Author Lord Kerr says Brexit Not Inevitable’ (BBC News, 3 November 2016)
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-37852628>. 
13   European Council Guidelines, EUCO XT 20004/17, Brussels, 29 April 2017, 4. See also Directives for the
negotiation of  an agreement with the UK and Northern Ireland, XT 21016/17 ADD 1 REV 2, Brussels, 22
May 2017, 4 (hereinafter ‘the negotiating directives’) and Resolution of  the European Parliament of  5 April
2017 (concerning negotiations with the UK following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the
European Union) [2017] P8_TA-PROV(2017)0102.
In the first phase of  the negotiations, settling the question of  citizens’ rights was a
priority for the EU (part III.1 of  the negotiating directives).14 Analogously, ‘securing the
status of, and providing certainty to, EU nationals already in the UK and to UK nationals
in the EU’ is described as one of  the UK government’s ‘early priorities’ for the withdrawal
negotiations.15 This is why, according to para 8 of  the European Council guidelines,
‘agreeing reciprocal guarantees to safeguard the status and rights derived from EU law at
the date of  withdrawal of  EU and UK citizens, and their families, affected by the United
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union will be the first priority of  the negotiations’.16
The prioritisation of  EU citizens’ rights is confirmed by the EU negotiating directives,
which state that the withdrawal agreement should ‘safeguard the status and rights derived
from Union law at the withdrawal date, including those the enjoyment of  which will
intervene at a later date as well as rights which are in the process of  being obtained’, both
for citizens of  other Member States residing (or having resided) and/or working (or
having worked) in the UK, and vice versa.17 Inevitably, a ‘personal’ and a ‘material’ scope
of  such rights is involved.
From the perspective of  the EU, ‘the personal scope’ of  the guarantees to be included
in the withdrawal agreement should coincide with Directive 2004/38 (i.e. the ‘Citizens
Directive’),18 so as to include ‘both economically active, i.e. workers and self-employed, as
well as students and other economically inactive persons, who have resided in the UK or
EU27 before the withdrawal date, and their family members who accompany or join them
at any point in time before or after the withdrawal date’. As far as ‘the material scope’ (the
rights to be guaranteed) is concerned, the negotiating directives mention residence rights
and rights of  free movement as derived from the principle of  non-discrimination based
on nationality (Article 18 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union
(TFEU)), free movement of  workers (Article 45 TFEU), freedom of  establishment
(Article 49 TFEU), and citizenship (Article 21 TFEU),19 and as otherwise set out in the
Citizens Directive.20 The scope would thus include: residence rights based on the Treaties
or the Citizens Directive and the procedural rules to be followed in order to document
those rights; the social security coordination rules, including export of  benefits and social
security contributions made in different countries; the supplementary rights in the
Regulation on free movement of  workers, including workers’ children’s access to
education; access to self-employment; and recognition of  qualifications which were
obtained before Brexit or which are in the process of  being recognised on that date.
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14   In the same vein, see Letter from Theresa May to the EU Citizens, 19 October 2017
<www.gov.uk/government/news/pms-open-letter-to-eu-citizens-in-the-uk>. As regards the negotiating
directives, see n 13.
15   UK Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘The United Kingdom’s Exit from, and New Partnership
with, the European Union’ (Policy Paper, 15 May 2017) para 6.3 <www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-
united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper/the-united-
kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union--2#controlling-immigration>. 
16   European Council Guidelines (n 13).
17   As regards the negotiating directives, see n 13.
18   Directive 2004/38/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  29 April 2004, on the rights of
citizens of  the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of  the Member
States, [2004] OJ L 158 (Citizens Directive).
19   Consolidated Version of  TEU and TFEU (n 11).
20   For the Citizens Directive, see n 18.
Another issue concerns social security rights.21 In this regard, the negotiating
directives underline that the guarantees to be included in the withdrawal agreement
should be reciprocal and ‘based on the principle of  equal treatment amongst EU27
citizens and equal treatment of  EU citizens as compared to UK citizens, as set out in the
relevant EU acquis’ (para 20).22
The joint negotiation report of  the European Commission and the UK and the
Commission Communication on the negotiation progress, both of  8 December 2017,
again focus on safeguarding EU citizens’ free movement rights, as exercised in the past,
as far as possible.23
During the second phase of  the negotiations, a Statement of  Intent on the EU
Settlement Scheme, produced by the Home Office in June 2018, confirmed that
‘safeguarding the rights of  EU citizens and their family members living in the UK and
ensuring reciprocal protections for UK nationals living in the EU’ was the first priority in
the negotiations.24
In particular, Part 2 of  the Commission’s Withdrawal Agreement25 focuses on
citizens’ rights and social security provisions. Importantly, these provisions are justiciable,
as Article 151 allows references for preliminary ruling to the CJEU concerning the
interpretation of  Part 2. Although this is only possible within eight years of  the end of
the transition period, the provisions should be read in conjunction with Article 152,
which provides for an independent authority with the task of  interpreting and applying
Part 2. This body may not only exercise its powers of  investigation upon receiving
complaints from EU citizens and their family members, but may also conduct inquiries
autonomously and bring a legal action before a UK court or tribunal.26
In the official documents mentioned above a clear emphasis on the need to protect
EU citizens’ rights can be detected. However, two fundamental questions emerge. A first
line of  inquiry ought to focus on what the real value of  EU citizenship and free
movement rights is, given that – as it seems – their status can be challenged or threatened
when a Member State decides to withdraw from the EU. A second aspect that deserves
attention is that the fate of  EU citizens’ rights in the withdrawal process illustrates the
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21   Regulation 883/2004 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  29 April 2004 on the coordination
of  social security systems, [2004] OJ L 166/1.
22   As regards the negotiating directives, see n 13.
23   Joint Report from the negotiators of  the European Union and the UK Government on progress during
phase 1 of  negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union
TF50 (2017) 19; Commission to EU27, 8 December 2017; Communication from the Commission to the
European Council (Article 50) on the state of  progress of  the negotiations with the UK under Article 50 of
the TEU, Brussels, 8 December 2017 COM (2017) 784 final. See e.g. s 4(a) of  the Communication: ‘[T]he
principle underlying the Union’s position are that the Withdrawal Agreement should protect the rights of
Union citizens, United Kingdom nationals and their family members who, at the date of  withdrawal, have
enjoyed rights relating to free movement under Union law, as well as rights which are in the process of  being
obtained and the rights the enjoyment of  which will intervene at a later date.’ 
24   UK Home Office EU Settlement Scheme: Statement of  Intent, 21 June 2018, 5
<www.gov.uk/government/publications>.
25   European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of  the United Kingdom of  Great
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, TF50
2018 (33) Commission to EU27, 28 February 2018 and TF50 2018 (33/2) Commission to UK, 15 March 2018.
26   As far as Part 3 (including inter alia free movement of  goods) is concerned, Article 153 provides for the
application of  Articles 258, 260 and 267 TFEU. Moreover, without prejudice to Article 153, Article 162
includes the possibility of  setting up a Joint Committee for the settlement of  disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of  the agreement. Such disputes may in some circumstances be further
submitted to the CJEU. 
impact of  a Member States’ withdrawal on the nature of  the EU as a polity and the
reasons for its existence. In order to answer the two questions mentioned above, the
following pages will attempt to provide the necessary conceptual framework offering
both a descriptive and a normative account of  the current events.
3 Brexit and the security dimensions
It is argued in this section that several security dimensions may be identified as distinctive
to the EU polity: spatial, temporal, popular, ontological, epistemic and semantic (or
reflexive). Each of  these dimensions is expressed by a conceptual category, operates
through a dichotomy and addresses one or two fundamental questions relating to
European integration. While this is a general model applying to the EU, for the purposes
of  this article it is argued that the specific case of  Brexit affects to some extent each
security dimension. 
Indeed, the expressions and concepts used in the negotiating directives and related
documents (e.g. ‘securing the status of, and providing certainty to, EU nationals already
in the UK and to UK nationals in the EU’, ‘safeguard[ing] the status and rights derived
from Union law at the withdrawal date’, ‘preserving the internal market’) are more
significant than may seem at first sight. The fact that both parties to the negotiation have
placed emphasis on the priority of  citizens’ rights epitomises the nature of  the EU polity
and the reasons behind it.
In other words, the significance of  the EU liberal project lies beyond the commitment
to fundamental rights, the rule of  law and democracy, which, of  course, are all relevant
values reaffirmed in the Preamble to the TEU and the Preamble to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR),27 as well as several provisions therein and the case law of  the
EU judiciary. The added value of  the construction of  the EU as a polity emerges from
security, expressed by two ambiguous and contradictory discourses of  power: security and
fundamental rights. 
Firstly, the EU liberal project, as a project aiming to ensure peace and safety across
the European continent, has always relied upon a powerful and pervasive security
discourse, focusing on two functions, namely both securing the smooth operation of  the
internal market and ensuring a secure marketplace.28 Secondly, the emancipation of  the
individual from the moorings of  the nation state, as an expression of  the fundamental
rights discourse, is pivotal to building up the EU polity. It is not by chance that
Article 3(2) TEU is placed before Article 3(3) TEU. However, although the provision to
EU citizens of  an area of  freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), where free movement is
guaranteed, is prioritised over the establishment of  an internal market, in practice the
proclamation of  the free movement paradigm is characterised by the prevalence of
economic objectives over social needs.29
In light of  the contradictions outlined above, multiple security dimensions may be
identified and the Brexit negotiations are very helpful in clarifying how they ought to be
viewed. 
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28   As argued in M Fichera, ‘Sketches of  a Theory of  Europe as an Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice’ in
M Fletcher, E Herlin-Karnell and C Matera (eds), The European Union as an Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice
(Routledge 2016) 34.
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The table above illustrates how these dimensions may be articulated.30 In the
following pages an analysis of  each dimension and related challenges is offered.
3.1 SEMANTIC OR REFLEXIVE SECURITY
Semantic or reflexive security concerns the question of  how to be secure as a polity. As
every polity attempts to ensure its own survival by devising institutions, legal principles,
structures and techniques of  governance that allow it to continue and expand, so the EU
relies upon the security and rights discourses to avoid dissolution and chaos. These
discourses are associated with threats and periods of  crisis. 
Change and permanence are thus interwoven in the European liberal project of
integration, and this feature of  adaptation to change, of  permanence in the face of
threats in the name of  a ‘superior reason’, is what I call ‘the security of  the European
project’. There exists a constant interplay between security and insecurity and, whenever
the foundational values of  any polity are questioned by an excessively high number of
opponents, the very existence of  the polity is at stake.31 Thus, founding a polity also
means attempting to secure its long-term survival. In particular, the meta-constitutional
rationale of  the security of  the European project – which conveys the existential
implications of  the EU enterprise – is articulated in security and fundamental rights as
discourses of  power.
Discourses of  power can in fact be constitutive of  a polity, while at the same time
being constantly in tension or overlapping each other. They shape meanings, condition
actors’ behaviour and choices, and correspond to activities, speech acts and rhetorical
strategies that dominate in a given historical context. This does not happen by chance.
Processes of  production and interpretation of  texts, as well as the social conditions
within which they are generated, and other social practices, such as courts’ rulings or
other jurisdictional acts, are indicative of  specific patterns or relations of  power.32 These
discourses are constitutive of  the EU as a polity because it is through them that the
interaction between the EU institutions, as well as between the institutional apparatus and
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the citizens, takes place. They contribute to shaping a reality that is an integral part of  the
EU legal order. ‘Discourses’ are interpreted here as different from ‘narratives’, as the
latter are (sometimes competing) forms of  interpretation of  reality employed to explain
or justify events, and/or to support specific policies.33
In other words, discourses are considered essentially ‘practices that systematically form
the objects of  which they speak’34 and, more specifically, daily practices embedded in the
very process of  formation of  a polity. They include all forms of  formal and informal social
relationships and interactions between economic and social actors (e.g. courts, parliaments,
media, academic work, as well as social movements, trade unions etc.), which often clash
with each other. The concept of  ‘discourse’ employed here is thus potentially very wide
and does not include merely ‘groupings of  utterances or statements’, but ‘whatever
signifies or has meaning’ and produces effects within a social and institutional context.35
By observing such practices, it is almost inevitable to point out how, regardless of  our
personal judgement, dominance may be enacted and reproduced by subtle, routine,
everyday forms of  text and talk that appear ‘natural’ and quite ‘acceptable’.36 Importantly,
attention is paid to that type of  social power that is exercised by entrenched elites or
specific sectors of  society. A fundamental feature inherent in the notion of  ‘discourses of
power’ employed in this article is ideological and political struggle.37
From this viewpoint, the importance of  the first foundational cases of  EU law lies
not only in their ‘constitutional’ significance, but also in the contribution they gave to the
development of  the intertwined security and fundamental rights discourses from the
perspective of  autonomy and effectiveness/uniformity. In particular, Van Gend en Loos and
Costa v ENEL flow from the ‘speciality’ of  the EU legal order, which, on the one hand
(Van Gend), empowers individuals – the rights discourse – and, on the other hand (Costa),
empowers the EU legal order itself  – the security discourse. These rulings are part of  a
set of  ‘pre-dictions’ and ‘retro-dictions’, from which not only the strategic moves of  the
main actors but also their semantic patterns have formed a judicial framework of
principles that have crystallised at the foundations of  the EU polity.38 Even the principles
of  autonomy and effectiveness/uniformity39 (as well as loyalty, proportionality and
subsidiarity, and the notion of  common constitutional traditions)40 are expressions of  the
security discourse which is articulated in two directions.
First, the EU project can only be secure if  EU law is capable of  producing effects at
the domestic level, which benefit EU citizens uniformly. As a result, national provisions,
even having constitutional character, cannot undermine the unity and effectiveness of  EU
law.41 Second, the autonomy claimed by the EU legal order is both normative and
institutional and is often the result of  the robust interpretive role performed by the CJEU,
which has defended it vigorously. 
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As is well known, the idea that the EU legal order has a constitutional character has
been repeatedly emphasised by the CJEU in its case law.42 However, precisely because of
the concerns deriving from the tension between the transnational and the national level,
from the 1970s onwards the fundamental rights discourse has been a necessary
legitimacy- and autonomy-enhancing tool, as part of  the CJEU’s weaponry. A constant
effort to boost the EU’s credentials as a distinct creature of  transnational law has led to
an assertion of  autonomy, on the one hand, vis-à-vis its Member States,43 and, on the
other, vis-à-vis international law.44 Such autonomy implies that the interpretation of
fundamental rights that lies at the core of  the EU legal system is in line with the EU’s
structure and objectives.45 These moves may be interpreted as part of  the EU ongoing
strategy of  self-justification and self-empowerment accomplished in the name of  the peoples
of  Europe through the security and fundamental rights discourses. 
The same discourses resurface time and again, not only in the case law of  the CJEU,
but also in official speeches in times of  crisis. The EU liberal project cannot be
interrupted, because people demand it. The finalité of  European integration – sometimes
overtly federalist, often leaving little space for reflexivity – simultaneously requires further
enlargement and reinforced cooperation, because any alternative solution would lead to
self-destruction and ‘would demand a fatal price above all of  our people’.46
In addition, domestic standards of  protection of  fundamental rights cannot prejudice
either the standards provided by the CFR or the principles of  primacy, unity and
effectiveness of  EU law.47 The reason for this, as pointed out by the CJEU, is that
Article 53 CFR prescribes that nothing in the Charter is to be interpreted as restricting or
adversely affecting fundamental rights as protected by EU law and international law,
international agreements and the Member States’ constitutions. The CFR is thus the
cornerstone of  the EU legal system of  protection of  fundamental rights: its provisions
must be respected not only by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of  the EU, but
also by the Member States when they implement EU law.48 It is in light of  the interplay
between the security and fundamental rights discourses that the CJEU held that the draft
agreement for the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights would affect
‘the specific characteristics of  EU law and its autonomy’ and would therefore not be
compatible with Article 6(2) TEU.49
A first important contradiction to be pointed out is that the CJEU tends to protect
fundamental rights only to the extent that their recognition is instrumental to ensuring the
primacy, uniformity and effectiveness of  EU law: fundamental rights may be restricted for
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the purposes of  achieving the objectives set out by the Treaties,50 above all the
establishment of  a common market51 or the stability of  the financial system. 
The negotiations over Brexit and the challenges and difficulties posed by it merely
confirm other contradictions of  the security and fundamental rights discourses. On the
one hand, despite the ‘united in diversity’ and the ‘ever closer Union’ mottos,52 there
emerges a demand for an increasingly differentiated process of  integration.53 This seems
to be for many scholars the best way to preserve the internal market (the security
discourse). On the other hand, while one of  the principal aims of  EU law has been that
of  strengthening individual rights to free movement and, more generally, fundamental
rights (the rights discourse),54 there is an acknowledgment that free movement of  persons
might not be an essential feature of  the internal market and its rules may be adjusted to
allow third countries (including the UK as a future, albeit special, third country) to
conclude flexible agreements with the EU.55
In addition, the ambiguity of  the security discourse has allowed a shift towards a self-
referential attitude of  the EU in the last decades which has weakened the social
embeddedness of  EU law-making. Social rights, for example, have sometimes been
merely protected as a consequence of  the application of  the principle of  formal equality
(Griesmar; Mouflin)56 or with a view to protecting the free movement of  workers (Decker,
Elsen)57 or of  services (Kohll).58 Moreover, although there have been positive
developments in the case law of  the CJEU, a variety of  lines (‘inside’ and ‘outside’ regimes
of  protection by law) have been drawn between different categories, such as workers and
non-workers, or workers who benefit from secure full-time jobs and workers who do
not.59 In the face of  increasing fragmentation, one may thus wonder whether and to what
extent the very configuration of  the EU as a polity is at stake as a result of  the
negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal. Brexit could be interpreted as yet another warning
sign of  such fragmentation.
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In other words, if  (a) the European project is to be more than a self-referential
conglomeration of  legal arrangements aimed at ensuring the smooth functioning of  the
internal market for its own sake, and (b) has an effective claim to constitutional autonomy,
what should we make of  the negotiable character of  EU citizenship rights? How to
reconcile the potential significant loss of  rights associated with Brexit with the
identification of  EU citizenship as ‘destined to be the fundamental status of  nationals of
the Member States’,60 a state of  grace that aims to ‘provide the glue to help bind together
nationals of  all the Member States’?61 Can a polity be secure if  it itself  is not able to
guarantee that at least some of  its inherent features (including precisely the state of  EU
citizens) are preserved for an unlimited duration, until at least such time as that very polity
provides a sufficiently thick reflexive layer through which its members can recognise
themselves as members? The questions highlighted above point towards a powerful
challenge to semantic or reflexive security. Article 50 TEU is a response to this challenge,
because, as argued below,62 it leaves each Member State free to choose whether or not it
wishes to take part in the European project. In other words, the answer to the question
‘How to be secure?’ is provided by a particular arrangement of  the polity that allows a
more or less wide margin of  manoeuvre to its components. Such an arrangement thus
follows a ‘heterarchical’ form of  ordering. As a result, from such a heterarchical
perspective, reflexive security indicates that a transnational polity such as the EU is secure
as long as its principles and objectives (including autonomy, effectiveness, uniformity,
common constitutional traditions) are not imposed unilaterally upon its members. It
follows that each member ought to be allowed to leave whenever it no longer shares the
core ideas and values behind the project of  integration.
3.2 SPATIAL SECURITY
Spatial security addresses the question of  who ‘the Other’ is through the conceptual
dichotomy inside/outside. A space is normally divided into inside and outside. However,
the EU space is fragmented, in the sense that several insides and outsides can be identified
within it. As a consequence, rights and benefits are distributed in an unequal manner. This
dimension is thus characterised by the paradox of  ‘large space’ (as explained below). This
state of  affairs had already become evident in the recent episodes of  enlargement, which
have laid bare the tension between the functional and normative claims of  the European
project. Brexit merely reformulates the paradox and prompts us to wonder how inclusive
the EU ought to be. 
In other words, the fundamental questions associated with spatial security (‘Who is the
Other? Where is it located?’) can only be answered by drawing lines – which is
fundamentally a constitutional act. As a result, the underlying conceptual dichotomy,
inside/outside, becomes crucial. In fact, one of  the main justifications of  sovereignty is
that it shields a ‘secure’ inside against an ‘insecure’ outside. The demand for security leads
to the creation of  a space, in which several states share security as a common good.63 Such
space is the locus of  a tension between normativity and functionality. In fact, EU liberalism
contains a dangerous paradox: when it proclaims its neutrality and ability to include as
many claims as possible, its ambition to universality risks turning into an imperialistic
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claim, thus creating a Schmittian large space.64 The EU model of  transnational integration
and enlargement is caught in this paradox. 
The paradox can be unpacked as follows. One of  the key contentions of  EU law is
that of  being able to configure citizens as individuals entitled to transnational rights
claims and states as cooperative actors operating on an equal footing. From this
perspective, the argument from demoi-cracy65 often draws on both the republican value
of  non-domination and the liberal value of  mutual recognition to promote the principles
of  democratic integrity, non-discrimination and equal rights.66 Yet, while EU law
proclaims the existence of  a ‘sacred’ space, namely a privileged area, legally, politically and
morally distinct from other regions of  the world, characterised by universal values that
can be exported across the globe,67 in fact these values remain inevitably confined within
borders and boundaries. Stating that values not borders define Europe, and that
enlargement is a matter of  extending the zone of  European values, is a mere fiction that
exposes the rhetoric of  the large space.68 Where a space is reduced to ‘a collection of
juxtaposed places’, it fails to create ‘a sense of  belonging to a defined stretch of
territory’.69 A collection of  places is a u-topia, in the literal meaning of  a non-place, where,
although there are multiple insides and outsides, lines are blurred and the ambiguity of
fundamental rights discourses is as pronounced as ever. Precisely, when this happens, we
witness the risk of  the EU turning from a transnational polity into a large space. Brexit
has pierced through the EU rhetoric and shown that, when a space is merely a collection
of  juxtaposed places, EU citizens become displaced and their identities as EU rights-
holders reshaped. In other words, as a result of  the uncertainty and complexity of  the
UK–EU withdrawal process, the promises associated with EU citizenship are highly
questionable.
Arguably, a plurality of  inside and outside is inevitable in a transnational polity in which
multiple regimes (not only national v EU law, but also Customs Union, Schengen,
Eurozone, opt-in and opt-out provisions etc.) operate within the same space. Such
plurality of  insides and outsides, which generate separate categories of  individuals – such
as the ‘EU citizen’ as opposed to the non-EU citizen (i.e. the ‘third-country national’, or
the ‘mobile EU citizen’ as opposed to the ‘non-mobile EU citizen’) – allows plural claims,
which vary depending on the category within which individuals find themselves. Here the
ambiguous character of  the fundamental rights discourse is particularly evident. To have
rights as an EU citizen thus means not merely being entitled to a particular set of  rights,
but also being inscribed within a specific horizon, which is shaped by patterns of
inclusion and exclusion.70 In other words, the regime of  EU citizenship not only
presupposes but also produces the subjects who are regulated by EU law. The
formulation of  citizenship rights already assumes the exclusion of  certain categories of
individuals, such as, for example, those who do not circulate, or those family members
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69(3)260
64   See, in another context, M Fichera, ‘Carl Schmitt and the New World Order: A View from Europe’ in
M Arvidsson, L Brännström and P Minkkinen (eds), The Contemporary Relevance of  Carl Schmitt: Law, Politics,
Theology (Routledge 2016) 165.
65   See, more recently, R Bellamy, J Lacey and K Nicolaïdis, ‘European Boundaries in Question?’ (2017) 39 Journal
of  European Integration 483.
66   Ibid 490.
67   Fichera (n 28) 34, 42.
68   Olli Rehn, ‘Values Define Europe, not Borders’ (Speech, Belgrade, 24 January 2005): ‘the map of  Europe is
defined in the mind, not just on the ground’, thus suggesting a potentially unlimited extension. 
69   K Nicolaïdis and J Viehoff, ‘Just Boundaries for Demoicrats’ (2017) 39 Journal of  European Integration 591.
70   B Golder, Foucault and the Politics of  Rights (Stanford University Press 2015) 100.
who do not fall within the circumstances of  justice prescribed by EU law. Rights
discourses thus may be a vehicle for the disempowerment of  individuals. For example,
due to the existence of  a number of  exceptions to equal treatment and conditions for
lawful residence, the provision of  social assistance and social care for some categories of
vulnerable individuals, including homeless citizens, may be very difficult. Although in
theory access to social benefits and services should be ensured to citizens engaging in
economic activities, the CJEU has not considered voluntary work in exchange for
accommodation and maintenance by the Salvation Army (as part of  a social reintegration
scheme) as ‘real and genuine economic activity’.71
Yet, spatial security can be viewed from another angle. From the point of  view of  self-
preservation, it not only assumes but also necessitates that lines of  inclusion and
exclusion be drawn. This means that discourses of  power are also about the
empowerment of  individuals as members of  the EU polity, and as part of  the self-
justificatory conceptualisation of  the EU. In fact, the ambiguity of  the individual rights
discourse can be interpreted as a form of  openness that contains a ‘democratic potential’,
in the sense of  ‘a solicitation to different groups within a polity to assert or to constitute
themselves as rightful, co-equal members of  that polity’.72 However, for this
emancipatory function to be performed, the act of  drawing borders, both in the physical
and in the normative sense, is inevitable. Otherwise, the distinction between inside and
outside tends to blur: the abolition of  spatial limits may then lead to the removal of  the
very category of  ‘the political’73 and, with it, of  the possibility of  having a legal standing
and formulating legal claims. Faced with the refugee crisis, for example, the EU as a polity
and its legal system – typically, its institutional framework, built up both at the national
and supranational level – are called upon to articulate and channel spatial demands
through legal instruments. This type of  demand, formulated by the categories of
individuals generated by EU law, is inescapable and reflects both traditional, right-wing
identitarian strategies and left-wing solidaristic arguments. The need for physical and
normative borders can indeed also be expressed by emphasising the risk of
compromising the social-democratic premises of  continental Europe’s Rechtstaat.74
Distinctions and refinements between multiple insides and outsides have also been
produced during the negotiation on the UK withdrawal. For example, a ‘special status’ is
conferred upon EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU who move before
‘Brexit day’ – 29 March 2019.75 They will have the right to reside and work in the host
state, as well as equal treatment rights. Moreover, these provisions are also addressed to
spouses, registered partners, children and dependent parents or grandparents who are
legally resident in the host state at the time of  Brexit. Importantly, citizens’ right to family
reunification will be ensured, provided that the family link already existed before Brexit,
even if  the family member was not yet living in the host country. However, after Brexit
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day the strict requirements imposed by UK law will apply, thus removing the privileges
associated with the status of  EU citizen. To mention a few examples:76
(a) citizens who decide to live together as partners or marry after Brexit day do
not benefit from EU citizenship rights; 
(b) non-economically active migrants (such as those who renounce working to
look after their children, or disabled and elderly individuals) may find it
difficult or impossible to meet the requirements to acquire either ‘settled’ or
‘pre-settled’ status;
(c) there is uncertainty as regards the status of  so-called ‘Zambrano carers’ (non-
EU citizens who are primary carers of  EU citizens), who in some situations
acquire the right to residency on the ground that their care is irreplaceable
and would prevent genuine enjoyment of  the substance of  EU citizenship;77
(d) the margin of  protection of  UK citizens’ free movement rights across
Europe, children’s rights or the migrant’s right to return to the home country
with his/her family members is either null or unclear. Importantly, ‘any
restrictions on grounds of  public policy or public security related to conduct
after the specified date will be in accordance with national law’.78
One may wonder to which extent the principle of  non-discrimination on grounds of
nationality can be respected as regards the provision of  this ‘special status’. 
This state of  affairs shows that concern for the social embeddedness of  transnational
norms is not necessarily present in the documents produced during the negotiations,
which do not necessarily capture the complexity of  the situations directly and indirectly
covered by Brexit. Once again, the social constitution appears to be sidetracked or
marginalised in the process of  European integration.79 In other words, from the point of
view of  spatial security, Brexit confirms that, while the EU portrays itself  as a polity
pursuing the liberal project of  ensuring the privileged status of  EU citizen uniformly, in
practice, situations of  discrimination and loss of  rights are concrete possibilities. It is by
pointing out such contradictions that the ‘democratic potential’ of  citizenship rights (the
empowerment aspect of  rights), as ‘the ability of  different groups to assert themselves as
co-equal members of  the polity’, may be brought to the surface.80
3.3 TEMPORAL AND ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY
The temporal and ontological dimensions of  security are closely interrelated. The former
addresses the question of  the direction of  the EU polity through the conceptual category
of  time; the latter is about the nature of  the EU.
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Temporal security is a fundamental dimension of  the European project. Its relevance
goes beyond the mere idea of  continuity. Just as space is stretched in the sense of  a
potentially unrestricted extension – thus producing the paradox of  large space – so time
is presumed to be infinite because Member States have limited their sovereign rights ‘by
creating a community of  unlimited duration’81 – thus generating the paradox of  ‘large
time’. Temporal security is inherent in the very claim of  autonomy and primacy of  the
EU as a legal order that is distinct from international law. Precisely because the European
project stands above and beyond the national legal systems and purports to emerge as a
unity that is more than the sum of  its parts, it cannot admit of  an end. The transfer of
sovereignty to the EU polity and the binding force of  EU law are necessary for the very
survival of  the European project, which is not a provisional arrangement for the achievement
of  a specific immediate objective. Yet, simultaneously, if  time is extended indefinitely and
integration is pursued for its own sake, the principle of  self-determination of  Member
States as constituent parts of  the European project is compromised. 
Temporal security is in fact being challenged by Brexit. As shown in the table, temporal
security addresses the question: ‘In which direction are we moving?’ There will be a
‘before’ and an ‘after’ Brexit day and this temporal caesura risks producing further inequality
and ambiguity, in particular as regards personal situations, which fall in between the two
phases. For example, the draft of  the Withdrawal Agreement might be interpreted as
incorporating the logic followed in Lounes,82 so that naturalised migrant citizens continue
to enjoy their EU rights, in addition to the rights they possess as nationals of  the host
state.83 As seen earlier in this article, the result would be a ‘special status’ conferred upon
a privileged category of  individuals who exercise their free movement rights.84 While this
‘special status’ may be justified by the need to encourage integration in the host state, one
may still remark that a difference in treatment exists between free-movers and those who
do not exercise free movement rights. Thus, from the perspective of  temporal security, one
may observe that rights associated with the status of  EU citizen are not conferred for an
indefinite period of  time: they are still very much parasitic on the status of  national citizen
and, consequently, on whether or not the state of  nationality retains membership of  the
EU. Ultimately, the answer to the question ‘In which direction are we moving?’ seems to
be that further integration is for the moment very difficult to achieve.
Ontological security (addressing the question: ‘What is the best interpretative scheme
to understand the EU?’) is also challenged by Brexit. The notion of  ontological security
is fundamental for a polity: its premise is that ‘states and other political actors seek to
promote not only material and strategic interests but also some form of  self-identity in
their interactions with other actors in the international arena’.85 What the EU is and how
it represents itself  is crucial for its development, because it is indicative of  the type of
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values that are expressed over a period of  time and are subject to threat in specific
circumstances. From this perspective, it may be argued that a true constitutional
community should be able to preserve the rights associated with EU citizenship to their
full extent even where one of  its Members States withdraws. The argument would rely on
the almost ‘missionary’ nature of  EU citizenship as an independent and fundamental
status.86 However, quite apart from the political feasibility of  this teleological
interpretation of  EU law, it has been noted above that the nationality of  a Member State
is a condition not only for the acquisition but also for the retention of  EU citizenship,
with the result that the latter is lost once that state is no longer a member. Inevitably, these
considerations affect our configuration of  the EU as a polity. Would the normative force
of  citizenship and the values protected by Article 2 TEU, as well as the structure of
general principles and fundamental rights expressed by EU law, warrant an extensive or
rather a narrow interpretation of  citizenship rights? The answer is that constitutional
principles related to the integrity of  the EU legal framework are at stake: for example, it
is not entirely clear whether and to what extent the transitional provisions contained in
the agreement will have direct effect. It is also not clear whether, at the moment of
adjudicating on the possibility of  individuals relying on those provisions, the
integrationist mind frame (and related principles, such as effectiveness, uniformity of  EU
law etc.) will still inform their interpretation. 
A reference for preliminary ruling from the District Court of  Amsterdam addressed
some of  these questions.87 However, the Higher Court has in the meantime decided that
the parties’ claims were too general and hypothetical and could be dismissed without
having recourse to preliminary questions.88
Although the preliminary ruling procedure has been interrupted, those questions can
still be answered from a broad perspective. 
In fact, threats to temporal and ontological security point towards a number of  flaws
in the European liberal project. In other words, the idea of  the irreversibility of  the
process of  European integration is now, for the first time, strongly disputed (the paradox
of  ‘large time’). Just as in the other security dimensions, here too Brexit may thus reveal
important contradictions or ambiguities of  the EU polity.
In particular, Brexit seems to signal the failure of  the programmatic nature of  the
‘ever closer union’ provisions in the Treaty of  Lisbon.89 Nevertheless, the formulation of
Article 50 TEU does not necessarily go against – and may actually be interpreted as
bolstering – the security of  the European project. In other words, Article 50 TEU may
be configured as a compromise provision. It is precisely by allowing Member States to
leave, according to explicit guidelines and within the framework of  EU law, that the
European project is reinvigorated, for those states which decide to remain may have a
stronger reason to foster integration. Article 50 TEU is, in this sense, also a coming-of-
age provision, which consolidates the claim of  autonomy of  EU law, as general
international law on the right of  withdrawal (such as rebus sic stantibus, impossibility of
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86   Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk (n 60). 
87   The preliminary questions were the following: a) does the withdrawal of  the UK from the EU automatically
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264
performance or material breach of  the Treaty)90 may be interpreted as inapplicable, in
light of  the exclusive jurisdiction of  the CJEU.91
Article 50 TEU may also be read in a new light, if  considered from the perspective of
differentiated integration.
In the recent Rome Declaration, a cautious version of  the formula of  differentiated
integration was rendered as follows: ‘We will act together, at different paces and intensity
where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line
with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later.’92 This
statement echoed a bolder version of  the option of  differentiation presented by the
European Commission in its White Paper on the Future of  Europe published on 1 March
2017.93 Among the five possible scenarios for the EU’s future, one was identified by the
Commission as ‘[t]hose who want more do more’: this scenario envisages the creation of
several ‘coalitions of  the willing’ that would carry forward new cooperation projects in
areas such as defence, security and justice, taxation, and social policy; and the other
Member States would be able to join those projects at a later stage, as soon as they would
be ready or willing to do so. This scenario seems to be much more in line with the passage
from self-referential to heterarchical security as suggested in this article.
Of  course, it may also be argued that the very fact that Brexit ‘will be conducted
through Article 50 TEU is to accept the continuing political and legal authority of  the EU
until withdrawal has occurred’.94
However, despite the considerations above, there are no guarantees that principles and
values underpinning European constitutionalism will be fully respected during the Brexit
negotiations. Hence, even in the context of  temporal and ontological security, the
ambiguity of  the security and fundamental rights discourses can be observed. 
3.4 POPULAR AND EPISTEMIC SECURITY
Popular security is about the demos. This is a well-known and controversial theme, which
does not need to be reprised here. It may be noted briefly that demos (or the absence
thereof) speaks to the security of  a constitutional arrangement because of  its deeply
entrenched identitarian connotations. People(s) and demos are strictly interrelated
concepts, although they do not necessarily coincide, as the latter may also be understood
in a narrow sense, embracing those individuals who take part in the democratic process
of  a polity.95 However, when conceptualised as demos, the idea of  people(s) is often
associated with ‘a sense of  social cohesion, shared destiny and collective self-identity
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Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS vol 1155, 331, as well as customary international law.
91   Article 344 TFEU, referring to Article 259 TFEU. For this argument, see e.g. J A Hill, ‘The European
Economic Community: The Right of  Member State Withdrawal’ (1982) 12 Georgia Journal of  International
and Comparative Law 335, 351.
92   Rome Declaration of  the Leaders of  27 Member States and of  the European Council, the European
Parliament and the European Commission, 25 March 2017 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/03/25/rome-declaration/pdf>. 
93   European Commission White Paper on ‘The Future of  Europe’ COM (2017) 2025, 1 March 2017.
94   K A Armstrong, Brexit Time – Leaving the EU: Why, How and When? (Cambridge University Press 2017) 210.
95   M E Jolly, The European Union and the People (Oxford University Press 2007) 68.
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which, in turn, result in and deserve loyalty’.96 Be that as it may, whether viewed as a
source of  law, as an almost mythical ‘nation’,97 or as an exclusionary category, subject to
the principle of  the constitutive outside – in such a way that it is always bound to exclude
certain categories and include certain others98 – popular security lies at the foundations
of  a polity. For, despite all potential and actual contradictions that can be found in the
tautology of  the people(s),99 the evocative power of  this imagery is one that binds
together and brings to unity what is initially not unified.
Yet, the popular dimension of  security is being challenged by the idiosyncratic
mechanisms of  governance in recent decades, which have dismissed many of  the
democratic tenets practised by the Member States: recent events have essentially
confirmed both the deficiencies which were denounced by the critics and the disaffection
in the population at large with the way decision-making takes place.100
The waves of  left-wing and right-wing populism in many European countries are but
one symptom of  this ‘political’ turmoil.101
The failure of  the EU machinery to embrace the complexity of  the people(s) and the
extent to which, for better or worse, they are a fundamental construct of  European
integration, speaks to the need to delve deeper into the importance of  the popular
dimension. In order to do so, it is useful to engage with the epistemic dimension, too.
Epistemic security is also being challenged by Brexit. In this context, the dichotomy
‘one–many’ is central and allows us to understand better the failure of  the one-size-fits-
all model that has at times resurfaced in the official rhetoric of  the EU (i.e. a model of
integration that does not take sufficiently into account national idiosyncrasies). The
crucial question of  epistemic security is to what extent multiple rationalities or claims of
authority can co-exist. How can we ensure the survival of  a transnational polity in which
the conflictuality among several levels is not only visible but is also growing? This has
turned into a recurring theme not only among EU law scholars, but also beyond their
inner circle.102 Although Brexit in itself  does not increase multi-level conflicts, it indicates
that such conflicts exist and may resurface, sometimes unexpectedly, as occurred with the
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96   J Weiler, U Haltern and F Mayer, ‘European Democracy and its Critique’ (1995) 18 West European Politics 4,
11. On the debate on the no-demos thesis, see also inter alia D Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’
(1995) 1 European Law Journal 282; J Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos,
Telos, and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 219; W Streeck, ‘Neo-
Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 31; A Moravcsik, ‘In
Defence of  the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing the Legitimacy of  the European Union’ (2004) 40 Journal of
Common Market Studies 603.
97   E De Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état? (Editions du Boucher 2002) 53: ‘La nation existe avant tout, elle est
l’origine de tout. Sa volonté est toujours légale, elle est la loi elle-même. Avant elle et au-dessus d’elle il n’y a
que le droit naturel.’ (original emphasis)
98   B Bosteels, ‘Introduction: The People Which is Not One’ in A Badiou et al (eds), What is a People? (Columbia
University Press 2016) 1, 2–3.
99   J J Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract, or Principles of  Political Right’ in J J Rousseau, Basic Political Writings
(D A Cress tr) (Hackett 1987) 147: ‘before examining the act whereby a people chooses a king, it would be
well to examine the act whereby a people is a people. For since this act is necessarily prior to the other, it is
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100  Armstrong (n 94)98; A Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Oxford University Press
2015) 159; C Dupré, ‘The Unconstitutional Constitution: A Timely Concept’ in A von Bogdandy and
P Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Arena (Hart 2015) 351, 368.
101  S Champeau, ‘Populist Movements and the European Union’, in S Champeau, C Closa, D Innerarity and M P Maduro
(eds), The Future of  Europe: Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice after the Euro Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield 2015) 195.
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2016 referendum. Moreover, it may represent a precedent for the future. Ultimately, it
may be observed that challenges to popular and epistemic security confirm once again the
flaws deriving from the self-referential character of  security.
4 The consequences of Brexit
In light of  the conceptual framework adopted in the previous pages, which has shown
how Brexit affects all dimensions of  the security of  the European project, it is argued in
this section that Brexit points towards the need for further differentiated integration in
the EU. The phenomenon of  differentiated integration was formalised by the Treaty of
Maastricht, which created areas, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
including only a selection of  Member States. In particular, the UK adamantly opposed the
creation of  the EMU and the transferral of  new competences to the EU in the area of
social policy. In the case of  the EMU, an opt-out was agreed for the UK and Denmark.
In the case of  social policy, a special Protocol enabled 11 Member States to opt in to a
separate Social Policy Agreement laying down new competences for the EU. Once again,
the UK was excluded. 
In the Treaty of  Amsterdam, a new opt-out regime (concerning free movement and
immigration and asylum law) was set up, while at the same time incorporating the
Schengen regime in the Treaties. The opt-out provisions concerned both the UK and
Ireland. The Lisbon Treaty added a further layer of  differentiation: in the field of  police
cooperation and criminal justice; in return for the adoption of  the Community method in
that policy area, the UK was entitled to an opt-out from future developments, as well as
from existing Third Pillar legislation. 
Finally, an agreement between the EU Member States and the UK concluded in
February 2016 (but never entered into force) increased the degree of  flexibility by
allowing the implementation in the UK of  special provisions, in particular concerning the
free movement of  persons.103
Following the start of  the Brexit negotiations, a few options are currently open. 
1 the Norwegian Approach, which implies joining the European Economic
Area (EEA), including the provisions on the free movement of  goods,
services, people and capital;
2 the Swiss model, which involves the negotiation of  a series of  bilateral
treaties governing relations with the EU in specific areas of  common
interest, especially free trade. In particular, the UK may rejoin the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), although technical barriers to trade in goods
and services and free movement of  persons are not covered by EFTA rules
and would have to be the subject of  separate bilateral agreements. While
losing voice, the UK would retain significant financial obligations to the EU;
3 the World Trade Organization model which has no free movement of  labour
provisions and few provisions on the liberalisation of  trade in services;
4 a Customs Union following the Turkish model; or
5 a modern generation trade and investment agreement following the
Canadian model.
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Whatever option is finally chosen, one should bear in mind that Brexit is the outcome of
decades of  short-sighted policies which should not have ignored the deep challenges
associated with UK membership (as with other countries). Consequently, the solution
would be to embrace diversity as a fact of  life and at the same time push the European
project forward, but only for a core number of  Member States which share common
values and ideas for future action. This would, on the face of  it, represent a mere
reformulation of  ‘multi-speed Europe’ or of  the ‘concentric circles’ model.104 The
Eurozone countries could thus form a selected group and operate in specific areas of
cooperation, such as the Internal Market, social policy and the AFSJ. The remaining
countries would instead cooperate with each other, but would remain free to join in at a
later time. Yet, differentiation should not come at the expense of  the economic and social
constitution. Self-referential security (whether it has pushed for more unification or for
more diversification) has promoted a model of  integration which has systematically
sidetracked concern for the social embeddedness of  transnational norms. While this was
by no means the only factor behind Brexit, it is certainly a major aspect that should be
taken seriously into account when evoking any ‘future of  Europe’ scenario.
5 Conclusions
The events associated with Brexit may provide relevant elements to assess the nature of
the European project and the reasons behind it. The argument detailed in this article is that
security can be identified as a meta-constitutional rationale, namely a ‘superior’ reason that
operates beyond and sometimes also in contrast to the explicit provisions of  EU
constitutional law. Security is expressed by two discourses of  power (security and
fundamental rights) which have been constitutive of  the process of  European polity-
building and yet are characterised by ambiguities and contradictions. Brexit confirms this
consideration in the specific case of  EU citizenship and free movement rights, which
normally have an important role in creating bonds between the members of  a
transnational polity and are thus a key element of  these discourses. However, they seem to
be easily removable or at least endangered in the case of  withdrawal of  one Member State. 
In particular, it is possible to observe how all six dimensions of  security – spatial,
temporal, ontological, popular, epistemic and reflexive – have been affected to some
extent by Brexit. Reflexive security addresses the question of  how a polity can be secure.
In the particular case of  Brexit, the challenge consists of  guaranteeing that at least some
of  the EU polity’s inherent features (including the status of  EU citizen) are preserved. By
leaving each Member State free to choose whether or not it wishes to take part in the
European project, Article 50 TEU responds in part to this challenge, although there is
considerable uncertainty as regards the status of  EU citizens. Spatial security looks at the
question of  the ‘Other’ through the conceptual dichotomy ‘inside/outside’. Brexit
confirms that, behind the drive for the implementation of  relevant principles of  EU law
(e.g. unity and effectiveness), situations of  discrimination and loss of  rights are concretely
possible, for example when an unpredicted event, such as the withdrawal of  a Member
State, takes place. Highlighting these situations is very important because it enhances, at
least in theory, the ability of  those groups that are affected by Brexit to assert their rights
as co-equal members of  the polity. Temporal and ontological security (addressing,
respectively, the questions of  the direction of  EU integration and the nature of  the EU
polity) are challenged by the failure of  the programmatic nature of  the ‘ever closer union’
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provisions in the Treaty and again it is useful to point out the constitutional relevance of
Article 50 TEU as a security-oriented provision. The popular dimension of  security may
help us to emphasise the failure of  the EU machinery to embrace the complexity of  the
people(s) and is intimately connected to the recurring debate on the demos. Epistemic
security, relating to the question of  the extent to which multiple rationalities or claims of
authority can coexist, must deal with the degree of  conflictuality between different levels
of  governance, which Brexit, as well as other ‘crises’ currently undermining the European
project, have highlighted. 
In addition to the descriptive analysis mentioned above, security may also provide a
normative conceptual framework to understand Brexit and its relationship with EU law:
such a framework emerges simultaneously as an opportunity for growth and as a threat
to the European project. Brexit should be considered a lesson for the future, because self-
referential, navel-gazing security (i.e. pursuing the European project for its own sake –
whether pushing for more unification or for more diversification) has promoted a model
of  integration which has not necessarily taken into account the diversified needs of  the
Member States. In other words, although the EU should make more effort to avoid the
fragmentation of  the Internal Market, differentiated integration should not be dismissed
too easily, and future policies and regimes should take the economic and social
constitution more seriously. The hope is that both conceptual frameworks employed in
the article – descriptive and normative – will provide a starting point for future research
in the field.
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‘Benefit tourism’ post-Brexit: tackling the





This article argues that welfare migration, although ill-defined and yet to be proven empirically, needs to be
addressed by the EU. The negative perception of  immigration has given rise to anti-EU, nationalist
sentiment. Financial solidarity between EU citizens is subject to caveats, although there is hope for increased
solidarity between pro-EU citizens post-Brexit. The EU should foster this by introducing ‘associate
citizenship’. It can take guidance from the USA and provide for basic EU social standards while
guaranteeing free movement for the rich and the poor. 
Keywords: migration; social benefits; solidarity; federalism; Dano; social union; associate
citizenship; EU minimum social standard; EU funding
Introduction
In a federation or organisation of  states based on free movement of  citizens, people canmake their living wherever they think they and their families will thrive best. This is
typically incentivised insofar as migrants contribute to the host society. But what about
those who are not yet, or not currently, providing for themselves in terms of  housing, basic
income or health insurance? Such migrants are typically deterred in one form or another,
for example by limiting social protection in the host state, or by limiting free movement of
those who are not self-sufficient. Challenging such practices, it will be argued that deterring
migration of  poor people in a ‘federal’ system1 with otherwise open borders is neither
workable nor can it be a valid policy option. 
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1     Following James Madison (The Federalist No 39), power in a ‘federal system’ lies in more than one central
governmental unit. The reference to federal systems as opposed to federal states is meant to capture the
supranational structure of  the EU. Functionally, the EU is a federal system, regardless of  whether it achieves
the same level of  integration as a nation state: see Ingolf  Pernice, Harmonization of  Legislation in Federal Systems
(Nomos 1996) 9, 15. Employing a political science perspective, see Ernest A Young, ‘What Can Europe Tell
Us about the Future of  American Federalism’ (2017) 49 Arizona State Law Journal 1109, 1110: both the EU
and the USA fulfil the criteria of  geopolitical division, independence (i.e. different bases of  electoral
authority), and direct governance. 
When newcomers to a country with relatively high social standards claim public
benefits, their entitlement is often questioned. At worst, they are suspected of  having
moved solely in order to enjoy this higher social standard compared to their home
country (pejoratively referred to as ‘social tourism’, or ‘benefit tourism’): the larger the
group of  benefit recipients, the bigger the risk of  a decrease in social standards in the
affected countries. Although not uncontroversial, this might ultimately lower the overall
standard within the federation or organisation, as no country wants to attract more poor
people than its neighbouring countries (in a ‘race to the bottom’). 
This is not a new problem for the EU. The (failed) EU constitutional project,
including the separately adopted Fundamental Rights Charter, and the EU Citizenship
Directive2 prompted discussion of  the Member States retaining powers to limit their
financial exposure. However, the problem has been aggravated since the Brexit
referendum campaign, in which ‘benefit tourism’ served as a tool to discredit the freedom
of  movement and the authority of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU).
Euroscepticism may well showcase an increased reluctance vis-à-vis international law and
cooperation more generally.3 However, the focus in this article will be on the ‘cultural
backlash’ that is caused by public resentment against immigration.4 Drawing on
sociological research and a comparative outlook into US law, I will argue that if  free
movement is coupled with equal access to social benefits this needs to be combined with
minimum social provision at the EU level.
1 The empty slogan of ‘benefit tourism’
There is no empirical proof  that people move across borders in order to improve their
social status by obtaining benefits in another country. At best, the evidence is mixed.5
However, policymakers appear to take the possibility of  welfare migration into account
when regulating, even if  this may be more of  a perceived than a real risk.6 The fear of
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2     Directive 2004/38/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on the right of  citizens of  the Union
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of  the Member States: OJ L 158/77,
29 April 2004.
3     Catherine E De Vries, ‘Waning Public Support for International Cooperation? Some Lessons from Europe’
(6 October 2017), essay prepared for the ‘Challenges to the Contemporary World Order’ Workshop, Filzbach,
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(Hart 2017) 55, 82 with further references. D Thym (ibid 2) illustrates this with German policies explicitly
directed at disincentivising welfare migration in 2013. 
migration suggests a ‘downward bias’ simply because there is the perception that benefits
need to be capped so as to avoid them becoming a ‘welfare magnet’.7
However, even in theory it is not clear what ‘benefit tourism’ is supposed to mean. In
EU law, one very broad definition can be found in the Trojani case, where Advocate
General Geelhoed defined ‘social tourism’ as ‘moving to a Member State with a more
congenial social security environment’ (Trojani-test).8 While this is a clear-cut objective
test, it would catch all scenarios in which an EU citizen from a poorer Member State
moves to a richer one. At least, one must add the condition that the newcomer claims
social benefits in the richer Member State. But even this leaves an over-inclusive definition
that potentially applies to students, jobseekers, and former workers or service providers
who are currently on leave (voluntarily or involuntarily), or in transition between jobs, and
pensioners with a low income. This goes too far as it does not account for either the
length of  or reason for economic inactivity. Therefore, the EU citizen’s situation at the
point in time he or she actually entered the host Member State becomes crucial. The
Trojani-test makes sense only if  limited to people who already at the time of  entry into the host
state are either economically inactive or already in receipt of  benefits. The objective factors
thus narrowed down would require that a citizen from a Member State with a less
congenial social environment moves to another Member State at a point in time where he
or she is not self-sufficient, and then claims benefits in the host Member State.
This sharpens the focus on people like family members, students or jobseekers; in
other words, EU citizens who at the time of  entry were ‘economically inactive’. All these
might qualify as potential ‘social tourists’ – at least as soon as they claim benefits in a
Member State richer than their home state. This shows that there is an important element
missing so far: an inquiry into the state of  mind within which the non-active EU citizen
exercised his or her free movement rights. A different test, looking at subjective factors,
would address this element. One example is the relevant provision of  the German Social
Code at the heart of  the Dano case, which will be analysed in more detail below. It
excluded from the right to social assistance ‘foreign nationals who have entered national
territory in order to obtain social assistance . . . and their family members’.9 The obvious
downside is that it will normally prove very difficult, if  not impossible, to determine the
precise intentions with which someone moves from one country to another. For example,
a jobseeker by definition does not have a secured income yet. Do jobseekers who know
or should know that their chances of  finding employment in the host Member State are
extremely low already meet the subjective threshold? There will typically be more than
one motivating factor for the move to another country; so how should one determine
which one is the paramount factor? Any workable test should therefore combine
objective and subjective analysis.
One important objective factor is the overall amount of  benefits received, contrasted
with the overall amount of  taxes paid by (a specific group of) migrants. Worth noting is
‘Benefit tourism’ post-Brexit 273
7     Brückner (n 6) 507–8, 519 (USA). For the EU, see Giuseppe Bertola, Juan F Jimeno, Ramon Marimon and
Christopher Pissarides, ‘Welfare Systems and Labor Markets in Europe: What Convergence before and after
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the empirical study by Dustmann and Frattini,10 based on data from 2000 onwards. It
showed that foreigners from the European Economic Area (EEA) in total contributed
positively rather than burdened the UK economy. This suggests that at least in overall
fiscal numbers there has been no ‘social tourism’ of  migrants from the EEA within the
UK. With regard to out-of-work benefits, the Financial Times in September 2017 published
a figure of  only 1.9 per cent (for the year 2015/2016) that were claimed by EEA
nationals.11 Again, this shows that the numbers of  individual EU citizens that may (or
may not) classify as ‘benefit tourists’ is low. This is important because the CJEU case law
suggests that the ‘burden’ on public resources is the sum of  benefit claims.12
This much-criticised case law13 has implicitly followed an approach very similar to the
one suggested here: it has looked at objective factors of  integration of  EU citizens – either
with regard to the employment market, or with regard to the society of  the host state
more generally. It appears to have done so with a view to establishing the subjective mindset
of  the migrant, which may make sense as a matter of  theory. But in practice, as an analysis
of  Dano will show, people are likely to have better reasons for migration than merely
reaching out for higher social standards.
2 Waiting requirements for new residents?
Welfare migration needs to be tackled since it is a perceived (‘ghost’) problem that
policymakers address. It will now be argued that this cannot be done by disincentivising
migration of  the poor. 
2.1. US LAW AS POINT OF COMPARISON
Although there remain important differences between the USA and the EU, the former
can well serve as a point of  comparison for the EU since both are structured as federal
systems.14 Welfare migration in both systems has already been compared from a
constitutional law point of  view.15 The aim here is to add a sociological perspective, with
particular regard to the events leading to and following the UK’s decision to leave the EU. 
The – perceived16 – problem of  ‘social tourism’ exists in the USA to the extent that
social policies and some benefits remain within the power of  the states, leading to a divide
between states with robust social welfare systems and those with weaker ones. Therefore,
similarly to the EU, the question became whether states could protect their public
finances against claims by new arrivals. In the 1969 case of  Shapiro v Thompson17 the US
Supreme Court had to decide whether Connecticut, Pennsylvania and the District of
Columbia could lawfully limit access to social welfare by requiring new residents to wait
for one year before making claims. The US Supreme Court held that they could not:
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10   Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, ‘The Fiscal Effects of  Immigration to the UK’ (2014) 124
Economic Journal 563. 
11   Gavin Jackson, ‘EU Migrants’ Claims for Unemployment Benefits Fall’, Financial Times (London, 2 September
2017) < www.ft.com/content/520f183e-8bdd-11e7–9084-d0c17942ba93>.
12   Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 para 62.
13   See e.g. Herwig Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU: A Narrow or Broad Interpretation of
the Possibilities Offered by the ECJ in Dano’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 363. 
14   See n 1 above.
15   For an in-depth discussion, see van der Mei (n 5). For a discussion from an EU fundamental rights perspective,
see Konstanze von Papp, Die Integrationswirkung von Grundrechten in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Nomos 2006)
246–89. 
16   See nn 6–7 and accompanying text. 
17   394 US 618 (1969).
On the basis of  this sole difference [between those who have already resided for
at least a year and those who have not] the first class is granted and the second
class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of  the families to
obtain the very means to subsist – food, shelter, and other necessities of  life.18 
It added that: 
If  a law has no other purpose than to chill the assertion of  constitutional rights
[here, the right to travel within the US from one state to another] by penalising
those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.19
Even the narrower question of  whether combatting ‘social tourism’ in the subjective
sense (people who move with the intention of  claiming higher benefits in another state)
might constitute a legitimate purpose of  state legislation was answered in the negative.
First, the legislation at stake applied to all new residents, irrespective of  their qualifying
as ‘social tourists’. Second, it was legitimate for US citizens to have regard to the standard
of  living and welfare when choosing their place of  residence. 
By contrast, the Supreme Court held that the introduction of  an objective test of
residency, fraud prevention and encouraging early entry into the workforce were
legitimate aims. However, the legislation remained unconstitutional because it was not
rationally related to either of  these purposes. Some of  the reasoning here could well be
extrapolated into the EU context.
In 1999, the Supreme Court scrutinised a Californian law that limited benefits for new
arrivals in their first year to the amount they would have received in the state of  their
former residence. While this legislation had been enacted with federal approval, it was
obviously motivated by the narrower aim of  discouraging ‘social tourism’: there is no
windfall immediately to be obtained in the new state, so people are either moving for
reasons other than higher social standards, or show a willingness to fully integrate.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Saenz v Roe20 still found this unconstitutional since by
discriminating against newcomers (who did not get the higher Californian welfare rate) it
created a ‘hierarchy of  45 subclasses of  similarly situated citizens based on the location
of  their prior residence’.
The US Supreme Court clarified that: 
Were we solely concerned with actual deterrence to migration, we might be
persuaded that a partial withholding of  benefits constitutes a lesser incursion on
the right to travel than an outright denial of  all benefits . . . But since the right to
travel embraces the citizen’s right to be treated equally in the new state of
residence, the discriminatory classification is itself  a penalty.21
Whereas the precise doctrinal basis for the holding in Saenz v Roe is a different one from
that employed in Shapiro, the ultimate outcome in both cases rests on a somewhat stricter
scrutiny applied to the equal protection clause.22
The CJEU has based its case law on the same link between citizens’ free movement
rights and non-discrimination.23 Does this mean that, as in the USA, deterring welfare
migration as such is not a valid policy option in the EU?
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22    See von Papp (n 15) 261–7. The limits of  an analogy with EU free movement law are discussed ibid at 269–86.
23   Case C-85/96 Sala [1998] ECR I-2691 para 62. See also Cases C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193 and 
C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565 para 44. 
2.2. POLITICAL THEORY UNDERLYING THE ACCESS-TO-WELFARE CASES: CAN THE EU BE
COMPARED TO THE US?
In the words of  Justice Cardozo, quoted by the Supreme Court in Saenz:
The Constitution was framed under the dominion of  a political philosophy less
parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of  the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not in division.24
The Supreme Court thus relied on equal citizenship rights as a matter of  political
philosophy or theory. The question becomes whether a similar understanding of  EU
citizenship is possible, applying equal treatment strictly to social rights. Despite the similar
doctrinal approach – tying free movement and non-discrimination – it is questionable
whether this originates from a similar political theory in the EU. In the absence of  a
European ‘nation’, the somewhat vague notion of  EU ‘solidarity’25 would arguably come
closest to building the necessary bridge to such a unionist philosophy.26 It is here
understood as preparedness to share public resources. 
2.2.1. EU solidarity in theory
It can be left open here whether solidarity has any legal bite, for example by amounting
to a general principle of  EU law.27 Solidarity in the literature is often discussed hand-in-
hand with citizenship28 and hence ultimately the democratic legitimacy of  the EU given
its (lack of) one demos.29 It is important, however, to differentiate, since associative
relationships as the basis for solidarity can be described at different levels. We are here
looking not at the political, but at the societal level into what could be labelled
communitarian solidarity.30 The assumption is that the place of  residence – more precisely,
actual or bona fide residence – serves as one important point of  reference for people of  all
nationalities because they have a natural interest in local (and eventually, national) matters
that affect them. Societal bonds thus exist between people belonging to the same
community, with smaller communities potentially yielding the stronger bonds.31 Residents
in a particular place are normally recognised as legitimate ‘stakeholders’ with very close to
equal rights when compared to full citizens.32 This makes sense from a fairness perspective,
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24   Baldwin v GAF Seelig, Inc, 294 US 511, 523 (1935), which is quoted at 526 US 489, 511 (1999).
25   See the literature review by Dimitri Kochenov, ‘The Essence of  EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten
Years of  Academic Debate: Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon?’ (2013) 62 International and
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27   See Catherine Barnard, ‘Solidarity and the Commission’s Renewed Social Agenda’, in Ross and Borgmann-
Prebil (n 25).
28   Dagmar Schiek, ‘Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to Status Socialis Activus
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29   Peter L Lindseth, ‘European Solidarity and National Identity: An American Perspective’ (2012) Berliner
Online-Beiträge zum Europarecht Nr 79. See section 4 below.
30   de Witte (n 5). Communitarian solidarity can be seen as playing out on a ‘societal’ level, thus distinct from
‘market solidarity’ and ‘political solidarity’. Ibid. 
31   See section 2.2.2 below.
32   Peter Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity after Globalization (Oxford University Press 2008) 81; Pavlos
Eleftheriadis, ‘The Content of  European Citizenship’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 777, 792.
since there is some basic level of  reciprocity between all permanent residents (and
citizens) as ‘cooperative agents’ in the respective state.33
On an abstract level, solidarity can be contrasted with market dynamics. As such it
plays a role in different contexts of  EU law.34 The context of  specific interest here is free
movement and citizenship law to the extent it dealt with access to social benefits in actual
cases. In the landmark case involving a French student in Belgium, the court famously
held that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of  nationals of  the Member
States’;35 and ‘there is a certain degree of  financial solidarity between nationals of  a host Member State
and nationals of  other Member States, particularly if  the difficulties . . . are temporary.’36 The court
clearly postulates some form of  financial solidarity – but does this exist in reality?
2.2.2 ‘Financial solidarity’ between residents?
The Court in Grzelczyk explicitly addressed solidarity not between EU Member States, but
between people in the Member States. Therefore, I will focus on solidarity between EU citizens.
More precisely, the question is whether there is financial solidarity between actual residents.
There may be a plausible argument that some solidarity between national and non-
national residents within a community exists at least at the local level.37 The fact that EU
citizens as residents have active and passive voting rights in municipal elections (Article
22 Treaty on the Functioning of  the EU (TFEU)) illustrates this. Similarly, the court may
be implicitly acknowledging the importance of  attachment to a place when relying on
(lawful) residency as a basis for an equal treatment claim to social benefits.38 More
specifically, a case that was handed down very shortly before the 2016 UK referendum
found room for Member States subjecting in-work benefits such as child benefits to a
habitual residence requirement.39 This corresponds with the sociological insight that the
prerequisite of  solidarity is social freedom,40 which in turn is strongest in places where
people know each other.41 The particular importance of  small communities in this
respect is evidenced by empirical research in the US, where sociologists have concluded
that solidarity-building is one purpose of  civic engagement on the local level.42 The same
is true for the EU,43 and also globally.44
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Dimensions’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of  European and Comparative Law 605; and the collection of
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36   Ibid para 44 (emphasis added).
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38   Case C-85/96 Sala (note 23) para 63.
39   Case C-308/14 Commission v UK ECLI:EU:C:2016:436 (finding an indirect discrimination that is justified). For
a detailed critique see Jaan Paju, The European Union and Social Security Law (Hart 2017).
40   This goes back to Emile Durkheim, referenced by Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford
University Press 2014) 266.
41   Ibid 265.
42   Gianpaolo Baiocchi et al, ‘The Civic Imagination: Political Culture in Contemporary American Cities’
(American Political Science Association 2013) 25–9 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2304198>. 
43   Tom Inglis and Susie Donnelly, ‘Local and National Belonging in a Globalised World’ (2011) 19 Irish Journal
of  Sociology 127 (based on data collected between 2000 and 2007): despite increased mobility, the level of
identification with national and local places is high. It is evidenced regarding ‘deep rooted belonging’ (people
brought up in one place) and ‘elective belonging’ (people who chose to move there).
44   As illustrated by the resurgence of  area studies, see the collection by Tony Chafer, ‘Area Studies in the Global
Age: Community, Place, Identity’ (2017) 25 Journal of  Contemporary European Studies 510.
However, the crucial question is the following: from which point in time do nationals
of  the host state consider newcomers as sufficiently integrated in the sense that they are
seen as entitled to social benefits? From the point of  arrival? Or should newcomers have
to earn their social entitlement? Empirical research in the EU points to the latter, as is
revealed in particular by the data underlying the afore-mentioned study by Dustmann and
Frattini:45 according to a European Social Survey dating from 2008, only 8 per cent of
EU citizens thought that newcomers should have access to social welfare from the point
of  arrival. At the opposite end of  the spectrum, another 8 per cent thought that
immigrants should never have the same rights as natives. But there is a broad consensus
among the remaining majority that migrants must demonstrate that they deserve social
benefits in the host state. However, this majority is almost evenly split between those who
believe newcomers have earned their rights to social benefits once they have worked and
paid taxes for a year (38%); and those who believe that access to welfare should be limited
to those who have acquired citizenship of  the host state (37%). Hence, there is an
obvious problem of  defining the exact point in time from which migrants can generally
be regarded as sufficiently integrated into the host society, so that the local population is
willing to let them share in social benefits. Defining this point in time correctly is
particularly challenging given that the range is between one year and the acquisition of
full citizenship. This can best be seen in cases involving students, where other indicators
(such as taxpaying) normally do not apply.
The presumption of  financial solidarity with a foreign student in Mr Grzelczyk’s
situation arguably falls within these parameters for two reasons. First, when Mr Grzelczyk
claimed benefits he had been studying in Belgium for three years. He could thus have
achieved what the court in later case law referred to as a ‘real and effective degree of  connection’46
with the host state. Apart from education in the relevant state, the court in other student
cases saw the following elements as indicative of  such a real connection: ‘family,
employment, language skills or the existence of  other social and economic factors’.47
Second, students from other EU Member States have a special status in the sense that
they are not expected to fully integrate into the host society as they might ultimately
complete their education elsewhere, and/or enter their respective professions in their
home state. But what about other non-active citizens?
3 Ms Dano as prototype of the not deserving,48 non-active citizen?
While case law at some point loosened the ‘lawful residence’ requirement,49 the court in
Dano reaffirmed its importance regarding rights of  non-active EU citizens. In addition,
Dano exemplifies a line of  enquiry into the proximity between the relevant EU citizen and
the host state. This case will now be analysed in more detail for two reasons: first, its
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theoretical reasoning constitutes an important breaking point with earlier case law;50
second, its factual background illustrates how wrong the presumption of  ‘benefit tourism’
can be. It will be argued that the court’s reasoning is sound in theory, but it fails to
account for Ms Dano’s real-life situation.
3.1 DANO: THE FACTS
Ms Dano was a very young Romanian mother who, at the age of  20, had a baby son born
in Germany in 2009. While her original arrival date remained unclear, she last entered
Germany in late 2010. At this point she received an unlimited residence certificate from
the city of  Leipzig in mid-2011, followed up by a duplicate certificate in early 2013.
Ms Dano had moved in with her sister in Leipzig, who was supporting her and the child.
Ms Dano, who was in receipt of  federal child benefits (€184 per month) and social
assistance by the city for children and young people (€133 per month), then applied in
vain for basic provision under the German Social Code. This was denied by reference to
para 23(3) of  the relevant part of  the Social Code SGB XII, excluding foreign nationals
from claims if  they entered German territory to obtain social assistance.51
3.2 DANO: THE JUDGMENT BY THE CJEU
The CJEU held that excluding Ms Dano from these benefits was lawful. There was
‘nothing to indicate that Ms Dano has looked for a job’, so she was ‘not seeking
employment and . . . did not enter Germany in order to work’. This is an inference from
objective factors to Ms Dano’s subjective mindset. Having been in Germany for longer
than three months but shorter than five years, her residency status under the EU
Citizenship Directive 2004/38 was subject to Articles 7(1) and 14(2) (sufficient
resources); and specific regard was due to recital 10 in the preamble (not becoming an
unreasonable burden). The court held that under the Directive, ‘economically inactive
Union citizens [are thus prevented] from using the host Member State’s welfare system to
fund their means of  subsistence’. While this may be true – although the primary objective
of  the Directive according to its recital 3 could be understood as facilitating free
movement – the question that would normally have followed is whether primary law
requires an exception, given the individual circumstances.52 A right to reside may also
have followed from the national residency certificate53 which Ms Dano had. 
The court in Dano did not, however, follow these lines of  enquiry, and instead based
its conclusion solely on secondary law: since Ms Dano was making a request for basic
provision, she did not have sufficient resources. If  she did not have sufficient resources,
she did not have a right to reside as a non-economic active EU citizen. This kind of
circular reasoning has been technically ruled out since Grzelczyk, at least for temporary
neediness. A preferable approach would thus have been the one followed by the
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52   Case C-140/12 Brey (n 23).
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programme might constitute employment). Mr Trojani’s situation warranted access to welfare on the basis of
lawful residence, derived from a national permit. The outcome in this case can well be understood to be
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Advocate-General in reliance on previous case law: even though Ms Dano may still be
lawfully resident and thus have the right to equal treatment, her exclusion from benefits
may be justified by showing a burden on the social assistance system of  the host state,
and by demonstrating that the criterion used by the national legislator in order to establish
a ‘genuine link’ between the EU citizen and the host Member State is proportionate. 
3.3 DANO: OBJECTIVE FACTORS DEMONSTRATING (IN)SUFFICIENT SOCIETAL INTEGRATION
The CJEU relied on findings by the German court that Ms Dano had neither completed
school education, nor undergone any professional training, nor ever had a job. Moreover,
while her oral understanding of  German seemed sufficient, she could not write in German
and her ability to read texts was limited. Assuming that Ms Dano did not qualify as a
jobseeker, the court considered not her chances of  finding employment, but other factors
such as education and language skills (with an emphasis on reading and writing in
German). Whereas language skills are one of  the traditional requirements for
demonstrating societal integration,54 the consideration of  Ms Dano’s level of  education
could be taken as inquiring into her potential for qualifying as a jobseeker at some later
point, or her potential to contribute to the society of  the host Member State in some (other)
way. Seen in this light, her lack of  sufficient language skills could also be understood as
showing that she currently did not contribute to German society. It seemed therefore
plausible to conclude from these objective factors that Ms Dano intended to move to
Germany for benefit purposes. Although the decision does not explicitly rest on it, this
intention must be inferred in order for Ms Dano to fall under the relevant German law.55
3.4 A CRITIQUE OF DANO
Ms Dano was a young and single immigrant mother raising a small child. Hence, she
suffered multiple disadvantages on grounds of  age, ethnicity and gender, which put her
in one of  the structurally weakest groups in society.56 Childcare obligations at least
provide a solid reason for not being in paid employment. Alternatively, childcare for one’s
own child born in the host state could qualify as a societal contribution, which would have
allowed Ms Dano to be treated more like Mr Trojani or Mr Baumbast.57 Moreover,
Ms Dano’s young age rendered it unlikely that she would qualify as a former worker.58
Looking at this real-life scenario behind her appearance as ‘economically inactive’, one
could have argued that her need was only temporary in the Grzelczyk sense, that is, until
her son was at school and she able to find low-skilled part-time work and attend German
language classes. 
Moving on to the subjective mindset – the question of  why Ms Dano moved to
Germany – are there any motives other than ‘benefit tourism’? Ms Dano had joined her
older sister in Germany. This could have been a straightforward case of  family
reunification. However, the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 does not recognise the bond
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between siblings as strong enough to warrant derived rights of  residence automatically
(had Ms Dano joined her parents in Germany upon whom she depended for a living, she
would have benefitted from a right to reside under Article 2(2)(c)). Nevertheless,
according to recital 6:
. . . in order to maintain the unity of  the family in a broader sense . . . the situation
of  those persons who are not included in the definition of  family member . . .
and who therefore do not enjoy an automatic right of  entry and residence . . .
should be examined by the host Member State on the basis of  its own national
legislation, in order to decide whether entry and residence could be granted . . .
taking into consideration [the] relationship with the Union citizen or any other
circumstances, such as their financial or physical dependence on the Union
citizen (see also Article 3(2)).59
This makes perfect sense given that family ties are the strongest bond of  solidarity60
within any broader parts of  society. 
Hence, there were strong indications that Ms Dano was not a benefit tourist. Although
portrayed as a typical case of  ‘economic inactivity’, one could well have argued temporary
financial solidarity. This shows that the formal dichotomy active–inactive cannot fully
address people’s real situations. Tackling migration by denying social rights to perceived
benefit tourists is therefore not an appropriate tool. 
4 Access to benefits: the citizenship angle
To recap, solidarity can be looked at from either an economic, a societal, or a broader
political perspective.61 Moving on to the latter, the question is whether we can assume
solidarity between EU citizens that is independent from their attachment to the market
or a local community. Therefore, the notion of  EU citizenship becomes important, but
from a functional perspective rather than an examination of  its precise content, following
different citizenship models.62 The question is: what role can EU citizenship play when it
comes to welfare migration and its public perception?
4.1 THE DECLINE OF THE IDEA OF NATION-BUILDING?
The traditional view is that, in contrast to the USA, the EU does not constitute a nation
since the socio-political requirements necessary for the emergence of  a pan-European
society are lacking.63 This is also why solidarity on a political level has been referred to as
‘aspirational’ only.64 On a theoretical level, one could counter this by saying that
European nation-building in a traditional sense is not (necessarily) the purpose of  EU
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64   de Witte (n 5).
citizenship.65 From a global perspective, one could argue that the assimilation of  the legal
position of  permanent residents to that of  nationals (as is the case under EU law) goes
some way towards diminishing the importance of  the nation state.66 But apart from its
structural role,67 EU citizenship also has a specific function ensuring fairness in a more
substantive sense.68 Seen in this way, it is the potential driving force for developing
solidarity within European societies.69 I am here following Ulrich Beck’s suggestion that
the ‘horizontal’70 level of  Europeanisation (deriving from the actual lives of  people) is the
most important element in achieving solidarity. Jürgen Habermas’71 proposal to foster
solidarity simply by improving EU democratic structures (‘vertical’ Europeanisation in
Beck’s terminology) appears too theoretical and overly optimistic. In other words, I
understand the purpose underlying EU citizenship along the lines of  transnational fairness,
while relying overall on the structural framework originating in the literature on EU
democratic deficit. This means that we are looking at the potential of  EU citizenship to
bring about a ‘European way of  life’ that includes people embracing a social safety-net for
all EU citizens as such. What is the impact of  Brexit on such a vision?
4.2 BREXIT AS A BREAKING POINT
Brexit stands as a synonym for ‘taking back control’ and hence the return of  the nation
state. With specific regard to migration, it is revealing the limits of  European integration
– or, more broadly, globalisation – by reasserting the power of  the state. What does this
imply for solidarity between EU citizens as such? One possible line of  argument would
see Brexit as ending this aspiration, stressing the anti-globalisation and anti-EU sentiment
(from both the political left and right) that Brexit stirred in the UK and elsewhere.
However, from a political theory perspective, this does not necessarily have to mean the
end of  a European collective identity: arguably, it is still better to have a pan-European
discourse than to have none at all, even if  this discourse is ‘contest-driven’ instead of
searching for a consensus.72 At least in the UK, awareness and knowledge of  the EU have
been increasing since June 2016. Nevertheless, the problem is that anti-EU sentiment has
also led to strong election results for nationalist parties in countries such as France,
Germany and Austria – although immigration from outside the EU appears to have
played a major role here. It is generally acknowledged that the public perception of
immigration as a ‘threat’ to either the culture or the economy is a salient factor for the rise
of  right-wing parties.73 Even proponents of  a more controversial political discourse
acknowledge that in federal systems74 this poses the risk of  eventual disintegration of  the
central unit, in particular if  there is an exit option such as Article 50 of  the Treaty on
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European Union.75 If  nationalism is the alternative to the EU (instead of  EU reform),
the risk of  failure of  the EU project is real. So this would corroborate an argument against
EU citizenship as a solid pathway to solidarity after Brexit.76
Another, more optimistic line of  thought would see Brexit as a breaking point in a
promising sense: faced with a choice, 48 per cent of  UK voters overall wanted to remain
part of  the EU. Those of  them who are convinced Europeans (‘remainers’, in contrast to
‘soft remainers’ without a real sense of  belonging) have teamed up with EU citizens
elsewhere – i.e. not along but across national boundaries. They have spoken out more
loudly in favour of  the EU than ever before. This can be evidenced, for example, by the
rise of  the newspaper The New European and, most recently, by the foundation of  Renew
(a new anti-Brexit party),77 as well as Our Future Our Choice (OFOC) (a new campaign
group initiated by young people opposed to Brexit).78 Given the crucial role of  the media
and campaigning with respect to people forming a political opinion, this allows for a pan-
European political discourse that consolidates knowledge about the EU, and is also
consensus-driven79 since it aims to foster the EU project. In other words, there is now a
basis for more solidarity among those parts of  European societies who have been
rendered more aware of  the advantages of  the EU and have elected (or would elect) to
stay European. I will refer to them as ‘new EU citizens’.
4.3. THE CASE FOR INCREASED SOLIDARITY AMONG THE NEW EU CITIZENS
Sociologists associate identity with the feeling of  belonging to a certain culture and social
psychology.80 While it has become evident that European societies are divided, Brexit is
likely to strengthen the sense of  belonging to the EU amongst the new EU citizens. This
article’s argument is that the bond between new EU citizens has larger potential than the
diffuse anti-EU sentiment, which superficially unites UK ‘leavers’ and EU-critics elsewhere.
This can best be seen when looking at EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in other
Member States following Brexit: these feel the immediate consequences of  the 2016
referendum, which has put their vested EU rights and hence their legal status in jeopardy.
Their interests in preserving as much of  the status quo as possible are aligned perfectly with
territorial focus on the EU. In other words, European society is divided, but not along
national frontiers. There is now realisation of  a new form of  discrimination in the UK
against EU citizens as a group. This is cause for concern,81 but also noteworthy in that ‘EU
nationals’82 are treated as one group. Immigrants in the UK are being singled out not for
being foreign (i.e. non-UK), nor for being from another Member State, but for being European.
The alarm or even shock over this experience is being absorbed by new pro-EU activist
groups, both in the UK (e.g. the3million) and abroad (e.g. British in Europe and Pulse of
Europe). In short, Brexit nurtures solidarity amongst the new EU citizens.
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Solidarity may also increase with changing business structures post-Brexit. The risks
associated with an exit from the EU and existing models of  affiliation with the Internal
Market, including the Customs Union, is prompting firms and EU agencies in the UK to
reconsider their location. Ironically, Brexit is triggering more free movement in the sense
that businesses need to find territorial bases in the EU to ensure continued access to the
EU market. This increases the chances of  UK citizens living and working abroad, thus
experiencing the economic benefits of  the EU and becoming embedded in the societies
of  other Member States. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the use of  ‘opportunity
structure’ for social interaction is to a certain extent related to a country’s level of
economic interactions and the process of  economic integration.83 This cautious
conclusion is based on data from 2007 to 2011, so may be influenced by the financial
crisis. In any event, Euroscepticism is relatively low amongst those who are mobile across
national borders, or those who have lived in another EU country: the more ‘transnational’
in that sense an individual is, the more pro-European he or she is likely to be.84 So the
level of  Europeanisation, which in the UK is lower than in other EU Member States,85 is
likely to improve for those UK citizens who following Brexit are willing to relocate with
their jobs. 
4.4 BREXIT AS A SHARED MEMORY
From a sociological perspective, the above-mentioned factors support the argument that
despite its divisional force there is also promise in Brexit. This is because solidarity
(sometimes also referred to as ‘trust’) requires a collective identity, which presupposes
some form of  self-awareness that is construed vis-à-vis ‘the other’,86 and a collective
memory.87 The unfolding of  Brexit – the debate, the choice, the consequences – will
constitute such a collective memory for people in the UK and the EU. It is likely to be
strongest for UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK who (together with UK
remainers) feel immediate consequences. Their collective memory is thus sharper and
likely to be more powerful, especially if  it continues to be echoed among wider parts of
(pro-)EU societies. In any event, whether as a positive or negative image, Brexit will shape
public opinion and hence the collective memory of  people in the EU.88
4.5 THE IMPACT OF INCREASING NUMBERS OF DUAL NATIONALS
The impact of  new EU citizens with a European sense of  belonging is likely to deepen
in the longer run. This is because mobile EU citizens directly affected by Brexit are now
much more likely to apply for a second passport in light of  the uncertainties for residency
and other rights following Brexit. This is generally evidenced by the rising number of
citizenship applications in the UK: Home Office statistics published by the BBC in
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August 2017 have shown the number of  citizenship applications by EU nationals almost
doubling, rising from 15,871 in 2015/2016 to 28,502 in 2016/2017.89 These numbers
focus on the UK only, but there is also evidence of  rising citizenship applications by
British nationals in other EU Member States, totalling 6555 in 2016 (up from 2478 in
2015).90 Even if  this does not lead to dual nationality in all cases, there will be a political
voice for pro-European citizens in the UK that was formerly lacking in the 2016
referendum. The same is true for UK expats in other Member States. This may well
confine or reduce the current role of  anti-EU, nationalist parties: people with two
nationalities embody an understanding of  different cultures – they can bridge
discrepancies or misunderstandings. In other words, the more shared (national) identities
there are, the clearer becomes the awareness of  ‘the other’, which will increase tolerance91
and, ultimately, mutual trust. 
Moreover, if  these increased applications do lead to dual nationality, those EU citizens
would then have the right to vote in more than one Member State, thus increasing their
voice within the EU as a whole. It remains for the EU Member States to decide whether
they want to relax their regulations regarding the possibility of  dual citizenship, which has
traditionally been discouraged. However, there are signs that in the aftermath of  Brexit
some EU Member States will allow for dual nationality of  their citizens in the UK,92 or
UK citizens abroad.93 While the underlying motive for the increase in passport
applications is likely to be a pragmatic desire for security, this does not exclude that at
some point there has been, will be, or still is a genuine feeling of  belonging to the EU and
the host state. Crucially, EU citizens with a second nationality will become fully integrated
politically, forming part of  the future electorate of  their second home country. 
Thus, there is a case for increased solidarity between (new) EU citizens following
Brexit. This would have to be acknowledged in future case law in a way similar to the US
metaphor of  ‘sinking or swimming together’.94 The question remains whether the
increase in tolerance and political participation will be enough to change attitudes towards
‘benefit tourism’, or migration that may be perceived as such. It has been shown by
analysing Dano that tackling migration of  poor (inactive) people relies on inapt tools and
can cause unfair results. The circuitous reasoning of  Dano can render a migrant poor EU
citizen illegal under EU law. It would be an interesting question for further empirical
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research whether new EU citizens directly affected by Brexit are now more likely to
empathise with Ms Dano – having experienced how quickly one could become an ‘illegal
migrant’. However, if  the cautious optimism regarding solidarity between (new) EU
citizens as such does not necessarily extend to financial solidarity and sharing of  public
benefits. This will be addressed with some general caveats, which underlie the conclusion
in the final section that more EU social engagement is needed, either in some form of
minimum harmonisation and/or financing.
5 Limits of financial solidarity: more EU social engagement?
5.1 THE LIMITS OF FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY IN FACT AND IN LAW
The first caveat is that the new EU citizenry might to a large extent consist of  people who
have previously enjoyed free movement. By definition, these are likely to be part of  a
particular ‘class’95 of  what could be referred to as a global ‘elite’, or more neutrally,
‘transnationally mobile’96 people – namely those who can afford to travel and most easily
fulfil the requirements that EU law imposes on free movement.97 Unless they have
experienced temporary financial distress themselves (e.g. caused by job loss, change in
status, or illness), they might not necessarily feel increased financial solidarity with fellow 
EU citizens.
The second caveat results from the fact that burden-sharing within any given society
is easier in economically robust times.98 There is generally a connection between a rights-
based, generous approach by the judiciary and the economic climate in which the relevant
cases reach the courts. The Dano case exemplifies this.99 Hence, there is a concern that in
the aftermath of  severe EU crises (stretching from the financial and Euro crises to Brexit
itself) state funds will remain strained, and it will be unlikely that people are prepared to
share.100 As indicated above,101 simply improving democratic structures within the EU –
albeit a necessary start – is not sufficient to remedy this.
Thirdly, it must be noted that, as a matter of  legal doctrine, the case for a strict
application of  equality of  EU citizens in all circumstances is weaker than in the USA,
where the Supreme Court held in Saenz that ‘the discriminatory classification [of  US
citizens as either newcomers or more established residents] is itself  a penalty’.102
Attempting a similar argument for the EU would face the problem that the principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of  nationality applies similarly to EU fundamental rights
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only ‘within the scope of  EU law’. Although this can be a very low threshold at times,103
it remains an important signpost that can be put into practice where needed. This also
means that Member States may ultimately deport illegal migrants from other Member
States – a possibility that appears more than merely theoretical following Dano, which
strictly subjects free movement to narrowly interpreted secondary law. 
5.2 THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS TO FACILITATE AND PROMOTE EU SOLIDARITY
This is where actors other than the citizens themselves are called for. Solidarity can be
incentivised as a matter of  governance, namely either by the Member States or the EU
itself. My argument is that solidarity should be especially incentivised by the EU. The role
of  the Member States is limited given that they use ‘benefit tourism’ as a narrative to
depict themselves as victims: the very purpose is finding the stopping point for a state’s
financial exposure. But in terms of  solidarity on the political level, Member States can –
and do – play an important role. By increasingly allowing for dual nationality,104 Member
States can abolish a traditional hurdle that had assumed an individual’s indivisible
(national) identity. More flexibility here would pave the way for the above-mentioned
diversification and sharing of  identities that enables tolerance and trust amongst the new
EU citizens.
For the same reasons, the EU could play an important part by offering UK citizens an
optional ‘associate EU citizenship’ post-Brexit. Although the proposed amendment to the
treaties105 appears to be withdrawn,106 the idea itself  should remain under
consideration.107 It would demonstrate a concern of  the EU for its citizens, which could
greatly enhance the public perception of  the EU as more than one central administration
based in Brussels.108 Moreover, it would create an EU citizen ‘by choice’. One critical
factor will be the costs for this (‘membership fee’),109 which carries the risk that only
those who are well off  could afford it. This concern could be tackled by drawing the
financing into a wider EU-level action plan (see below).
Alternatively, solutions could be developed by case law, starting with vested rights of
British expats in the EU. The pathway to such a solution may have been opened since the
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issue of  the exact consequences of  Brexit for EU citizenship of  UK citizens in the
Netherlands has been considered by the Dutch courts.110 The EU law protection of  dual
nationals is already quite robust, as can be seen from the case of  Ms Ormazabal, a Spanish
national who after her studies in the UK remained as a worker in the UK, acquired British
nationality in addition to her Spanish nationality, and could still successfully rely on EU
(primary) law regarding derivative rights for her Algerian husband:
[i]t would be contrary to the underlying logic of  gradual integration that informs
Article 21(1) TFEU to hold that such citizens, who have acquired rights under
that provision as a result of  having exercised their freedom of  movement, must
forego those rights – in particular the right to family life in the host Member
State – because they have sought, by becoming naturalised in that Member State,
to become more deeply integrated in the society of  that State.111
5.3 THE CASE FOR MORE SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL
At the societal level and as a matter of  EU policy, it would be important to enable free
movement of  all – the rich and the poor. This is because the EU is based upon free
movement and anti-discrimination. If  this causes a perceived risk for a decline in social
standards and hence a reaction by policymakers (see section 1), this ‘ghost’ can only be
tackled by increased social engagement at the EU level.112 Acknowledging that EU
competences in the area of  social policy are limited,113 there is still an economic argument
that as long as states fear (negative) spill-over effects of  national regulation, this
constitutes a collective action problem that can only be solved at a central level.114 In EU
terminology, this would suggest a need for minimum harmonisation. 
From a political philosophy perspective, a similar argument could rest on the need to
create more democratic structures at the supranational level in order to constrain a pure
market rationale by political considerations of  non-economic interests. Habermas’
conclusion regarding the implications of  the financial crisis can be generalised for the
place of  social policies in an economically highly integrated system: ‘welfare state and
democracy together form an inner nexus that in a [currency] union can no longer be
secured by the individual nation state alone’.115 As indicated above,116 formal
improvements to EU democracy are a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving
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more fairness in the EU: it is also essential that the EU takes on some financial
responsibility for realising social rights. This could be done by redirecting existing EU
finances such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds, which could focus on disadvantaged
EU citizens instead of  EU regions.117 Alternatively, one could consider setting up new EU
funds, either tax-based,118 or financed from membership fees for ‘associate EU
citizenship’ (while ensuring that there is a waiver system in place for people who cannot
afford this fee). This proposal ties partially with the more general call for an EU tax based
on citizenship that Stiglitz made in the wake of  the Euro crisis.119 It does not necessarily
call for fully Europeanised social redistribution. Instead, special funds could be allocated
to the Member States whose public resources are ‘unreasonably burdened’120 to ensure
an EU-defined minimum social standard.
In the longer run, one could consider combining some basic financing with flexible
forms of  EU regulation, for example by taking guidance from the US Medicaid
programme: this has become the most important block of  the controversial Affordable
Care Act,121 but – unlike social security – is not fully federalised. Instead, it relies on
cooperation with states by offering federal grants for financing state health insurance
plans that broadly match federal definitions.122 Calling for EU social engagement does
not yet have to side with either a ‘unionist’ perspective, favouring Europeanisation of
social standards including redistribution by EU policies,123 or the traditional decentralised
model, seeing social redistribution as a quintessential power of  states. While the latter
would appear more realistic in the short term,124 working towards the former should be
a mid- to longer-term task. The EU needs to provide the necessary policy objectives and
resources to accommodate the losers of  free trade and open borders.125
Finally, one could also define as a matter of  EU (case) law what minimum social
standard an EU citizen is entitled to (in abstract terms such as basic claims to food,
shelter, clothes, health coverage etc.). The amount necessary to finance this basic standard
could vary from one Member State to another (depending on effective purchasing power).
This would ideally be combined with the suggested EU financial assistance described in
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the preceding paragraph. I would base this least intrusive proposal, variations of  which
can be found in the literature since the late 1990s and early 2000s,126 on an analogy to the
Californian legislation at stake in Saenz v Roe.127 Member States would remain free (e.g. in
an explicit derogation from the otherwise applicable equal treatment principle) to provide
a higher standard above this EU minimum to their own nationals and to permanent
residents. This would give some comfort to the richer Member States and, at the same
time, secure free movement and equal rights to basic necessities for all. Achieving this has
become more important post-Brexit than before. 
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The UK out, Social Europe in? 






This article considers the impact of  Brexit on the future of  Social Europe. Through recourse to key
moments in the history of  European social integration, where Britain more often than not vehemently
opposed any coming together, its role as an important veto player in EU social policy-making is established.
With the UK set to leave the Union, the option for further social integration is no longer inconceivable. It
is featured as one of  the possible scenarios in the Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of  Europe, and
recent developments, such as the European Pillar of  Social Rights, together with its accompanying initiatives,
appear to lay the groundwork towards that. The article concludes that, although the realisation of  Social
Europe is more likely post-Brexit, there are other Member States willing to take over the UK’s role and act
as veto players on their own terms.
Keywords: Brexit; European Union; social integration; Social Europe; veto player
1 Introduction
The UK has not traditionally been an ally of  Social Europe. Any support ensued aftergiving up fierce resistance, either subsequent to change in domestic party politics or, as
a price to pay for gaining advantage from other measures that came as part of  an overall
package. Those measures were almost always linked to a liberal, economic and free-market-
oriented paradigm, which the UK framed as the essence of  its EU membership. Mainly, the
UK faced the social dimension of  EU integration with disgruntlement and wariness,
increasingly so during the period preceding the Brexit referendum. This is said to have
contributed, possibly significantly, to the pro-Leave majority. Now that the UK is set to
leave the EU, will the latter’s social dimension finally draw level with its economic one?
Social Europe had been in a stalemate until recently, despite the Lisbon Treaty’s
proclamation of  the social market economy as a key paradigm for the Union. At the same
time, the aftermath of  the global economic and financial crisis is still lingering. The
resulting anti-austerity narrative, calling for a reorientation of  the EU’s agenda, might,
together with the UK’s departure, act as a key catalyst, as epitomised by Jean-Claude
Juncker’s pledge for a more Social Europe following his 2014 election as European
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Commission President. The unveiling of  the European Pillar of  Social Rights,
accompanied by social policy consultations and proposals, demonstrates accelerated
momentum, indicating that the departure of  a persistent objector may enable the Union
to finally move forward.
The article’s key aim is to test the hypothesis that Brexit would strengthen the social
dimension of  EU integration. To do so, it employs an analytical framework rooted in the
political science theory of  veto player, coined by Tsebelis in 1995.1 By looking at the
structure and evolution of  EU social policy-making, and through recourse to key moments
where progress towards further social integration was stalled due to the UK’s opposition,
the paper establishes Britain’s role as a veto player on the basis of  three grounds:
(1) ideology, (2) party politics and Euroscepticism (3) and external interference. It then
proceeds to present the policy change that a veto player’s departure would prompt in
relation to current policy development indicated by the Reflection Paper on the Social
Dimension of  Europe (specifying an aspect of  the White Paper on the Future of  Europe)
and the European Pillar of  Social Rights, alongside accompanying initiatives. Their viability
is ascertained in light of  the UK’s departure, with reference to European Scrutiny
Committee reports and other pertinent UK government documents in order to substantiate
observations on the British position towards these initiatives. The latter will allow an
assessment of  whether Brexit will have the assumed emancipatory outcome for Social
Europe. Following that, the key constraints to the aforementioned position are analysed
based on other Member States’ attitudes toward the social dimension of  EU integration, to
show that, whilst the British departure might give social integration a push, there will be
other obstacles that can impede the realisation of  a truly social Social Europe.
2 The UK as a veto player
2.1 THE VETO PLAYER THEORY AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The veto player theory made its initial appearance in two pivotal comparative politics
studies of  the early 1990s, which used terms such as ‘veto points’ or ‘constitutional
structure’.2 Interestingly enough, both studies were focused on social policies developed
in national settings. They investigated the influence of  the power dynamics between
different institutional and political actors on the decision-making processes and resulting
policy outcomes. As Immergut argued: ‘welfare state programs . . . are not simply the
product of  long-term social and political trends; such programs have been introduced in
steps, through discrete instances of  legislative conflict’.3 It is not only the underpinning
ideologies in a country’s society and governing political elite that leave their mark on
social policy development, but also the end product of  the law-making processes in which
compromises are sought between actors with various competing interests. 
While these discussions were significant in providing a new perspective on the policy-
making discourse, Tsebelis’s seminal work conceived the notion of  ‘veto player’ and
introduced it into the dictionary of  political science. According to him, ‘a veto player is
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an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for policy decisions’.4 The
flexibility and adaptability of  the concept to different systems and settings, including
supranational institutions,5 led to a plethora of  applications in an array of  diverse ways
and scenarios.6 This article engages with the axiomatic use of  the veto player theory,7
drawing on its pre-existing application to EU-level policy-making8 and makes reference
to the key moments of  UK opposition towards furthering Social Europe, in order to test
the hypothesis that Brexit will favour a stronger EU social dimension.  
2.2 VETO PLAYERS AT EU LEVEL
Veto player theory, though initially conceived through comparative studies of  national
policy-making was soon used to analyse dynamics of  EU policy-making by Tsebelis
himself. He concluded that, up to the introduction of  the Single European Act in 1987,
each Member State was an autonomous veto player; this still applies in areas that require
unanimity for EU legislation and as regards Treaty revisions, which require ratification by
all Member States (Article 48 Treaty on European Union (TEU)).9 Post-1987, with the
gradual introduction of  qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of  the EU and
the expansion of  co-legislation of  Council and Parliament in today’s ordinary legislative
procedure, many EU decision-making processes are now imbued by the presence of
collective veto players, found in the amalgamations of  the key institutions.10
While as autonomous veto players Member States can independently block reforms,
as collective veto players they need to forge coalitions with other Member States to
advance or veto policy proposals11 through avoiding or achieving blocking minorities, as
well as influencing voting in the Parliament. EU policy-making thus requires finding allies
among countries and politicians sharing the same vested interests, underpinning
ideologies and/or policy preferences. In many areas, including social policy, unanimity
remained important post-1987 for EU legislation, and it is still required for extending the
social dimension through Treaty reform.12 The individual role of  a Member State as veto
player thus retains its relevance for the social dimension of  EU integration. 
2.3 THE UK AS A VETO PLAYER IN EU SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING
This section showcases the numerous instances where EU social integration was rejected
by the UK government. Since 1973, when the UK became an EU Member State, Labour
and Conservative governments have succeeded each other in power, and a Conservative–
Liberal Democrat coalition government was in charge between 2010 and 2015. Inevitably,
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this means that different governments, at different points in time, rejected some of  the
reforms for different reasons. This section groups the British grounds of  veto into three
categories: (1) rejections due to the ideological underpinnings of  the ruling party;
(2) rejections due to internal party politics and the diffusion of  embedded
Euroscepticism; and (3) rejections due to concerns about external interference. Whilst
there is unavoidably some overlap between the reasons behind the vetoing of  social
reforms at EU level, and all three groupings are in a way manifestations of  scepticism
over Social Europe, the categories were coined on the basis of  the key reason underlying
each rejection.
2.3.1 Ideological rejections 
This section is almost exclusively dedicated to vetoes by the Conservative Party, fuelled
by a liberal ideology and a strict commitment to shielding the British liberal social model
from any pro-welfare initiative.13 Whilst Labour also rejected aspects of  EU integration,
for example in campaigning for the 1975 referendum, their ideological orientation called
for the outright rejection of  EU integration based on its economic roots, supported by
an anti-market sentiment on behalf  of  most trade unions, which did not translate to
ideological opposition to EU social reforms.14 The Conservative Party’s ideology did not
conflict with the initially predominantly economic nature of  the European project: the
Treaty of  Rome left social matters to the Member States, despite the momentum building
during the Paris negotiations in the 1950s, in an arrangement modelled after the
‘embedded liberalism’ paradigm.15 This allowed the Heath government to negotiate the
British accession to the block in 1972. 
A resurgence of  Social Europe in the 1970s did not face British opposition, whose
Labour government was able to nominate the Commission’s Director-General for Social
Affairs, Michael Shanks.16 The 1980s proved more tempestuous: the Thatcher
government, elected in 1979, adhered to a liberal agenda and vetoed any legislative
proposals, e.g. directives covering the rights of  fixed-term and part-time workers, or
parental leave.17 The Thatcher government embraced the Single Market project,
perceiving it as supportive of  the market liberalisation it aspired to for the UK. It
opposed any social initiative that could undermine competitiveness and the welfare state
retrenchment that was underway in Britain.18 It was also thought that having to comply
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with EU social legislation would increase bureaucratisation and impose additional
regulatory burdens on employers’ business plans.19
Under such circumstances the introduction of  QMV by the Single European Act 1987
had limited impact on European social policy in the years immediately following its
adoption: QMV was extended in the social field only to the area of  health and safety of
workers,20 leaving unanimity as the rule in the rest of  the social arena. This was a
concession to the British position.21 Moreover, in the mid-1980s, various stakeholders
prompted a reorientation of  the Community’s priorities, by criticising the solely economic
nature of  the 1985 internal market programme, which – perhaps unsurprisingly – had
been drafted under the direction of  Lord Cockfield, a Conservative Commissioner from
the UK. 
The criticisms resulted in the subsequent adoption of  various working papers pushing
for a stronger social dimension at EU level, with proposals in the areas of  health and
safety of  workers, employee participation, and benefits for those who exercise their free
movement rights.22 The proposals came to a crescendo with the adoption of  the
Community Charter of  the Fundamental Social Rights of  Workers, in December 1989,
which, nonetheless, was fiercely opposed by the UK, contributing to the final document’s
non-binding nature and, thus, weak influence over the establishment of  concrete and
justiciable labour rights.23
At the end of  the 1990s, the next obstacle to Social Europe by the UK was observed
in the talks for the Charter of  Fundamental Rights, during which Britain opposed a
comprehensive inclusion of  social rights.24 Interestingly enough, this was instigated by a
Labour government, which initially displayed a constructive approach to EU policy-
making with the endorsement of  the Social Chapter in 1997.25 Of  course, this was not
just any Labour government, but the one crafting the paradigm-change to New Labour,
abandoning a quasi-socialistic ideology in favour of  market economics. Thus, the social
policy choices at EU level made initially by Labour faded away over time, coinciding with
the erosion of  the party’s social-democratic heritage under the Third Way paradigm,
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normatively bridging social and market policies, but in practice veering to the anti-welfare,
neoliberal discourse of  the right.26
2.3.2 Internal party politics and Eurosceptic rejections
This persistent hostility by the British authorities to the strengthening of  Social Europe
cannot be attributed solely to the Conservative government of  that time, but also to the
Euroscepticism towards the reach of  EU law that prevailed even among Labour politicians
and trade unionists, preventing any support for a change of  approach.27 The Conservative
Major government of  1990 softened the UK’s stance towards the EU, yet retained the
former position towards Social Europe. Rifts in the Conservative Party around the
Thatcher legacy affected the acceptance of  enhanced social policy provisions at EU level
in particular. As a result, Prime Minister John Major had no choice but to reject the Social
Chapter proposed for the Treaty of  Maastricht as a substantive policy change.28
The British opt-out of  the Social Chapter led to its displacement as an Agreement on
Social Policy, annexed to the Treaty as a Protocol.29 This instance represents a good
example of  the ‘exploitation’ by the UK side of  the unanimity required for Treaty reform,
and therefore of  its power as a veto player therein post-1987. Only in 1997, when Tony
Blair’s New Labour government came to power in the UK, was the opt-out reversed and
the Social Chapter finally included in the Treaty of  Amsterdam. This enabled the EU to
better involve social partners and more comprehensively tackle policy fields such as
working conditions and labour market activation. UK opposition in another area
requiring unanimity, that of  equality under the then Article 141 EC, led to redirecting the
planned Pregnant Workers Directive towards the competence base of  health and safety
of  workers, which provided for QMV, but required the withdrawal of  the aspects not
related to health and safety.30
The emergence of  Euroscepticism as the new trend within the Conservative Party was
fuelled by David Cameron’s utilitarian view of  the EU as something desirable as long as
its benefits outweigh its costs. Cameron displayed enmity and discontent with the
widened scope of  integration, and in particular the extended influence on the sphere of
social policy.31 Welfare benefits for EU citizens who exercised their free movement rights
were particularly targeted. That resurgence of  the anti-welfare Eurosceptic rhetoric,
brought the UK back as an active veto player. This time it was not content to only veto,
but strove to abandon existing – and already agreed – levels of  integration. 
With the pledge for an EU referendum to please the anti-EU side of  the Conservative
Party and his subsequent win in the general election making it happen, Cameron further
pushed Europe to water down the reach of  welfare benefits for EU migrants in the text
of  the so-called ‘EU Reform Deal’.32 The looming referendum arguably motivated the
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Court of  Justice of  the EU (CJEU) in Commission v United Kingdom to backtrack its
jurisprudence – and consequently the social acquis on social security benefits – in order
to accommodate the UK’s pre-referendum demands.33 But the result of  the referendum
favoured the exit from the EU project over any concessions on certain, partly social
policy-related aspects of  that.
This rejection of  the acquis communautaire was also shared by circles within Labour
and the Liberal Democrats. After all, their overarching stance throughout the last decade
was that of  a wary, half-hearted embracement of  the European project, pegged on to the
UK’s prevailing national interests, something that outside the peculiar domestic context
of  Britain could even amount to soft Euroscepticism when compared to the political
discourse of  their West-European peers.34
2.3.3 External interference rejections
Arguably, most rejections to social integration at EU level could be grouped under the
aegis of  the first two categories, given the perseverance of  their underlying reasons.
Nonetheless, a moment in the not-so-distant past merits its own categorisation under the
banner of  rejections of  external interference. As a continuation of  its neoliberal turn
described above, New Labour, to appease concerns that were expressed in relation to an
increase in the external influence of  the EU on the UK legal order, vouched to secure an
opt-out from the Charter of  Fundamental Rights, in light of  its binding force with the
adoption of  the Lisbon Treaty.35
With much fanfare the UK government announced that it had managed to secure an
opt-out in Protocol 30 annexed thereto, which was still linked to demurs over the
justiciability of  the rights enshrined in the Charter’s Solidarity Chapter, and the fear of
creeping EU interference.36 Yet, what was presented as an opt-out was an opt-out in
name only. The Select Committee commented that it represented more of  a clarification
on the horizontal scope of  the Charter and a reaffirmation of  the fact that it does not
extend the EU’s competences to the UK, than a declaration that the UK is not bound by
its provisions.37
In any case the fact remains that while for a left-wing party such as Labour it was
almost preordained to adopt and follow more easily a pro-social agenda, even when
‘imposed’ by the EU, the fact that it was this supranational body that instigated the policy
change had the ability to shift the focus of  national debates from the traditional notions
of  left and right to other antithetic pairs such as centre–periphery, national–supranational,
us–them.38 External interference was somewhat vilified in these debates, and, in order to
remain in power, New Labour had to find a way to tame the emerging national concerns.
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3 Brexit’s potential for Social Europe
Through the milestones presented in the previous section, the UK could be perceived as
a vocal veto player, impeding progress in the realisation of  Social Europe, its rejections
centred around three cores. To put the potential significance of  Brexit in context, it is
useful to note Tsebelis’s observation that ‘if  a veto player with significant differences
enters or leaves . . . important policy changes will follow’.39 This implies that Brexit may
signal a watershed moment for Social Europe. The matrix of  collective veto players,
prominent at EU level, is likely to be shaken upon the UK’s departure, thus altering the
output of  the Union’s institutions to reflect a more pro-welfare line, once the most
prominent veto player is no longer part of  the block.40 It has become clear from the
preceding analysis, that the UK in the European social arena possessed most of  the
characteristics of  a significantly divergent Member State in this respect. Britain’s inability
to influence the debate on Europe’s future post-Brexit might act as a liberating event for
the EU.
Nevertheless, adopting a more social stance may not be the only option forward for the
EU, as demonstrated by the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of  Europe of
1 March 201741 with its five different scenarios: maintaining the status quo; focusing solely
on the Single Market; shaping coalitions within a multi-speed Europe; enhancing progress
in certain areas whilst leaving others behind; and, lastly, integrating further.42 The White
Paper’s core function was to test the waters by expressing in very general terms potential
directions for the EU, in the light of  its 60th anniversary and the impending trigger  of
Article 50 TEU by the UK. While social considerations were briefly mentioned, the White
Paper’s inherently broad nature meant that all specifications were left to five more focused
reflection papers,43 among them the Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of  Europe
of  26 April 2017,44 showcasing the importance the EU institutions placed on the Union’s
social aspirations. This should come as no surprise after Juncker’s 2014 speech which
introduced the new position of  Vice-President for the euro and social dialogue, and
pledged for a social triple-A rating for Europe, of  equal importance to the economic and
financial one.45 Nowadays, the social is clearly featured as one of  the Commission’s – and
consequently the Union’s – key priorities. While the Reflection Paper makes no reference
to Brexit, the fourth chapter’s heading ‘A Possible Way Forward for the EU 27’ indicates
that the UK’s withdrawal was considered in its drafting. 
The Reflection Paper aims to ‘galvanise Europe’s social spirit’,46 by seeking to map out
the possible avenues for this to be translated into EU actions. It kicks off  by presenting
the different views on the current state of  Social Europe, followed by its ongoing and
future challenges. These pave the way for the diverse resolutions that are presented as
alternatives therein. Due to the nature of  the Reflection Paper as a follow-up to the White
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Paper on the Future of  Europe, it incorporates a table addressing the consequences of  the
White Paper’s five scenarios for Social Europe.47 Notwithstanding that, moving forward,
it groups the possible outcomes for the social dimension of  Europe into three categories:
a limited Social Europe as a side-note of  free movement; a multi-speed Social Europe; or
a further integrated Social Europe among the EU 27.48
The first option presented is that of  scaling back and stripping down the social acquis
to only those aspects that are vital to free movement. In this vision, the social dimension
is anything but, becoming instead a facilitator of  free movement of  persons. Such a
functionalist approach departs from the EU citizens qua citizens approach and the
enhanced levels of  social integration that – should – come with it, drifting back into the
EU citizens qua economic actors dogma.49 In the latter, there is only space for rules on
the transferability of  social security contributions and health care coverage, or the
simplification of  the posting of  workers.50 Any substantive social development, such as
the right to paid annual leave, the framework on employee consultation, the regulation of
health and safety in the workplace, the minimum standards for temporary agency and
part-time work and the Open Method of  Coordination (OMC) in the area, could all be
easily sacrificed on the altar of  free movement and deregulatory gains.51
Ultimately, the aim of  this scenario is to tackle concerns over the bureaucratisation of
the internal market, the single most important thing the EU has to offer according to
some, a position long shared by the UK.52 This position, if  proclaimed, would also
vindicate the more deterministic views on Social Europe, which see the latter as almost
always subordinate to the European economic constitution, rendering the national level
the sole playing field for any deeper social dimension to take place.53 The position, apart
from appeasing the UK demands, should the country wish to remain a Member State, is
problematic for two reasons. First, the market-first thesis, also articulated by the CJEU in
the Laval Quartet case,54 is gradually giving way to more balanced worldviews in the
aftermath of  the global economic and financial crisis.55 Second, the laws and measures
threatened with extinction under this scenario have been less problematic in practice,
compared to those that are to be retained; the saga surrounding the regulation of  posted
workers is a good example of  that. Thus, the viability of  this option is questionable, and
becomes even more so in light of  Brexit: if  the UK, which even contemplates rescinding
limitations on working time,56 leaves the EU, it is difficult to imagine that the remaining
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Member States would retain the impetus for such ambitious deregulation of  basic social
rights. Even if  they did, then there would be no social policy for the remaining Member
States and/or institutions in which to act as veto players. The Commission also appears
rather dismissive of  this scenario, establishing in the Reflection Paper that its negatives
outweigh any potential benefits.57
The second scenario of  the Reflection Paper depicts a situation not much different to
the current one. Thus, according to this scenario, minimum standards of  protection
would remain the norm, with the mechanism of  enhanced cooperation open to groups
of  Member States that wish to do more in the field.58 It is a tad paradoxical that the
possibility for willing Member States to boost their social policies together under
enhanced cooperation is presented as something novel by the Reflection Paper. After all,
the notion of  Europe à la carte has been trending since the 2000s, as a process that allows
for different responses by separate groups of  like-minded Member States to emerge.59
It seems though, and the emphasis placed on that matter in the Reflection Paper
makes it clear, that the inclusion of  this scenario is laid out as a possible remedy to the
social deficit within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was exacerbated
during the years of  the crisis.60 It alludes to the inherently asymmetric structure of  the
EMU, which shows a Europe veering to a neoliberal, primarily economic model with just
an atrophic social side attached to it.61 These asymmetries, not limited to but particularly
connected to the EMU, have led to deterministic accounts highlighting the impasse the
EU is faced with when enacting policies to ‘socialise’ the landscape.62 Indeed, any efforts
to enhance the social dimension of  the EMU based on soft integration through Europe
2020 and the European Employment Strategy have not been very successful, calling for
more concrete legally binding measures as the way forward.63 The enhanced cooperation
proposed by the Reflection Paper appears to fit these criteria, despite the – similar to the
first scenario – danger of  a race to the bottom and regulatory divergence between the
Eurozone members and the rest of  the EU. In terms of  potential vetoes by the Member
States, then, differentiated integration could lead to a coming together solely of  those
wishing to advance the social acquis, with veto players arising in concentrated cases of
reforms that would de facto affect a group of  countries, for example those of  the
Eurozone.
Nonetheless, the differences between EMU and non-EMU members might not be as
great as they first appear to be. Studies have shown that in terms of  social expenditure
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the patterns between Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States during the crisis did
not differ significantly, exhibiting a form of  peer pressure for retrenchment throughout
the Union.64 Scharpf  speculates that only an EU-wide crisis shaking up the current
institutional framework could remedy the inherent asymmetries that overshadow social
integration;65 in that regard, Brexit could play the role of  such a wake-up call. 
Yet, if  Brexit is to instigate radical change at EU level, it is not difficult to imagine a
path departure from the well-worn regime of  the second scenario in relation to Social
Europe. This is precisely what the third scenario stands for. Unlike the disintegrationist
first, this one imagines a firm commitment to a more social EU, by taking new actions
and elevating the efforts to reinforce its social dimension in lieu of  merely reaffirming
what is already there.66 Despite calling for the re-evaluation of  the admittedly limited
competence regime on social policy, together with the extension of  the legislative reach
for setting minimum standards to harmonisation, the Reflection Paper underlines the fact
that the ‘centre of  gravity for action in the social field should and will always remain with
national and local authorities and their social partners’.67 This vision allows us to draw
parallels with scholarly views that see a future for Social Europe in tandem with the
retention – to varying degrees – of  national welfare states.68
It seems that this scenario is the one endorsed by the drafters of  the Reflection Paper.
Its envisioned impact in practice appears much more multi-fold compared to the first two,
and its pros-and-cons list contains only two negatives; that of  the difficulty of  reaching
consensus among the EU 27 and the feeling of  detachment some of  their citizens might
feel due to an increase in centralised EU decision-making.69 Furthermore, the third
scenario explicitly refers to and builds on the Rome Declaration of  the EU 27 leaders and
of  the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission.70
The declaration is among the first since the Brexit referendum from which the UK is
absent. According to the Rome Declaration, an enhanced Social Europe is among the key
agenda items the EU is going to work towards achieving in the next decade.71 Moreover,
the vision is also supported by the commitment of  the Juncker Commission to widen the
scope of  Europe’s social dimension.72 It signals a policy change that should come as the
natural consequence of  a veto player’s departure, according to the pertinent literature.73
4 The proposals for a stronger social dimension of the EU
This section sets out to examine the elements of  the proposed policy change. The
viability of  the third scenario of  the Reflection Paper is further boosted by some
accompanying actions that EU institutions have taken recently, signalling a ‘social
renaissance’. They corroborate the commitment to bolster the social dimension of  the
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Union. The timing of  the unveiling of  these actions, which coincides with the Brexit
negotiations and with a UK absent from crucial meetings about the EU’s future, cannot
help but cement the thesis that the country’s intended departure – and its prior role as a
veto player – is likely to have liberating effects for the EU 27 and Social Europe more
specifically. In addition to that, Brexit could be just the tip of  the iceberg, the final act not
closely related to but still coming after a series of  spirited reactions to a neoliberal
European agenda, whose adverse effects grew exponentially during the crisis.74 That
agenda was also promulgated by the CJEU, which has now cautiously started to revise its
position.75 Brexit, thence, is what caused the alarm bell for the future of  Social Europe
to finally ring and led to more concrete actions to be put forward. It is these actions, the
recent developments made public en masse around the middle of  2017, that spurred on
the euphoria of  the proponents of  a more pronounced EU social dimension and
pinpointed a deeper social integration as the way forward for the future without Britain.
Or, at least, that is what this ‘social’ experiment stands for.
4.1 THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
The measures that led to the resurgence of  attention towards the social dimension of  the
EU were presented, together with the Reflection Paper, with much fanfare. These
included the launch of  the consultation processes to address the challenges of  access to
social protection for people in all forms of  employment76 and to revise the Written
Statement Directive (Directive 91/533/EEC),77 the proposal for a work–life balance
directive for parents and carers to repeal Council Directive 2010/18/EU,78 and the
interpretative communication on the implementation of  the Working Time Directive.79 80
The aforesaid initiatives were all taken under the aegis of  the simultaneously launched
European Pillar of  Social Rights,81 the highlight of  them all, which was proclaimed by the
triad of  the key EU institutions during the Gothenburg Social Summit for fair jobs and
growth in November 2017.82 It being proclaimed so fast shows an allegiance to galvanise
the discourse towards achieving a more comprehensive EU social dimension. This might
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subsequently lead to the Pillar gaining Treaty-like status by the next Treaty amendment,
in a similar way that the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the EU did.83
The Pillar, while initially conceived for the Eurozone members, is now addressed to
all Member States, as its Preamble 13 states.84 The latter also includes the bases of  its
inception, found in: the elusive concept of  social market economy embedded in Article 3
TEU; the horizontal social clause of  Article 9 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the
EU; the social policy chapter of  the Treaties together with other closely related provisions
such as those on free movement of  workers; and the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of
the EU.85 Accordingly, and in trying to awaken the dormant social side of  the European
project, the Pillar contains 20 rights and principles which are grouped in three Chapters:
equal opportunities and access to the labour market; fair working conditions; and social
protection and inclusion. These rights and principles involve a wide spectrum of  social
policy areas, such as equality, education, labour market policies, social dialogue, workers’
rights, health and safety in the workplace, social inclusion, care, housing, and social
security. It is a comprehensive list that aims to call attention to fields of  EU policy-making
that were left neglected compared to economic integration.
The Pillar’s key function is to act as a stimulus to push for further and more concrete
actions to enrich the Union’s social acquis. That is why the rights and principles included
therein are for the most part not new at EU level. Instead, they are catalogued in the
Pillar, complemented by it in such a way as to take into account the new social realities,
in the hope of  raising awareness, but most importantly, their ‘actual take-up’.86 The
chosen way to achieve these aims is through a flexible – predominantly soft law –
approach, allowing for a melange of  methods mainly at the level of  the Member States,
paying due respect to the principle of  subsidiarity.87 According to the Pillar, the EU takes
on a mostly supporting and supervisory role, to lay down the appropriate framework, to
make sure that the ground is fertile enough for the relevant initiatives to be adopted, and
to monitor any progress using the Social Scoreboard.88 The EU toolkit, as shown through
the proposals accompanying the unveiling of  the Pillar, may include both legislative and
non-legislative measures.89
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4.2 ACCOMPANYING MEASURES
As said supra, the Pillar was accompanied by a series of  legislative and non-legislative
initiatives that aim to reinforce the Union’s renewed interest towards its social side. The
most tangible and concrete among them was the proposal for a work–life balance Directive
aimed at both parents and carers, to repeal the Council Directive on parental leave
(2010/18/EU).90 The proposal was made by the Commission through its power to initiate
legislation, omitting negotiations with the social partners, as the employers’ side,
BusinessEurope and UEAPME more specifically, did not support any new legislative
action in the area.91 Endeavouring to achieve higher levels of  work–life balance, gender
equality and labour market activation for women, to acknowledge the thorny area of
carers, and to raise the number of  men taking up parental leave and flexible working
arrangements,92 the proposed Directive guarantees parental leave’s level of  pay (Article 8),
introduces a stand-alone paternity leave of  10 days (Article 4) and a carers’ leave of  five
days a year (Article 6), and expands flexible working arrangements (Article 9).
While not ground-breaking and certainly diluted to gather the approval of  both the
Parliament and the Council,93 the proposal for the Directive represents a step forward in
trying to shape a fairer and more social Europe. This might be easier to materialise upon
the UK’s departure. Britain’s initial refusal to accept the Agreement on Social Policy
allowed the first Directive on parental leave (96/34/EC) to be adopted under the
Agreement without having to stumble upon the UK veto, since the country was excluded
from its application. The UK’s absence from the negotiating table might also lead to
stronger provisions making their way to the final version of  the Directive, given that
country’s dismissive attitude, requiring concessions and watered-down proposals, which
at times did not even manage to guarantee its agreement.94
Going back to the measures that accompanied the unveiling of  the Pillar, the two
consultation processes launched in April 2017 to address the challenges of  access to
social protection for people in all forms of  employment and to revise the Written
Statement Directive bore fruit. The Commission combined them and, by exercising its
legislative initiative once more, proposed a new Directive on transparent and predictable
working conditions in December 2017, after seeing no light at the end of  the tunnel in
relation to the involvement of  the social partners, faced anew with opposition by the
employers’ representatives.95
The Directive aims to tackle new social risks and contemporary challenges of
industrial relations by going a step further as regards the minimum harmonisation of
social protection of  workers in all forms of  employment, introducing in Article 2 thereof
an EU-wide definition of  worker emanating from the CJEU case law. Furthermore,
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Chapter III of  the proposed Directive lays down a new set of  minimum requirements for
their working conditions. The draft also includes stringent sanctions and provisions for
redress, much more thorough than those of  the Written Statement Directive. Arguably, if
these proposals go forward, the revamped Directive, rather neglected in its current form,
is likely to achieve its Cinderella moment at last.96
The UK opposition to the Written Statement Directive was first and foremost
ideologically driven, Britain already having in its legal system an obligation on employers
to issue written statements to employees.97 Nevertheless, given the ongoing ‘colonisation’
of  labour law through deregulation and re-regulation,98 for Britain to remain competitive
in the global marketplace,99 it is unlikely that the aforesaid proposal would be welcomed
with open arms if  the UK chose to remain in the EU. On the contrary, introducing
minimum rights that would affect non-standardised forms of  employment could be seen
as an attack on the country’s competitive advantage. 
The rest of  the accompanying initiatives either refer to already well-established
legislative measures, such as the Working Time Directive,100 or concern a soft law
approach, like the documents on the implementation of  the Active Inclusion and
Investing in Children Recommendations,101 and, thus, UK opposition would be
implausible. The proposed measures are complemented by the new plans under the
Commission’s Work Programme, also known as the Social Fairness Package, for a
European Labour Authority and a European Social Security Number, which are currently
underway. Apart from a supervisory role, ensuring the proper adherence to EU labour
and social standards, these developments could lay the seeds for a more institutionalised
concept of  EU social citizenship. 
5 Reflections: will policy change follow?
5.1. BREXIT BRITAIN’S POSITION
Moving on to the UK side, the consultation phase for the European Pillar of  Social
Rights which preceded all other initiatives occurred simultaneously with the run-up to the
Brexit referendum in the first half  of  2016. The rest of  the aforementioned initiatives
coincided with the period following the referendum result. The political reality in post-
referendum Britain inevitably influenced the country’s position apropos the new social
developments at EU level. In that regard, the European Scrutiny Committee’s reports are
quite enlightening. While the first report on the matter does not offer much insight on the
UK’s position due to its exploratory nature,102 the second one incorporates Brexit into
the debate. The report underscores its defining character as to how the future relationship
with the EU is to be shaped, on which the country’s stance towards the EU’s social
proposals would depend.103 If  the UK chooses regulatory convergence or approximation
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for example, some apposite social proposals would merit further exploration. In its third
report, published in February 2017, the Committee welcomes the UK’s involvement in
the Pillar, notwithstanding the Leave vote, on the basis of  commitments made by the
Prime Minister to maintain most of  the European social acquis;104 fast-forward to the
end of  2017, and such guarantees became shaky.105
In addition to the above, it is also important to look at the evidence submitted by the
UK government as a response to the Commission’s consultation on the Pillar. The
document, apart from praising the country’s position as regards its adherence to and
compliance with the principles and rights set out therein, suggests that no further actions
by the EU are needed, showcasing once more Britain’s negative stance towards further
social integration.106 In the Explanatory Memorandum on the White Paper on the Future
of  Europe, the Department for Exiting the EU switched roles from that of  a veto player
to one of  a leaver, by simply deferring to the EU 27. The same position was adopted in
relation to some of  the Reflection Papers as well, acknowledging that this was essentially
instigated by Brexit. The developments are a sign of  the emancipatory effect the 
UK’s departure might have for European integration; a veto player is no longer sitting at
the table. 
On the other hand, if  the UK reconsidered and chose to remain, it is difficult to
reconcile the proposed reforms with the categories of  objections presented in section 2
of  this article. The policies adopted by the Conservative government continue the
austerity paradigm and embed the neoliberal underpinnings of  the welfare-to-workfare
mantra. Market-correcting measures such as those proposed come in direct confrontation
with that, hinting a possible ideological rejection. The party unity rejection could also be
invoked, given the current state of  division within the political elite and the Eurosceptic
hysteria by some party members.107 Not only that, but the proclamation of  the Pillar and
the proposals under the Social Fairness Package may also raise concerns about an
extension of  the EU’s competences without the appropriate treaty reform, bringing the
external interference rejection into play. Potentially rejecting the proposals on all three
grounds means that Brexit could avert a catastrophe for the social acquis, given the UK’s
likelihood of  veto.
5.2. CONSTRAINTS: THE OTHER VETO PLAYERS
Whilst it could plausibly be argued that Brexit would facilitate the realisation of  a stronger
social dimension for Europe, it is not certain that this would be the end result. The
concretisation of  the Pillar and its accompanying initiatives is still at an early stage, and it is
not certain if, when and to what extent this would materialise. Its cautious approach relying
heavily on soft law measures, which lack the bite of  legislative ones, casts doubts on its
effectiveness in the long run. This was picked up by the relevant stakeholders, who called for
more concrete measures in their responses to the Pillar’s consultation phase.108 In particular
the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) has been critical of  the overstatement of  the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69(3)
104  European Scrutiny Committee, Thirty-First Report (HC 2016–17, 71-xxix) 112–15.
105  Dobbins (n 56).
106  Evidence in response to the consultation on a European Pillar of  Social Rights
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=17273&langId=en>. Note that in its submission, the
Scottish government exhibited a much more welcoming stance.
107  Will Jennings and Martin Lodge, ‘Brexit, the Tides and Canute: The Fracturing Politics of  the British State’
(2018) Journal of  European Public Policy Online First: doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1478876. 
108  For example: European Anti-Poverty Network, ‘Last Chance for Social Europe?’ (Position Paper on the
European Pillar of  Social Rights, EAPN 2016).
306
social acquis and the alleged improvements to the labour market, the lack of  linkages to
economic integration and the disregard of  collective bargaining.109 The Pillar being at an
early stage ought not to be used as an excuse not to evaluate its progress and outcomes, as a
more comprehensive social agenda should have already been in the making.110
Policy-making under the shadow of  the veto threatens not only the coming of  an EU
law into existence, but its actual content as well. Thus, other Member States, smaller veto
players on the fringes, may even substitute the UK in diluting the furthering of  Social
Europe. In such a scenario, a common denominator would need to be sought, which is
likely to be the lowest one, putting the proposals in danger of  being watered down in
order to become accepted. This is especially relevant to areas where unanimity is still
required, since compromises will inevitably occur therein. Yet, without its enfant terrible and
the polar opposite views that came with it, Social Europe might come a step closer to
materialising, even through the road of  compromises. The ‘socialness’ of  the final
outcomes is likely to be improved post-Brexit.111 The UK departure may not be fully
liberating, but, be that as it may, less controversial reforms would more easily move
forward as their dogmatic opponent would no longer sit at the table. 
The proposed reforms’ actual content and reach are of  paramount importance, in a
similar way that their take-up by the Member States is for the Pillar’s success. The danger
that lurks with this approach is that even if  Britain – the key veto player in EU social
policy-making – leaves, there will be others that may take up its position, and which have
been relatively quiet so far. A few years ago, the now abandoned amendments to the
Directive on maternity leave were rejected not exclusively because of  the UK’s
opposition: it formed a blocking minority together with Germany, Hungary, Ireland,
Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden to achieve this.112
The latter was not the only instance where the UK was not the sole Member State
opposing a social proposal. Examples go as far back as the 1980s, when the
harmonisation proposals in the areas of  employment rights and industrial democracy
were blocked by the British government, but as Bruun and Hepple note ‘with the active
or tacit support of  some other governments’.113 Indeed, hiding behind the UK’s skirt has
been a tactic for some Member States prior to the 2004 enlargement, with a noted path-
dependence of  a blocking minority consisting of  the UK, Denmark, Germany and
Ireland on social matters, such as the proposals on information and consultation in the
event of  collective redundancies, or the temporary agency work Directive.114 Following
Eastern enlargement, the post-socialist Member States have been perceived as forging a
‘market-making coalition’ with Britain, opposing any market-correcting measure. While
Brexit might come as shock, their ambition to leave their stamp in EU policy-making may
render them the new vocal veto players.115
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It is thus true that, while Britain was the most overt of  the veto players, and perhaps
the more consistent opponent of  Social Europe, in recent years it was not the sole
Member State voting down legislative proposals. A study found that, during 2009–2015
in employment and social affairs, in the Council of  Ministers Germany was in the
minority as often as the UK was.116 These changes and the introduction of  other players
ties in well with the discussion in the veto player literature of  the change in power
dynamics within the EU institutions with the introduction of  QMV and the expansion of
the ordinary legislative procedure. The literature argues that in an enlarged EU with
diverse policy interests and an increased role of  QMV policy changes will be difficult to
materialise, resulting in high levels of  policy stability and increasing the role of
bureaucracy (the Commission) and the CJEU.117 Voting in the Council has become
extremely difficult, and it has been advanced that this would likely stall any policy-making
going beyond the status quo.118 The proposed reforms, in trying to alter the social acquis,
might become victim to that. Whilst trying to find more Member States to openly oppose
a proposal might have sounded more difficult in the past, in an EU of  27 this is no longer
such an arduous task, as the Central and Eastern European countries or the building
coalition of  the New Hanseatic League show.
In addition to that, it is not inconceivable that some of  the rejection categories
presented in section 2 could also apply in relation to some of  the EU 27. Whilst the
ideological rejections are in a way more endemic to the liberal British social model,119
Emmanuel Macron’s proposed welfare cuts in France invite comparison with New
Labour’s paradigmatic change of  social policy narrative. His attitude might also impact
upon the country’s stance vis-à-vis the social reforms at EU level. It is indicative, for
example, that in the Franco-German Meseberg Declaration of  June 2018, social reforms
do not get much attention whatsoever.120 The second type of  rejections, the Eurosceptic
and party unity ones, can also be triggered by some of  the EU 27. Euroscepticism has
been diffused in almost all Member States’ party systems, in parties of  the left and the
right, forging competing poles even within a single party.121 As for the last category of
fears of  external interference, countries already in dispute with the EU, for example
Poland, may not welcome further reforms on that basis. This would not be the first time
Poland exhibits such traits, given its opt-out from the Charter sitting alongside the British
one in Protocol 30 thereof. The veto player drama does not seem to have an end in sight;
just a change of  cast. 
The previous remarks are especially important for the enactment of  any legislative
proposal, which is more likely to induce significant policy change. The adoption process
gives significant negotiating – and consequently veto – power to the Member States. On
the other hand, in relation to non-legislative or soft law initiatives, such as those included
in the text of  the Pillar, other difficulties lie ahead, again, involving the Member States.
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69(3)
116  Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann, ‘Does the UK Win or Lose in the Council of  Ministers?’ (LSE EUROPP 
Blog, 2 November 2015) <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/02/does-the-uk-win-or-lose-in-the-
council-of-ministers>. It even exhibited this in the 1980s according to Hepple (n 20).
117  Tsebelis (n 10).
118  George Tsebelis and Xenophon Yataganas, ‘Veto Player and Decision-making in the EU after Nice: Policy
Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial Discretion’ (2002) 40(2) Journal of  Common Market Studies 283, 304.
119  Refer to the discussion in n 13.
120  Press and Information Office of  the Federal Government, Meseberg Declaration: Renewing Europe’s
Promises of  Security and Prosperity (No 214 2018).
121  Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of  the Eurozone and
Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States’ (2018) 25(8) Journal of  European Public
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The deferential soft law approach requires persevering commitment for the measures’ full
potential to be unleashed. Otherwise, it risks becoming a halfway house, a flawed
mechanism much like the OMC, and leading to a catastrophe similar to that of  the Lisbon
Strategy.122 Even in its proclaimed form the Pillar is largely dependent on the Member
States’ discretion. Peer pressure is the only effective way under which its principles would
be acted upon, if  legislating is not on the horizon, and it is here where the looming Brexit
might help, but perhaps not conclusively as this section has shown.
6 Conclusion
The referendum of  June 2016 was the first step towards the UK’s departure from the EU,
following what has been, admittedly, an uneasy relationship over the years. The British
stance over Social Europe exemplifies the uncomfortable moments of  that relationship,
moments that can be traced back to the early attempts to establish a formalised social
dimension for the Union. The successive Conservative governments of  Margaret
Thatcher and John Major saw any such development as a threat to their neoliberal
worldviews and to internal party politics in some instances, perceiving the then
Community as a synonym of  free trade. New Labour’s takeover in 1997 saw a change of
approach initially, endorsing the institutionalisation of  certain social policies at EU level,
a largely symbolic gesture to make amends with the party’s socialist past. Its position was
rescinded a few years later, coinciding with its widespread turn to more liberal policies, by
securing a new opt-out from the Charter, also in fear of  external interference. By
opposing social integration so often, the UK was the key veto player in EU policy-making
therein.
Up until 2016, the UK was known for its opt-outs from Social Europe. The anti-
welfare and Eurosceptic rhetoric of  the new Conservative government, wishing to scale
back on what the UK had already agreed at EU-level social policy-wise, led to a new
change of  circumstances: the ‘Bropt-outs’ are dead, long live Brexit! From a veto player,
the UK would eventually become a spectator. This, in turn, could be a positive
development for Social Europe, which could finally start getting into full swing, as the
third scenario of  the Commission’s Reflection Paper shows. The latter, in a similar way to
the White Paper, contemplates the challenges the social side of  the European project is
facing in the wake of  the Brexit referendum. Its third scenario advocating for a further
integrated Social Europe skirts around the dangers of  deregulation, a divided EU and a
race to the bottom, yet it requires strong political commitment in order for its initiatives
to be taken up and not to result in EU scapegoating and citizens of  other Member States
demanding to ‘take back control’. It also requires the elimination of  all opposition by
other veto players, something that at present looks unlikely, at least in the short term.
Nevertheless, with Britain gone, a key player advocating against the advancement of
the social acquis is lost. Moreover, together with the publication of  the Reflection Paper,
which makes it clear that further integration is the most beneficial route for Social
Europe, the Commission presented its proposals for the European Pillar of  Social Rights,
accompanied by a series of  other social initiatives, cementing Juncker’s vow to revive the
social side of  the Union. These developments showcase a commitment, at least on behalf
of  the Commission, towards achieving enhanced social standards EU-wide, which can
only become more daring now that their familiar foe is no longer at the negotiating table,
if  for nothing else than to test the waters for further integration in the field. A plan for
policy change has been put on the table, following the veto player’s departure.
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Consequently, it would be naïve to disregard the potential of  the social initiatives that
have emerged in the wake of  the Brexit referendum. Granted, some, such as the EU Pillar
of  Social Rights, were in the making before that in order to tackle the rising levels of
dissatisfaction towards the EU in crisis-ridden Member States. However, their momentum
and scope has undoubtedly been revisited post-June 2016. The prospect of  the British
departure acted as a wake-up call, but also liberated the strained EU social agenda by
opening up room for more far-reaching experiments, such as the proposals for work–life
balance and transparent and predictable working conditions for EU workers in all forms
of  employment Directives, or the European Labour Authority. With the persistent
objector out of  the equation, things might finally be able to move forward. 
It is still too early to speculate on the exact direction the EU would pursue in the
future, and, for the purposes of  this article, to predict with certainty whether the UK’s
departure would trigger the necessary impetus for further social integration to actually
meaningfully materialise at EU level. Was the UK the only weight to be taken off  in order
to finally achieve Social Europe? It may be so, but other veto players are still lurking in
the remaining Member States, particularly in the Central and Eastern European ones,
which perceive aspects of  social integration burdensome for their competitiveness.123
They are also lurking in the collective – institutional – structures, such as the European
Parliament, following the post-1987 developments as the veto player theory suggests.
This, coupled with Eurosceptic and deregulatory attitudes elsewhere in Europe, on which
it is still too soon to evaluate the looming Brexit’s impact, might mean that there are still
a few obstacles Social Europe has to overcome prior to materialising. 
As for the EU developments, they need to reflect determination and include legislative
initiatives, not just soft law measures, so that they trigger acceptable compliance levels to
solidify Social Europe’s position in the European landscape. If  the aforementioned
proposals manage to cultivate the right climate and get the majority of  Member States on
board, then peer pressure in combination with the opposing Member States’ less
unmalleable – compared to the UK at least – red lines, might allow them to be persuaded
without weakening the reforms themselves. On a different note, the Brexit referendum
showed that every so often a significant number of  citizens feel detached from Europe,
something that the national political elites readily take advantage of.124 What better way
to welcome them back to the EU then, than by showing that the Union cares, through the
– long overdue – expansion of  its social dimension?
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The consequences of Brexit for the labour
market and employment law: challenges for





One of  the most important problems arising from Brexit will concern labour law and the labour market –
specifically the future development of  labour law at the European level, the situation in domestic labour
markets, and (as a consequence) changes in national legislations. At present, it is difficult to draw any precise
conclusions regarding the impact of  Brexit; however, it is possible to identify some of  the more likely
scenarios and consequences. There are substantial questions concerning: the future of  EU law after Brexit
and how Brexit will affect British labour law; the situation of  multinational labour law institutions 
(e.g. European Works Councils), as well as the posting of  workers. A lot depends on the final agreement
between the UK and the EU. A close economic partnership may enforce the maintenance of  the most
important labour standards and mechanisms which are necessary to guarantee equilibrium between the
partners. 
Keywords: Brexit; employment; labour; market; standards; protection; worker; employer
1 Introduction
One of  the most important problems arising from Brexit will concern social legislationand the labour markets, not only in the UK, but throughout the EU. The most
profound question is related to European social policy after the withdrawal of  the UK: is this
a threat or a chance for European social policy to accelerate? Brexit will inevitably influence
British labour (employment) law; it is, however, unclear to what extent and in what areas.1
The position of  migrant workers, who were perceived as one of  the most important reasons
for the dissatisfaction of  British citizens, is particularly delicate.2 It is also worth asking if
Brexit may influence other labour law systems – particularly those of  the home countries of
NILQ autumn 2018
1     This problem was discussed, inter alia, by Jeremias Prassl, ‘When the Tide Goes Out: UK Employment Law
after Brexit’ (Conference on the EU without the UK: Implications and Legal Consequences of  Brexit,
University of  Warsaw, 26 November 2016). According to media analyses, those voting to leave were frequently
convinced that large numbers of  migrant workers were entering the UK, which was said to have had an
immensely negative impact on public services and the social security system (see polling evidence 
available at <http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why>;
<www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39149/bsa34_brexit_final.pdf>); for a critical assessment see Niamh Nic
Shuibhne, ‘Reconnecting Free Movement of  Workers and Equal Treatment in an Unequal Europe’ (2018)
43(4) European Law Review 477, 478ff. 
2     Unless specified otherwise, throughout this article the terms migrant and migrant worker(s) refer to EU
citizens moving to other EU Member States and not to non-EU citizens moving to the EU.
migrant workers. The next point is the future of  transnational institutions with British
involvement (e.g. posting of  workers, European Works Councils (EWCs), transnational
collective agreements). Finally, one should consider the potential consequences Brexit may
have on labour markets, both in the UK and in the home countries of  migrant workers, as
well as labour markets in countries to which those workers may migrate. At present it is
difficult to draw any precise legal conclusions.3 A lot depends on the final results of
negotiations between the UK and the EU. However, it is possible to identify some of  the
more likely scenarios and consequences,4 as well as to articulate some proposals. This article
examines the consequences of  Brexit, using a Polish perspective for developing such
proposals with reference to UK and European institutions. Selecting the Polish case is
justified by the scale of  Polish immigration to the UK, as well as the position and structure
of  the Polish labour market, which is the largest one in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).5
The Polish example is, to an extent, symptomatic of  the whole region. Moreover, strong
Eurosceptic views have been observed in Poland. While Poland’s dependency on EU
subsidies might mitigate against this, another EU exit scenario does not presently seem
improbable. 
2 Legal background
When the two-year period for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 of  the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) ends on 29 March 2019, the Treaties will cease to apply
and EU legislation will be converted into British law.6 It is still not yet known how those
laws will be amended in the future. The British government has declared that it intends
to maintain workers’ rights, but has specified no time frames. Modifications to the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69(3)312
3     In any case, more transparency is needed. Such a need has been confirmed by other trade talks, e.g. concerning
TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) and CETA (EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement) see: European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), ‘Brexit Negotiating Guidelines:
ETUC Calls for Workers’ Rights to Be Resolved Rapidly’ (Press Release, ETUC, 31 March 2017)
<www.etuc.org/press/brexit-negotiat ing-guidel ines-etuc-cal ls-workers-r ights-be-resolved-
rapidly#.WstIxS_UToA>. 
4     When it comes to the British perspective, see further: Secretary of  State for the Home 
Department by Command of  Her Majesty, ‘The United Kingdom’s Exit from the European 
Union. Safeguarding the Position of  EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals 
Living in the EU’, presented to Parliament, June 2017, Cm 9464,
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6218
47/60093_Cm9464_NSS_SDR_Print.pdf>.
5     According to the data published by the UK Office for National Statistics, the largest group of  
migrants from CEE are Polish citizens. At the moment, there are around 1,021,000 Polish citizens 
in the UK. With regard to the dynamics of  immigration over recent months, there has been an 
increase in the numbers of  workers from Bulgaria and Romania
<www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/
populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationalityunderlyingdatasheets>. Polish immigration is
divided into two groups: the old immigrants and the new immigrants. The old immigration encompasses
people who remained or emigrated to the UK just after the Second World War and during the communist
period in Poland. The new immigration began after the Polish accession to the EU in 2004. At the same time
Poland is the largest labour market in CEE. In the first quarter of  2018, the number of  employed persons in
Poland amounted to 16,344,000 <https://tradingeconomics.com/poland/employed-persons>. 
6     See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (An Act to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and make
other provision in connection with the withdrawal of  the United Kingdom from the EU, 2018) ch 16
<www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/introduction>. In short, under this legislation EU-derived
domestic legislation, as it has effect in domestic law immediately before exit day, continues to have effect in
domestic law on and after exit day. However, the Charter of  Fundamental Rights is not part of  domestic law
on or after exit day. See also Jonathan Cooper, ‘The Fate of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights in English
Law after Brexit is Sealed’ (Oxford Human Rights Hub, 20 June 2018) <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-fate-of-
the-charter-of-fundamental-rights-in-english-law-after-brexit-is-sealed>.
mechanisms connected with the labour market will be influenced heavily by whatever
model of  cooperation between the UK and the EU emerges after Brexit. Theoretically,
an alternative is the so-called Norwegian model. The UK could join the European
Economic Area (EEA) (via the European Free Trade Agreement) with all freedoms
comprising the foundation of  the EU, including freedom of  movement for workers. This
would imply the application of  European legislation. However, this seems unlikely for
many reasons. First, such a change would not lead to the achievement of  the political
goals declared by Brexiteers (including regaining sovereignty). Second, the UK would lose
its influence on the creation of  legal standards. Third, the UK would be deprived of  some
privileges derived from membership without appropriate compensation. Fourth, the
results of  the Brexit referendum may be interpreted as an opposition to closer
cooperation (especially when it comes to the free movement of  workers).7
According to recent statements, membership in the EU Internal Market will be
replaced by an as-yet undefined ‘close economic partnership’.8 As the jurisdiction of  the
Court of  Justice of  the EU (CJEU) will no longer apply to the UK, the provisions for EU
residents under British law will necessarily change.9 Some doubts have been clarified in
the Joint Report from EU and UK Brexit negotiators10 and the subsequent Draft
Withdrawal Agreement.11 However, neither the report nor the Draft Withdrawal
Agreement are legally binding, and there are recurrent reports on potential further
changes. Moreover, these documents address only a part of  Brexit consequences. The
overall objective of  the Withdrawal Agreement with respect to citizens’ rights is to
provide reciprocal protection for Union and UK citizens, to enable the effective exercise
of  rights derived from Union law and based on past life choices, where those citizens have
exercised free movement rights by the specified date. All EU citizens, regardless of  when
they arrived in the UK, will need to apply to the Home Office for permission to stay and,
if  successful, will receive a document enabling them to continue to live and work legally
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7     See e.g. Adam Lazowski, ‘Norwegian Model for the UK: Oh Really?’ (The UK in a Changing Europe, 30 March
2016) <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/norwegian-model-for-the-uk-oh-really/>.
8     See HM Government, ‘The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union’
(Policy Paper, July 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-relationship-between-
the-united-kingdom-and-the-european-union>.
9     Secretary of  State for the Home Department by Command of  Her Majesty, ‘The United Kingdom’s Exit from
the European Union. Safeguarding the Position of  EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals Living
in the EU’, presented to Parliament, June 2017, Cm 9464, at 4. The problem could be that negotiations
concerning workers constitute a part of  trade talks, see ETUC (n 3); while worker rights should not been 
used as bargaining chips, see Statement Adopted by the Executive Committee, ‘Statement of  the ETUC 
on the Notification of  the UK to Withdraw from the European Union’, Malta 15–16 March 2017 (ETUC, 
20 March 2017) <www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-statement-notification-uk-withdraw-european-
union#.WstRoy_UTVo>.
10   Joint report from the negotiators of  the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on 
progress during phase 1 of  negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal
from the European Union, 8 December 2017 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/joint_report.pdf>.
11   European Commission TF50 (2018) 35 – Commission to UK <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf>.
in the UK.12 However, the British government may wish to limit access to the labour
market.13 Finally, if  the UK and the EU achieve close economic partnership, the
maintenance of  specific labour standards may turn out to be necessary (in particular to
avoid inequality between the partners). There is still a possibility of  regulating some
institutions and mechanisms, particularly those of  a cross-border nature, although a lot
depends on the final shape of  the agreement. 
3 European labour law
There is a substantial question concerning the future of  EU law after Brexit. There are
some expectations that the Union without the UK will be able to accelerate in the social
sphere. Although Brexit is considered to be a serious threat for the whole idea of
European integration, some positive aspects for social policy are also indicated. The UK
played a very specific role as regards the adoption of  employment standards within the
Union. For many years the British government blocked attempts at a more active social
policy.14 Eventually, this was reflected in the concept of  a two-speed EU. Even after the
Lisbon Treaty,15 the UK has been rather reluctant to embrace social reforms. The British
Protocol to the Charter of  Fundamental Rights was of  a symbolic character – its aim was
to demonstrate that there is no agreement in the UK to more interference from Europe
in British domestic affairs. At the same time, the need to further develop the social field
has become obvious.16 Economic freedoms, however, important in and of  themselves,
cannot guarantee sustainable development. Without stronger social reforms, the
European project will be put at risk. 
From this perspective Brexit may eliminate one of  the obstacles to social
development.17 The Union is trying to capitalise on this opportunity and change the
relationship between its economic and social objectives. It is hardly an accident that the
Union proclaimed the European Pillar of  Social Rights during Brexit negotiations. The
idea of  the Pillar is to deliver more effective but also new rights for individuals. The social
goals have been divided into three groups: equal opportunities and access to the labour
market; fair working conditions; and social protection and inclusion.18 As President Jean-
Claude Juncker has suggested, the Pillar would give citizens the opportunity to avoid
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12   See the Statement of  Intent by the UK Home Office on the UK Settlement 
Scheme <www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-settlement-scheme-statement-of-intent> which does
not fully comply with the Report: see Dagmar Schiek, ‘The Home Office “Statement of  Intent” for EU
Citizens’ Settled Status in the UK: For What It Is Worth’ (QPOL, 26 June 2018)
<http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/home-office-statement-intent-settled-status> and the subsequent draft statement of
change to immigration rules, establishing the basis for a trial by selected EU citizens
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7277
52/CCS207_CCS0718116274-001_Cm_9675_Immigration_Rules_Accessible.pdf>.
13   Secretary of  State for the Home Department (n 9) 7–8. See also the UK government’s White Paper on the
UK’s new partnership with the EU, 32ff  <www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-
from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper>.
14   See e.g. Roger Blanpain, European Labour Law (14th revised edn, Kluwer Law International 2013) 72. The UK
adheres to legal non-interventionism (91). 
15   Treaty of  Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 [2007] OJ C 306/1.
16   See Anthony Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30) on the Application of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the
European Union to Poland and the United Kindgom’ in Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff  Kenner and Angela
Ward (eds), The EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights: Part II – Reflections on the EU Charter of  fundamental Right (Hart
2014) 1599–1602. 
17   See on this Konstantinos Polimakarkis, in this issue.
18   See Sacha Garben, ‘The European Pillar of  Social Rights: Effectively Addressing Displacement?’ (2018) 14
European Constitutional Law Review 210–30. 
social dumping and social fragmentation. It is slated to be one of  the instruments aimed
at strengthening the Union and overcoming current difficulties. Concurrently, the Pillar
emphasises goals which (in some respects) would be unacceptable to the UK.
Of  course, the Social Pillar must be seen in a broader perspective. There have been a
lot of  factors encouraging a more active social policy. The economic crisis changed a lot.
However, Brexit has been a strong stimulus because it revealed the weakness of  the
European project, for example, the deficit of  appropriate social protection. Of  course, it
may turn out that the legal instruments offered by the Pillar are considered to be soft and
insufficient, nor can we predict the future results of  balancing European values. But, even
in the past, the economic approach was criticised (see the reactions to Viking, Laval etc.)19
and the Pillar may therefore support a more social approach to European values.20
One should avoid overstating the UK’s relevance here, as the British approach is not
the only hindrance to social development. Nevertheless, without the UK some changes
will probably be easier to carry out, since opponents of  harmonisation of  working
conditions will lose an important ally, easing the promotion of  protective solutions
common in the ‘Old Union’. The first signal was the discussion about the revision of  the
Posted Workers Directive. Despite the opposition of  some CEE countries, the
amendments discussed have been adopted.21 One can expect that further initiatives will
also be successful, which process will lead to the application of  a social model
characteristic of  advanced capitalist countries. From this perspective, Brexit may cause
significant changes for the whole Union. 
Paradoxically, the CEE countries might step into the void left by the UK. Social
partners and politicians in the CEE countries are concerned that the adoption of  a more
advanced European social model by CEE countries will considerably raise the cost of
labour and thus eliminate one of  the most important comparative advantages of  their
countries.22 CEE countries find themselves confronted with a difficult choice: either to
increase the level of  protection (also in the field of  remuneration) or be pushed out from
the main stream of  European integration. Brexit and new social standards may finally
change the structure of  investments in Europe (limiting transfers to the East), whilst
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19   See e.g. A C L Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008)
Industrial Law Journal 126–48; and Christian Joerges, Florian Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and
the “Social Deficit” of  European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of  the ECJ in Viking and Laval’
(2009) European Law Journal 1. 
20   See e.g. Zane Rasnaca and Sotiria Theodoropoulou ‘Strengthening the EU’s Social Dimension: Using the




21   Directive (EU) 2018/957 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  28 June 2018 amending Directive
96/71/EC concerning the posting of  workers in the framework of  the provision of  services (Text with EEA
relevance), Official Journal of  the European Union L 173/16, 9 July 2018.
22   According to the Eurostat, in 2017 average hourly labour costs were estimated at €26.8 in the EU28. However,
there are significant gaps between EU Member States. The lowest hourly labour costs are to be found in
Bulgaria (€4.9) and Romania (€6.3), while the highest are to be found in Denmark (€42.5) and Belgium
(€39.65), while Polish hourly labour costs (€9.6) are just above a third of  the median and the UK (€25.7)
hovers around the median (€26.7) <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Hourly_labour_costs>. Béla Galóczi attributes the low labour costs in CEE countries
to their heritage rather than a deliberate strategy of  low-cost competition, while suggesting that the low-wage
economy has reached its limits: ‘Why Central and Eastern Europe Needs a Pay Rise?’ (European Trade Union
Institute, 2017) 22, 18. 
weakening the position of  undertakings from new Member States which are currently
able to compete thanks to lower labour costs.23
Problems with the adoption of  new European standards appeared in relation to the
draft of  a new Directive on work–life balance for parents and carers.24 According to the
draft, Member States will take the necessary measures to ensure that workers have an
individual right to parental leave of  at least four months to be taken before the child
reaches a given age which shall be at least 12. Where Member States allow one parent to
transfer their parental leave entitlement to the other parent, they shall ensure that at least
four months of  parental leave cannot be transferred. In Poland, the proposed law has
been seriously criticised by the social partners (mainly employers) and also by the Polish
Parliament.25 The Union has been accused of  attempting to destroy the traditional family
model because fathers will be forced to participate in parental leave (otherwise families
will lose four months of  that leave). According to such allegations, it will change the
current structure of  leave connected with parenthood.26 Although the draft concerns
only selected social matters, it reflects different approaches to employee rights and the
safeguarding of  the individual’s position.27
The increase of  the role of  social rights may fundamentally change the Union. It
could even be a new way and a new opportunity for the development of  Europe.
However, it is too early to assess the importance of  the Pillar in balancing the values on
which the EU is founded.
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23   Doubts were formulated, for example, during the discussion on the amendments to the Posted Workers
Directive: see e.g. European Parliament Briefing, ‘The Revision of  the Posting of  Workers Directive’ (Policy
Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of  Life Policies, October 2017)
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607346/IPOL_BRI%282017%29607346_EN.pdf>.
See also Commentary of  the Union of  Entrepreneurs and Employers on the text of  the revised Directive on
the posting of  workers (PWD – Posting Of  Workers Directive 96/71/EC)
<http://zpp.net.pl/en/commentary-of-the-union-of-entrepreneurs-and-employers-on-the-text-of-the-
revised-directive-on-the-posting-of-workers-pwd-posting-of-workers-directive-9671ec>. One could even
suspect that, alongside providing for employee protection, the countries which constitute the core of  the
Union want to protect their internal markets (in some sense contrary to the idea of  integration). 
24   See ‘Proposal for a Directive of  the European Parliament and the Council on work–life balance for 
parents and careers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU’, Brussels, 26 April 2017, COM(2017) 253
final, 2017/0085 (COD); Council of  the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Directive of  the European
Parliament and of  the Council on work–life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive
2010/18/EU – Progress report’ (2017/0085 (COD)) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2017%3A253%3AFIN>.
25    Council of  the European Union (n 24); Mateusz Adamski, ‘Unia chce obowiązkowego 4-miesięcznego urlopu
rodzicielskiego dla ojców’ (‘The Union Wants Mandatory 4-Month Parental Leave for Fathers’ (Rzeczpospolita, 17
May 2017) <www.rp.pl/Kadry/305179940-Unia-Europejska-chce-obowiazkowego-4-miesiecznego-urlopu-
rodzicielskiego-dla-ojcow.html>; Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 czerwca 2017 r. w sprawie
uznania projektu dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w sprawie równowagi między życiem zawodowym
a prywatnym rodziców i opiekunów oraz uchylającej dyrektywę rady 2010/18/UE za niezgodny z zasadą
pomocniczości (Resolution of  the Lower House of  Polish Parliament of  22 June 2017 on recognition of  the
draft Directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on work–life balance for parents and careers and
repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU as incompatible with the principle of  subsidiarity (22 June 2017)
<www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/JURI/NP/2018/03-
27/1129470PL.pdf>.
26   See more Zbigniew Hajn and Leszek Mitrus, ‘Poland’ in Roger Blanpain and Frank Hendrickx (eds),
International Encyclopaedia of  Laws: Labour Law and Industrial Relations (Kluwer Law International 2016) 161–2.
27   It does not matter that a part of  the allegations is not justified. See further Council of  the European Union
(n 24).
4 Transnational institutions and mechanisms
A further problem will be the situation of  transnational labour law institutions. The most
obvious example is that of  EWCs (more than 200 of  which are based in the UK). One
will need to distinguish between EWCs established under the jurisdiction of  an EU
Member State (will British members of  EWCs retain their mandates?) and EWCs
established in Britain. At the Conservative Party Conference held in Birmingham,
government members declared on 2 October 2016 that the legislation concerning EWCs
will not be amended.28 Thus EWCs in the UK, a large proportion of  which were
established prior to adoption of  the relevant domestic rules, and membership of  British
representatives in other EWCs would be retained. Irrespective of  such retention, Brexit
will most likely result in the necessity to renegotiate the current rules governing the
operation of  EWCs.29 After Brexit, the UK will not be bound by European legislation
and CJEU judgments any more, which may seriously affect the position of  councils
established under British law. As a result, some companies, to avoid uncertainty, may try
to move their councils to other jurisdictions (e.g. to Ireland).30 This, in particular, may
apply to non-EEA-headquartered companies (i.e. in about 23% of  cases). Approximately
25 per cent of  these EWCs have chosen British EWC implementation laws as
applicable.31
Some problems may also arise for European Framework Agreements, frequently
concluded in the context of  transnational companies which also have EWCs. At the
moment they are concluded on a voluntary basis with dubious legal effects,32 which
means that Brexit will probably not cause additional problems with their application.
Although there are currently no such plans, the situation may change if  the EU decides
to create a legal framework for European Framework Agreements.33
Another problem that will arise concerns the mechanism for the posting of  workers.
Although the principles of  the EU’s Posted Workers Directive are not implemented in a
separate legal Act, they essentially correspond to EU standards.34 Posted workers from
EU countries are not registered, and there are no control procedures. Among the EU
Member States, the UK currently has the seventh largest number of  posted workers
(around 50,000);35 that number has increased steadily. British workers are, of  course, also
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28   EWC Academy, ‘Brexit: What Consequences for European Works Councils?’ <https://www.ewc-
academy.eu/en/consulting/brexit.html>.
29   Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Richard Hyman, ‘What about the Workers? The Implications of  Brexit
for British and European Labour’ at 8 <http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/18986/3/18986.pdf>. 
30   Denis McShane, ‘European Works Councils: Another Brexit Victim’ (Social Europe, 5 January 2017)
<www.socialeurope.eu/european-works-councils-another-brexit-victim>. 
31   Stan De Spiegelaere and Romuald Jagodziński, ‘European Works Councils and SE Works Councils in 2015:
Facts and Figures’ (European Trade Union Institute 2015) <www.etui.org/Publications2/Books/European-
Works-Councils-and-SE-Works-Councils-in-2015.-Facts-and-figures> 17.
32   See e.g. Silvana Sciarra, Maximilian Fuchs and André Sobczak, ‘Towards a Legal Framework for Transnational
Company Agreements’ (Report to the ETUC 2014) 12. 
33   Compare e.g. ‘Building and Enabling Environment for Voluntary and Autonomous Negotiations at
Transnational Level between Trade Unions and Multinational Companies (ETUC 2016). 
34   Jeffrey Kenner, ‘The United Kingdom and Posted Workers: Before and after Brexit’ (Seminar on Posting of
Workers, European Union and National Legal Orders: Problems and Perspectives, University of  Naples
Federico II, 13 October 2017). However, there are some problems connected with the implementation. There
are questions concerning the implementation of  the nucleus of  rights (in accordance with Luxembourg case
EU-Court, C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323), the lack of  extension on collective
agreements in construction sector, or restrictions on strike action. 
35   Alan Beattie, ‘Curbs on Posted Workers Will not Fix the EU Labour Market’ (Financial Times, 24 October
2017) <www.ft.com/content/8bf67744-b8a2-11e7-9bfb-4a9c83ffa852>.
sent to other Member States, and the problem of  posted workers is thus not dissimilar to
the issue of  migrant workers. The UK could theoretically maintain the current rules after
Brexit, as Norway does, but this could be difficult from a political point of  view (as
discussed above), and it seems more probable that restrictions will be established for
companies sending workers to other countries. 
At the same time, the whole mechanism of  posting workers is undergoing serious
changes. The coalition composed of  CEE countries and the UK defeated the campaign
to maintain liberal posting rules. The Directive limits the period of  posting as well as
extending the protection in the field of  remuneration (ensuring equal pay with local
workers).36 It can be viewed as one of  the first consequences of  Brexit. First, as already
discussed, the social approach prevailed over the liberal one and so the new rules are
going to be more protective (illustrating the French idea of  ‘a Europe that protects’).37 It
could also lead to amendments in the functioning of  the common market. Secondly, the
solution reflects the weakening position of  the UK as it awaits its withdrawal from the
EU. It needs to influence the position of  countries that represent a more liberal approach
to the European project. If  the Brexit negotiations safeguard the posting mechanism, the
amended standards may also influence the situation of  workers posted between the UK
and the EU. 
5 Domestic institutions of labour law
Even if  some migrant workers are formally allowed to stay in the UK, they may be forced
to leave due to changes in the labour market or the system of  social security. Some
workers may choose to work in another Western European country where the
remuneration is higher, while some will undoubtedly return to their home countries,
including to Poland. Waves of  returning workers may also have an adverse effect on local
labour markets, again, for example, in Poland, and it may become necessary to adjust
working conditions in response to changing circumstances. 
Over recent years, the Polish government has taken a number of  social initiatives
intended to improve working and living conditions (worker-friendly reforms). These have
included the introduction of  special family allowances, increasing protection of  workers
who are not employees and lowering the pensionable age. These changes may contribute
to convincing Polish migrant workers to return to their country. However, new social
policies may also pose some risks. The Polish economy in some areas still depends on
direct foreign investment and increasing labour costs may therefore deter potential
investors, although workers’ protection in Poland will certainly be increased. It is unclear
whether the Polish economy is sufficiently strong and innovative to fill the gap. The
reforms are relatively expensive and have been undertaken during a period of  prosperity
(visible growth in gross domestic product). Any economic slowdown may lead to serious
financial problems. Moreover, Poland has not reformed the legal framework for collective
relations, which are undergoing a deep crisis (its main manifestation being the very low
level of  coverage by collective agreements).38 A wave of  returning migrant employees
could create new challenges for the labour market and the government may be forced to
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36   Directive (EU) 2018/957 (n 21); European Commission, ‘Posted Workers’,
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=471>.
37   Sophie Maes, ‘EU: New European Rules for Posted Workers’ (Ius Laboris, 25 June 2018)
<www.iuslaboris.com/en-gb/resources/insights/a/new-european-rules-posted-workers>.
38   See further Łukasz Pisarczyk ‘The Impact of  the Economic Crisis on Collective Agreements in Poland’ in
S Laulom (ed), Collective Bargaining Developments in Times of  Crisis (Bulletin of  Comparative Labour Relations 99,
Kluwer Law International 2018) 63ff. 
integrate a large group of  workers with experience gained abroad and relatively high
expectations. Some support for the employers may be also needed. While there is no
typical autonomous instrument (collective agreement) which could reconcile what the
workers expect with what the employers can offer, more flexible legislation may be
needed.39 To summarise, growing costs and new challenges may further slow down social
reforms and bring some changes which will be unfavourable for workers. 
There are also concerns about how Brexit will affect British labour law. Many of  its
institutions have been introduced or developed to implement European standards.
Moreover, due to the lack of  a written UK constitution, EU standards have played a role
that in other countries is reserved for constitutional standards (international guarantees
are usually not precise enough to maintain the level of  protection).40
It is difficult to predict how the economic situation of  the UK will develop after
Brexit. British companies may need structural support to compete internationally in an
environment governed by World Trade Organization standards, and the deregulation of
employment standards may be viewed as a solution. Although this can be treated as an
internal problem for the UK, the level of  protective standards may influence labour
markets in countries with which the UK trades. Protective standards derived from EU law
will become a part of  the British domestic legal system. However, the UK, no longer
bound by EU law and the judgments of  the CJEU, will be able to change the legislation
shaped during the period of  its membership in the EU. The standards that have been
introduced as regulations (i.e. secondary legislation) are the most exposed to changes.
Moreover, ‘sectoral collective bargaining has now largely disappeared from the private
sector, removing an essential component of  the pre-WTD [Working Time Directive]
protections’.41
Employment standards can be divided into two groups. First, in some areas EU
membership has induced a significant increase in the level of  protection. An example is
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39   The process of  flexibilisation has been observed over recent years. For instance, in 2013, Poland introduced
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41   Ibid. The UK government has stated that UK maternity leave is higher than required by EU legislation, as
leave was extended to a maximum of  52 weeks by regulation in 2012, while the EU Pregnancy Directive only
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OJ L 348, 28 November 1992, at 1, consolidated version at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01992L0085-20140325>. However, the requirement to claim maternity
leave from one’s employer 15 weeks before commencement limits maternity rights, as well as the additional
requirement of  having accrued 26 weeks of  employment for the additional period. The limitations of
maternity pay in the UK, and the protection against dismissal of  pregnant women, constitute further practical
barriers (dismissal of  a pregnant woman or women on maternity leave is only deemed unfair if  it is based on
the leave or pregnancy itself  (Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999, SI 1991/3312, last changed
by Maternity and Parental Leave etc. (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/3221). There are concerns that
the withdrawal from EU membership will affect the future trajectory of  UK gender equality law, see Roberta
Guerrina and Annick Masselot, ‘Walking into the Footprint of  EU Law: Unpacking the Gendered
Consequences of  Brexit’ (2018) 17(2) Social Policy and Society 327.
the working time regulations following Directives 93/10442 and 2003/88.43 Although the
UK adopted a liberal model of  protection in the area of  working hours (through the
option of  waiving the mandatory daily and weekly norms of  working time),44 it was a
significant change compared to the traditional approach to working time in Great
Britain45 with a maximum weekly norm of  working hours (48) which, in some aspects,
limited the freedom to organise working time and impacted the costs of  economic
activity. As a result, after ‘Brexit’ working time standards may become a target of
liberalisation advocates.46. 
From the perspective of  freedom of  economic activity, the protection of  employees
at the transfer of  an undertaking is also contested (Directive 2001/23).47 Before the
implementation of  the first transfer Directive, British law did not recognise the automatic
change of  employers as a consequence of  a takeover of  an undertaking (business) or its
part.48 The obligation to continue employment relationships with the same working
conditions deeply affects the transferee position. Moreover, British legislation went
relatively far by extending the concept of  transfer to cover outsourcing procedures (even
second-generation outsourcing). Far-reaching protection, such as the restrictions on
harmonising conditions of  work after the transfer, have been criticised for
inconveniencing employers.49 Some problems will also appear in the field of  cross-border
transfers. Even today it is unclear whether such changes are covered by the protection
arising from Directive 2001/23. In case of  a transfer between EU Member States and
states that are outside the Union, it is problematic to expect that courts would hold the
transferred entities to have retained their identity (taking into account a significant change
of  the attendant legal background). 
Among other standards that will be maintained post-Brexit are fundamental rules
which govern the relationship between the employer and the employee, predominantly
anti-discrimination law.50 The UK government has vowed to keep the standards arising
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42   Council Directive 93/104/EC of  23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of  the organisation of
working time [1993] OJ L 307/18.
43   Directive 2003/88/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  4 November 2003 concerning
certain aspects of  the organisation of  working time [2003] OJ L 299/9.
44   However, British law recognised opting out of  the 48-hour working week (see reg 5 the Working Time
Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1883). 
45   See e.g. Stephen Hardy, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Great Britain (3rd revised edn, Kluwer Law
International 2007) 124–5; and Simon Honeyball, Textbook on Employment Law (13th edn, Oxford University
Press 2014) 10–11. 
46   Tony Dobbins, ‘Tory Attack on Working Time Directive Signals a Post-Brexit Race to the Bottom’ 
(The Conversation, 20 December 2017) <http://theconversation.com/tory-attack-on-working-time-directive-
signals-a-post-brexit-race-to-the-bottom-89395>; Doug Pyper, ‘Brexit: Employment Law’ 
(Commons Briefing Paper 7732, 10 November 2016)
<https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7732 >.
47   Council Directive 2001/23/EC of  21 March 2001 on the approximation of  the laws of  the Member States
relating to the safeguarding of  employees’ rights in the event of  transfers of  undertakings, businesses or parts
of  undertaking or businesses [2001] OJ L 82/16, replacing Council Directive 77/187/EEC of  14 February
1997 on the approximation of  the laws of  the Member States relating to the safeguarding of  employees’ rights
in the event of  transfers of  undertakings, businesses or parts of  business [1977] OJ L 61/26.
48   About the implementation consequences see Hardy (n 45) 166ff.
49   Anthony Fincham, Finlay McKay, Alison Woods, Graham Paul, Gillian MacLellan and Sarah Ozanne, ‘The
Impact of  Brexit on UK Employment Law’ (CMS Cameron McKenna LLP, 2016) 3
<www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4f793105-7fa5-4a01-82b2-9a91a52d6564>.
50   About the impact of  Brexit on equality rights, see Sandra Fredman et al (n 40).
from EU law and unified in 2010.51 Moreover, the protection arising from the EU
standards will be supported by the application of  CJEU judgments which will be applied
to preserve EU-derived law. However, there will be an important time limitation as only
the judgments binding on the UK on the day of  its departure from the EU will continue
to apply.52
6 Brexit and migrant workers
The first important question concerns the future rights of  workers who arrived in the UK
before Brexit (or before another date negotiated with the EU). Clear guarantees for this
group of  people were widely expected to be established in other EU Member States. Until
Brexit, EU citizens will continue to enjoy the full rights guaranteed them by the Treaties.
An important element of  the new system is the so-called ‘settled’ status. EU citizens
granted this status will be free to reside in the UK, undertake any lawful activity and
continue to have access to social services. According to the Settlement Scheme, to obtain
settled status EU citizens will generally need to have lived continuously in the UK for five
years. Those with less than five years’ continuous residence will be granted pre-settled
status and be able to apply for settled status once they reach the five-year point. There
will be no change to the current rights until the end of  the implementation period on
31 December 2020, and the deadline for applications to the scheme for those resident in
the UK by the end of  2020 will be 30 June 2021.53 The first applications have just been
submitted. However, the scheme is not due to fully open until 30 March 2019.54
The UK and the EU will also need to deal with the problem of  migrant workers who
wish to move to the UK in the future. A common market with freedom of  movement
could theoretically be maintained. This scenario is unlikely to become reality because
‘uncontrolled immigration’, inter alia in relation to its alleged impact on the labour
market, was one of  the key reasons for the Brexit vote, and the UK government has
vowed that free movement will cease to exist.55 The immigration policy that replaces
freedom of  movement will depend on the situation of  the British labour market: despite
claims to the contrary during the referendum campaign, there are numerous sectors of
the British economy that rely on migrant workers. If  the UK introduces a system of
permits, the EU will probably expect a special (simplified) procedure for its citizens.
Poland recently introduced a simplified procedure for workers from certain Eastern non-
EU European countries, largely to facilitate the recruitment of  Ukrainian workers.
Although the regular procedure required permits to be issued by public authorities, the
simplified procedure requires only that the public authorities be notified.56
The consequences of Brexit for the labour market and employment law 321
51   Department for Exiting the EU, ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European 
Union’, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of  State for Exiting the EU by Command of  
Her Majesty, London, March 2017, Cm 9446, 16,
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6045
16/Great_repeal_bill_white_paper_accessible.pdf>.
52   European Union Withdrawal Act 2018 (n 6) ch 16 does not provide any role for the CJEU in the
interpretation of  that new law, and does not require the domestic courts to consider the CJEU’s jurisprudence.
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53   Home Office, EU Settlement Scheme: Statement of  Intent (21 June 2018)
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-settlement-scheme-statement-of-intent>. 
54   ‘Brexit: First Applications from EU Nationals for Settled Status (BBC News, 28 August 2018). 
55   Secretary of  State for the Home Department (n 9) 7.
56    Act of  20 April 2004 on employment promotion and labour market institutions (Journal of  Laws, consolidated
text from 2017, item 1265, and the implementing Acts, in particular Decree of  Ministry of  Family, Labour and
Social Policy of  7 December 2017 on issuing work permits for foreigners and entry of  declaration of  entrusting
work to a foreigner into the register of  declarations (Journal of  Laws from 2017, item 2345).
There are further doubts regarding the criteria applied to migrant workers. If  the UK
wants to limit immigration to skilled workers, it will be necessary to determine a set of
qualifications, and perhaps to differentiate the period for which people of  different levels
of  qualification are allowed to reside in the country. Regardless of  how the UK revises its
immigration policy, it is worth mentioning the International Labour Organization (ILO)
Convention concerning Migration for Employment (revised 1949),57 as well as
obligations under other international instruments.58 Obviously, the UK has declared that
it will continue to honour its international commitments and follow international law.59
In the past, the Committee of  Experts assessed rather positively the British legislation in
this area. The Committee noted, for example, that the Equality Act of  201060 prohibited
discrimination on the basis of  a number of  grounds including sex, religion and race,
which also includes nationality.61
The ILO Convention requires equal treatment of  workers migrating for employment
at the level of  statutory standards and actions. The states bound by the ILO Convention
are obliged to apply to immigrants lawfully within their territory – without discrimination
in respect of  nationality, race, religion or sex – treatment no less favourable than that
which applies to their own nationals in respect of  the following matters: 
(a) in so far as such matters are regulated by law or regulations, or are subject to the control
of  administrative authorities: 
(i) remuneration, including family allowances where these form part of  remuneration,
hours of  work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on home-
based work, minimum age for employment, apprenticeship and training, women’s
work and the work of  young persons; 
(ii) membership of  trade unions and enjoyment of  the benefits of  collective bargaining;
(iii) accommodation; 
(b) social security (in respect of  employment injury, maternity, sickness, invalidity, old age,
death, unemployment and family responsibilities, and any other contingency which,
according to national laws or regulations, is covered by a social security scheme), subject
to some limitations;62
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concerning benefits or portions of  benefits which are payable wholly out of  public funds, and concerning
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(c) employment taxes, dues or contributions payable in respect of  the person employed; and 
(d) legal proceedings relating to the matters referred to in this Convention (Art. 6).63
The ILO Convention allows, under certain conditions, for more detailed arrangements
between states.64
7 The situation of the UK and Polish labour markets 
The UK is one of  the largest labour markets in Europe and is often a destination of
choice for EU citizens. Its popularity is due to the relatively high level of  remuneration,
a developed social protection system, access to non-material goods (culture, sport), and
the opportunities offered by a multicultural society. These conditions have resulted in
immigration on a large scale: more than 10 per cent of  workers are foreign citizens65 and
between January and March 2017 approximately 7 per cent of  workers were from other
Member States.66 There are various sectors of  the British economy (e.g. agriculture)
which particularly depend on this workforce. 
While the Polish labour market is also one of  the largest in the EU – there are around
16.5 million workers,67 including around 13 million employees68 – Poland has traditionally
faced the problem of  emigration. There have been several waves, starting in the immediate
post-war period, and continuing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. After the central and
eastern enlargement of  the EU in 2004 the UK opened its labour market to workers from
new Member States, which had serious social and economic consequences. In the early
2000s, the unemployment rate in Poland reached 20 per cent69 (despite the introduction of
labour law reforms), resulting in another wave of  emigration to Ireland and the UK. The
new wave of  workers suffered from less favourable working conditions – including lower
pay – accompanied by a low level of  unionisation (around 8%; much lower than among UK
workers). Due to lower costs of  employment and a weaker bargaining position, these
workers were considered to be more attractive than British workers; however, there were
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problems of  social integration, and allegations that migrant workers were abusing the social
security system. It led to an increase in tension between British citizens and migrant
workers. Aversion to migrant workers has become a catalyst for a deterioration in attitude
towards the EU and one of  the reasons for the referendum result.70
The Polish labour market has changed significantly, subsequent to Poland’s accession
to the EU. In 2017, the employment rate was the highest in recorded history (around 16.5
million),71 while the unemployment rate had decreased to around 6.5 per cent.72
Nevertheless, in many sectors a labour shortage could be observed. This applies to both
low-skilled workers (e.g. in the retail sector) and highly skilled employees (e.g. in the
healthcare sector). As it happens, Polish workers from these same sectors are emigrating
to the Western EU countries, presently still predominantly to the UK. Such a situation
provokes questions about the relationship between the education system and employment
policy. Education in some areas (e.g. medical studies or IT studies) is very expensive and,
for a large number of  students, funded by the state. At the same time, young university
graduates in these subjects emigrate to countries offering better working conditions and a
higher level of  remuneration than Poland. The demand for employees seen in Poland over
recent years has caused some significant changes in the Polish labour market. First, it has
led to an increase in remuneration. The statutory minimum wage increased from PLN824
in 200473 to PLN2100 in 2018.74 The average remuneration in the national economy has
now exceeded the threshold of  PLN4200, whereas in 2004 it hovered around PLN 2300.75
Thanks to this, the Polish labour market has become more attractive for workers, especially
those from poorer European countries, including non-EU countries (predominantly
Ukraine). From the Ukrainian perspective, Polish wages appear relatively high which, in
combination with the liberalisation of  immigration rules,76 has contributed to a
considerably increased migration of  Ukrainian workers to Poland. Moreover, the Polish
authorities expect that the current situation will also change the attitude of  Polish workers
by, it is hoped, reducing the rate of  internal immigration within Poland and encouraging
Poles living abroad to return. Second, there is also the necessity to fill the gap in the labour
market, to which the liberalisation of  immigration rules for citizens of  some countries
(including Ukraine) has contributed. On top of  that, the government is striving to reverse
current tendencies and encourage Poles living abroad (mainly in the UK) to return, in
particular highly skilled employees. This was explicitly confirmed by the Polish Prime
Minister during a recent visit to the UK. Brexit may only serve to enhance such trends.
While some Poles may anticipate growing pressure and a less welcoming atmosphere,
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others may be motivated by the much higher costs of  living in the UK, in spite of  the
higher level of  wages and quality of  social protection in the Britain. 
In the UK, the labour market has already started to change as a result of  the Brexit
referendum. Although there are still more EU citizens coming to the UK than leaving, the
number of  those leaving the UK has increased.77 Some groups of  migrant workers began
to leave almost immediately after the Brexit referendum, due to uncertainty about their
future employment status and an increasingly negative atmosphere for foreign employees.
In general, there has been a decrease among workers from those Member States that
joined the EU in 2004. This is due in part to the racially motivated abuse experienced in
the aftermath of  the referendum, but also to the stronger position of  other nations within
the common European labour market. Increasingly, Polish workers are searching for work
in other European countries. Very popular directions are Germany, the Netherlands and
(recently) Belgium.78 Many workers are also choosing the Scandinavian countries. In the
UK there has been an increase in the number of  workers from Bulgaria and Romania,
both of  which joined the EU more recently.79 Migrant workers are essential in those
sectors (agriculture is one example) where the low pay and poor working conditions are
not attractive for British citizens, and there are plans to establish special visa programmes
for Ukrainian and Turkish citizens. These provisions, which will lead to maintaining the
current rights of  migrant workers in respect of  access to the British labour market,
however, raise questions about the real justification behind Brexit. 
8 Conclusions
The implementation of  Brexit will pose many challenges to the labour law systems at
European and national levels. Brexit may eliminate one of  the obstacles to social
development. The Union is trying to capitalise on this opportunity and change the
relationship between its economic and social objectives. It is hardly an accident that the
Union proclaimed the European Pillar of  Social Rights during Brexit negotiations.
Paradoxically, the role of  the UK could in future be taken over by CEE countries. For
them, adoption of  a more developed social model may lead to losing one of  their most
important advantages – the lower cost of  work. However, after the withdrawal of  the UK,
the position of  the ‘liberal group’ will get much weaker. This was clearly confirmed by the
amendment to the Posted Workers Directive. A further problem will be the situation of
multinational labour law institutions. However, there is still a possibility of  regulating
some of  these issues in the Brexit agreement. 
There are also concerns about how Brexit will affect British labour law. Many of  its
institutions have been introduced or developed to implement European standards. Waves
of  returning workers may also have an adverse effect on the labour market in their own
countries, and it may become necessary to adjust working conditions in response to
increased unemployment rates. 
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77   Office for National Statistics, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: July 2018 (rescheduled from May 2018)’ 2
<www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/
migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/july2018revisedfrommaycoveringtheperiodtodecember2017>. 
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The next question concerns guarantees for workers who are currently employed in the
UK; it will then be necessary to establish new mechanisms regulating access to the British
labour market, and to determine the length of  the transition period. Although it seems
unlikely that the current standard of  freedom of  movement will be maintained, there may
end up being a clash between political expectations and the needs of  the British economy.
In addition, there are numerous technical questions that may hinder the application of  the
newly adopted rules. There are also fundamental questions concerning European labour
law and transnational institutions after Brexit. 
Finally, Brexit will affect labour markets in many other European countries. In the
UK, there will naturally consequences for British citizens while other Member States will
experience a wave of  returns. Numerous workers will leave Great Britain and move to
their home countries or other European states, which may have the effect of  threatening
the current social equilibrium. 
A lot depends on the agreements regulating Brexit and the UK’s future cooperation
with the EU. The closer this relationship is, the higher will be the standards of
employment that have to be maintained. Moreover, there is also an opportunity to protect
or re-establish transnational mechanisms and institutions which may be a trigger for
future collaboration. 
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Abstract
The UK’s departure from the EU will have significant impact on the existing EU environmental protection
regimes. This article examines the possible options for the new relationship between the EU27 and the UK
and how the environment might be protected under this. This is done through an analysis of  how
environmental law is dealt with under the EU’s existing relationship models with non-member states. These
models are examined in conjunction with the negotiating lines that have been set down by both the UK and
EU to see which is most politically feasible, and what impact it will have on how the EU protects the
environment. 
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1 Introduction
Just as in all other fields, the departure of  the UK from the EU is going to have a majorimpact on environmental law and policy, both in that country and across the remaining 27
Member States. The transnational nature of  EU law and its ability to maintain coherence
in the legal regimes of  all the Member States has represented an unprecedented means of
setting and achieving environmental goals. The unified nature of  this system, and the various
thematic environmental legal regimes established through it, will now be diminished,
irrespective of  claims by Environment Secretary Michael Gove about the prospect of  a
‘Green Brexit’.1
There has already been significant commentary about the potential negative impacts
of  Brexit for UK environmental law.2 As the March 2019 departure deadline draws closer,
it is appropriate that consideration is also given to the possible post-Brexit environmental
NILQ autumn 2018
1     ‘New Environmental Protections to deliver a Green Brexit’ (Press Release, Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs, 12 November 2017) <www.gov.uk/government/news/new-environmental-
protections-to-deliver-a-green-brexit>.
2     Maria Lee, ‘Accountability for Environmental Standards after Brexit’ (2017) 19(2) Environmental Law Review
89–92; Colin T Reid, ‘Brexit and the Future of  UK Environmental Law’ (2016) 34(4) Journal of  Energy and
Natural Resources Law 407–15; Chris Hilson, ‘The Impact of  Brexit on the Environment: Exploring the
Dynamics of  a Complex Relationship’ (2017) 7 Transnational Environmental Law 1–25. Lee outlines some
potential (though it is submitted here, unlikely) upsides for the UK in moving away from the EU approach to
environmental regulation which, he argues, is centred around the needs of  the Internal Market: Robert Lee,
‘Always Keep a Hold of  Nurse: British Environmental Law and Exit from the European Union’ (2017) 29
Journal of  Environmental Law 155–64.
regime that will exist between the UK and the EU27 and how this can best maintain the
coherence of  existing EU environmental norms. Any measures that address
environmental law in the new relationship will operate within the wider legal and
institutional arrangements that will be agreed. In order to better understand the potential
options for the future relationship, this article considers the existing legal frameworks that
the EU has entered into with non-member states, and the environmental law implications
of  each of  these. 
Section 2 examines the types of  legal relations that the EU has formed with third
countries: European Free Trade Area (EFTA) membership combined with bilateral
agreements (the Swiss approach); the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement
model; third-country membership of  the EU’s Customs Union; Association Agreements;
trade relationships based on the Common Commercial Policy (CCP); the EU’s express
treaty-making power in the area of  the environment; and the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP). The key characteristics and institutional arrangements of  each are
described, as well as specific aspects related to environmental policy, using examples of
individual agreements where appropriate. While some of  these models have already been
explicitly ruled out by the British government, it is submitted that the continued lack of
clarity on the present Prime Minister’s preferences on a post-Brexit deal, the uncertainty
surrounding what would be acceptable in the Conservative Party and the realistic
possibility that the final negotiations may be undertaken by a Labour government after
another general election justify discussing all potential options. 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, broad parameters of  the future relationship
between the EU and the UK have been sketched by the UK government and the EU
negotiators. In light of  these, Section 3 outlines what type of  new arrangement might be
politically feasible and the extent to which it would allow for the maintenance of  the
consistency of  the EU’s environmental regime.3 Consideration is also given to the
coherency of  this regime in the event of  a ‘no-deal’ scenario. 
2 EU–third-country relationships in the field of environmental law
The approach to how the EU interacts with third countries has evolved over time.4
Emerson has identified 13 different sets of  graduated arrangements regulating the EU’s
relationship with neighbouring countries.5 This section considers the structure of
relationships between the EU and contiguous states, near-neighbours, and industrialised
non-neighbourhood states, with a focus on how environmental issues are addressed in
these relationships.
2.1 EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT MEMBERSHIP COMBINED WITH BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS WITH THE EU (THE SWISS MODEL)
Founded in 1960, the EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation, comprising four states:
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.6 The four members form a free trade
area, and the EFTA negotiates free trade agreements with third countries on their behalf.
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Only one of  the four – Switzerland – is not also a signatory of  the EEA Agreement
(discussed in Section 2.2 below), having voted against membership in a referendum in
1992. While Switzerland shares a free trade area with the EFTA and EU states, it is not
participating in the EU Internal Market. As a consequence, it only has limited access in
the area of  free movement of  goods under bilateral agreements negotiated with the EU.7
And it is also outside of  the Customs Union. As with the EEA states, Switzerland can
conclude trade agreements with non-EU states.
Due to its rejection of  EEA membership, each element of  EU–Swiss legal relations
has to be negotiated on a bilateral basis. There are over 100 such agreements and, while
there is no internalised obligation within Swiss law to adhere to these, the risk of  a
retaliatory blockage of  access to free movement of  goods by the EU in the event of  non-
compliance means that, in reality, Switzerland chooses to align itself  with many EU laws.8
This alignment is based on the principle of  equivalence of  law.9 The arrangement lacks
the supervisory and dispute resolution institutional structures present under the EEA
Agreement. The sole EFTA membership model has been criticised due to the perceived
‘fragility’ of  the bilateral approach of  Switzerland.10 This criticism is reflected in the
efforts by the EU to reform the manner in which legal relations between the EU and
Switzerland operate, with a particular focus on each agreement being interpreted in
conformity with the case law of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU).11
Similarly, only three of  the bilateral agreements are dynamic, to the extent that the
agreements are updated as EU law changes.12
2.1.1 Swiss–EU relationship and environmental law and policy
Switzerland is engaged in environmental cooperation with the EU on a number of
grounds, primarily on the basis of  the bilateral agreements such as the Agreement on Air
Transport (addressing noise emissions) and the Agreement on the Carriage of  Goods and
Passengers by Rail and Road (placing environmental taxes on heavy road haulage).13 The
influence of  the EU in terms of  the environment can also be seen with pieces of  EU
legislation being substantially mirrored within domestic law, such as the Chemicals
Ordinance on Protection against Dangerous Substances and Preparations, which
significantly copies the EU REACH Regulation on chemicals.14 A recent agreement will
see the emissions trading systems of  the EU and Switzerland being linked.15
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13   Federal Office for the Environment, ‘Relations between Switzerland and the EU in the Area of  the
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Unlike EFTA–EEA states, Switzerland is unable to submit formal comments during
the drafting stage of  EU legislation, limiting its capacity to influence the final content.
However, Swiss representatives do attend informal meetings of  EU environmental
ministers. Switzerland has also made financial contributions to the 2004 and 2007
accession states in order to improve their national infrastructure on a number of
headings, including the environment.16
2.2 THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA AGREEMENT
The EEA Agreement, signed at the Treaty of  Oporto in 1991, allows three of  the four
EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) to participate in the EU’s Internal
Market. EU legislation relating to the Internal Market, research and development policy,
social policy, education, consumer protection and environmental protection is
incorporated into the EEA Agreement and is therefore applicable within those three
states.17 As EU legislation in these areas changes, the EEA Agreement is continuously
updated through decisions of  the EEA Joint Committee, one of  the institutions
established to oversee the implementation of  the Agreement. These EEA Acts ensure the
applicability of  EU law in the EEA states.18 The EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee
undertakes scrutiny of  decisions taken by the Joint Committee.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority mirrors the European Commission’s role in
ensuring that states abide by their obligations under the Agreement. It can undertake
investigations of  potential breaches and initiate an action against one of  the component
states at the EFTA Court. The EFTA Court rules on infringement actions brought either
by the Surveillance Authority or another signatory state against a signatory state. It has
competence to hear appeals against decisions taken by the Surveillance Authority and can
give advisory opinions about the interpretation of  the EEA Agreement. Unlike the CJEU,
the EFTA Court does not have the power to impose a fine on states. EEA legislative
measures within EEA states do not enjoy supremacy and direct effect in the same way as
EU law within Member States, but there are three means of  achieving similar ends: the
obligation on the states to conform to their interpretation, the doctrine of  state liability
and Protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement (which states that in the event of  a clash between
EEA rules and other statutory provisions, the state undertakes to introduce a statutory
provision to allow the EEA rules).19
2.2.1 The European Economic Area Agreement and environmental law and policy
The elements of  environmental law covered by the EEA Agreement are primarily set out
in Annex XX (Environment), while Annex II (Technical Regulations, Standards, Testing
and Certification) also contains a section on environmental protection which enumerates
a significant amount of  applicable legislation. Annex XX also lists a number of  pieces of
EU environmental legislation which are specified as not being covered by the EEA
Agreement, encompassing both legislation in existence at the time the agreement was
signed and new laws subsequently passed. These exclusions cover broad areas such as
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wildlife protection, some water quality rules, radiation control and the Kyoto Protocol.20
As such, the listed legislation is not binding in the states that have signed up to the EEA
Agreement. 
While EFTA–EEA states do not have the capacity to directly amend draft regulations
and directives through the Council of  Ministers and the European Parliament, it has been
noted that they can bring some influence to bear on the shaping of  EU legislation
through the submission of  written comments on draft documents and participation in
expert groups of  the Commission or in comitology committees.21 A case study published
by the EFTA outlines the interactions that it had with the EU during the drafting of  the
REACH Regulation on chemicals,22 comprising a series of  engagements over a six-year
period including meetings of  ministers and of  experts, as well as written responses to the
EU White Paper and successive drafts.23 While acknowledging the difficulty in measuring
any specific EFTA impact due to the large number of  other stakeholders involved, it
notes that one EFTA priority – substituting dangerous substances for less dangerous ones
where possible – is included in the legislation and another – the placing of  a duty of  care
on manufacturers – is referred to in the Regulation’s preamble.24 The EEA states must
also make contributions to the ‘EEA and Norway Grants’ scheme, which provides
funding for a number of  EU beneficiary states to undertake projects under a number of
headings, including the environment.25
2.3 CUSTOMS UNION MEMBERSHIP
The EU Customs Union includes the 28 Member States, along with some territories of
the UK which are not part of  the EU (Isle of  Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Akrotiri and
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Kyoto Protocol [2004] OJ L 9/1; Directive 2006/7/EC of  the European Parliament and the Council of
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24   Ibid 26.
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Dhekelia) and Monaco. These states have abolished internal tariffs between them and
have agreed to charge the same external tariffs on goods entering the Customs Union.
Beyond the removal of  customs duties, the key benefit from membership of  the Customs
Union is that goods are not subject to quotas, checks and inspections for safety or routine
customs processes such as providing customs declarations.26 Nor do goods have to
comply with burdensome Rules of  Origin, which is of  particular importance in the
context of  products made from a number of  components.27
The EU has also entered into a Customs Union with Turkey, Andorra and San Marino.
As these non-EU states are now bound by the EU’s common external tariff, they can only
enter into subsequent free trade agreements with third countries which comply with the
EU’s external tariff  regime.28 Linked to this, where the EU enters into a trade agreement
with a third country, the non-EU Customs Union member must permit the goods of  that
third country to enter its territory, but has to negotiate separately the entry of  its goods
into the third country. 
In terms of  market size, the 1996 Customs Union Agreement (CUA) with Turkey is
the most significant CUA which the EU has entered into.29 It requires Turkey to apply the
EU common external tariff  to the majority of  industrial products and also to the
industrial components of  processed agricultural goods.30 Trade in primary agricultural
products is excluded.31 The agreement provides for an informal right of  consultation
with Turkey when the EU draws up new legislation relevant to the Customs Union.32
Turkey is also to be informed of  any decision to alter the EU’s Common Customs
Tariff.33 The overall implementation of  the Agreement is overseen by a Customs Union
Joint Committee.34 Its role is primarily one of  providing recommendations and options
about the proper functioning of  the Customs Union.35
2.3.1 Customs Union and environmental law and policy
Within their wider role, customs officials undertake measures related to the environment,
including controlling import of  exotic species, rare timber and confirming that
requirements surrounding the live transportation of  animals are met.36 They ensure the
products coming into the EU meet the particular environmental requirements across a
broad range of  areas such as chemicals, ozone-depleting substances, fluorinated
greenhouse gases, endangered species and waste.37 Full membership of  the Customs
Union thus requires a non-member state to be compliant with a significant range of
environmental regulations and directives. 
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31   Article 2.
32   Article 55. 
33   Article 14. 
34   Article 52. 
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2.4 ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS
The authority to negotiate an Association Agreement with other states or international
organisations has been open to the EU since the Treaty of  Rome and is now provided for
in Article 217 Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU). The provision
itself  is vague as to what Association Agreements should cover, other than that they
involve ‘reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure’.38 This
lack of  detail on what they contain has led Association Agreements to being described as
‘formal frameworks for privileged relations without strict rules as to the possible
substantive scope of  those relations’.39 A range of  differently titled legal agreements have
sprung from this provision including Association Agreements, Europe Agreements,
Stabilisation and Association Agreements, and Cooperation and Partnership Agreements.
Indeed, two of  the set of  legal arrangements already addressed in this article, the EEA
and the EU–Turkey Customs Union, are both formed on the basis of  Association
Agreements.40
Association Agreements are often undertaken with an expectation that they will lead
to future membership of  the EU.41 However, they do not always provide a path to
accession and can be used as an alternative to provide a preferential relationship with a
state that is structurally unprepared or even unwilling to join the EU.42 Association
Agreements will contain provisions for the creation of  an institutional structure around
the agreement to ensure its implementation, with a council, committee and often a
parliamentary assembly, each made up of  equal representation from the EU and the
signatory state.43
2.4.1 Environmental provisions in Association Agreements
Association Agreements may contain environmental cooperation and integration
clauses.44 The Association Agreement of  2014 between the EU and Moldova constitutes
a recent example.45 As with all Association Agreements in the EU’s neighbourhood, it
constitutes a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA),46 with its main
legal base in Article 217 TFEU.47 Two of  the Association Agreement’s chapters are of
particular relevance to environmental protection. Chapter 16 on the Environment states
that the EU and Moldova will ‘develop and strengthen their cooperation on
environmental issues, thereby contributing to the long-term objective of  sustainable
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development and greening the economy’.48 Fourteen topical areas are listed for
cooperation.49 Chapter 17 on Climate Change lists the areas where the parties should
cooperate in this field.50 Each chapter contains an article stating that Moldova will
undertake approximation of  its legislation to the EU Acts and international instruments
referred to in annexes to the Agreement (Articles 91 and 97 respectively). Between the
two annexes, 29 directives and regulations are listed, covering broad areas such as, inter
alia, chemicals regulation, nature protection, environmental governance, air quality, water
quality and climate.51 Instead of  a requirement to implement each piece of  legislation in
total, the Annex sets out which specific provisions need to be harmonised by Moldova
and outlines a timeframe within which this must take place for each legislative act.
The Agreement also contains a chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development.52
Within this, a range of  sub-categories is addressed, including multilateral environmental
agreements (referencing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto
Protocol),53 biological diversity,54 and sustainable management of  forests and trade in
forest products.55 Significantly, provision is made for the establishment of  a Trade and
Sustainable Development Subcommittee which will oversee the implementation of  this
chapter, including any cooperative activities undertaken.56 A procedure is established
whereby either party may seek consultations with the other regarding any matter arising
under the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter by delivering a written request to
the contact point of  the other party.57 If  the consultations do not address the matter, the
party can seek to have a panel of  experts convened to address the issue.58 The panel
produces a report with findings of  fact and recommendations. The parties then discuss
what measures need to be taken, in light of  the panel of  experts’ report.59
2.5 RELATIONSHIP BASED ON THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY
The CCP represents the EU’s trade with third countries, based on the common external
tariff. Since the Lisbon Treaty, Article 3(e) TFEU states that the CCP remains an exclusive
competence of  the EU. Article 207 TFEU sets out the parameters of  the CCP, and
outlines a special procedure for the adoption of  agreements based on the CCP, as an
exception to the process for ratifying international agreements outlined in Article 218
TFEU. The exercise of  the CCP and agreements made based on it must be done in a
manner compatible with the EU’s internal powers, including the environment.60
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2.5.1 Bilateral free trade agreements and the environment
The free trade agreement concerning goods, services and establishment entered into
between the EU and South Korea is an example of  an EU agreement which relies on
Article 207 TFEU as one of  its legal bases.61 The fact that it covered a broad range of
areas, including intellectual property rights, competition and governance, and contained
significant provisions on environmental and labour standards means that it is classified as
a DCFTA, though, unlike the agreement with Moldova, this description is not clearly
stated in the text.62 The agreement incorporates a significant number of  environmental
concerns within the chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development.63 The regulatory
divergence provided by a free trade deal is recognised as each party may ‘establish its own
levels of  environmental and labour protection’ and ‘adopt or modify accordingly its
relevant laws and policies’.64 Article 13.11 states a commitment to cooperate on trade-
related aspects of  environmental (and social) policy, with the fields of  such cooperation
outlined in Annex 13 of  the agreement.65 A Committee on Trade and Sustainable
Development is established to oversee the implementation of  this chapter.
More recently, a broad free trade area between the EU and Canada was established
through the signing of  the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in
2017.66 Like the agreement with South Korea, it also relies on Article 207 TFEU as one
of  its legal bases.67 It also features a chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development
(chapter 22) but, in contrast to the South Korean agreement, there is a full chapter
entitled Trade and Environment (chapter 24), a reflection of  the fact that the EU’s
environmental competence provision in Article 192(1) TFEU is also referenced as a legal
base for the agreement. It is stated that the combined aim of  these two chapters, along
with that on Trade and Labour, is that the parties will: promote sustainable development;
uphold their environmental protection objectives in a context of  open and free trade;
enhance enforcement of  their respective environmental law; and promote public
consultation and participation in the discussion of  sustainable development issues.68
The Trade and Environment chapter recognises that each state may set its own
environmental priorities, establish its own levels of  environmental protection, and adopt
its laws and policies accordingly and in a manner consistent with any multilateral
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environmental agreements to which it is a signatory.69 It also contains a statement that it
is inappropriate for state parties to encourage trade or investment by weakening levels of
protection afforded in environmental law.70
Institutional structures, similar to those in the Association Agreement with Moldova,
in the form of  a Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development are established and
charged with responsibility for the implementation of  the chapters on Trade and
Sustainable Development, Trade and Labour, and Trade and Environment.71 A process
for resolution of  disputes about issues covered in the Trade and Environment chapter is
outlined, comprising an initial consultation on the disputed issue between the parties,72
followed by referral to a panel of  experts for a decision.73 The panel makes findings of
fact and a determination which is communicated to the parties.74 If  it determines that a
party has not conformed with its obligations, the parties must engage in discussions to
take necessary measures or agree a mutually acceptable plan to address the issue.75
2.6 EXPRESS TREATY-MAKING POWER IN THE AREA OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Since the Single European Act and the addition of  what are today Articles 191 and 192
TFEU, the EU has had an express competence to conclude treaties with third parties in
the field of  the environment.76 The use of  Article 192 TFEU as the sole legal base for
signing international environmental agreements has been challenged before the CJEU a
number of  times where the agreement in question also covered trade issues and allegedly
required Articles 192 and 207 TFEU as a joint legal base. The key significance here is the
special procedure required for agreements adopted under Article 207 TFEU, as an
exception to the general rules for international agreements under Article 218 TFEU.
When the EU signed the Cartagena Protocol (Convention on Biological Diversity),
the decision approving this was adopted under Article 191 TFEU. The Commission
argued for a joint legal base consisting of  Articles 191 and 207 TFEU.77 The court found
that its primary objective was an environmental one, justifying the use of  Article 192 as
the sole legal base.78 Neither the fact that international trade agreements often had
multiple objectives, nor the requirement to give the CCP a broad interpretation stopped
the environment from being the core element of  the Protocol, even though it could have
some impacts on trade.79
The court reached the opposite conclusion in the Energy Star Agreement case,
concerning an agreement between the EU and the USA regarding an energy-efficiency
labelling programmes.80 While the court accepted that this would have had some positive
environmental effects stemming from reduced energy consumption in more efficient
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machines, this was an indirect effect, compared to the direct and immediate impact on
trade in office equipment.81 Subsequently, in relation to the Rotterdam Convention (on
the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in
international trade), the court found the commercial elements to be not purely incidental
and that some of  its provisions had direct and immediate effects on trade in hazardous
chemicals,82 while recognising that the protection of  human health and the environment
was foremost in the minds of  all signatories of  the Convention.83 In both cases, the court
annulled the contested decisions on the basis that Article 207 TFEU should have been
used as a joint legal base along with Article 191 TFEU. 
In light of  these and other decisions, it has been argued that international agreements
being only concerned with environmental matters to a degree to warrant sole reliance on
the environmental legal base would be exceptional.84 The provisions do form a shared
legal base for a substantial number of  bilateral agreements between the EU and other
organisations, but also individual states. It has already been referenced how Article 192
TFEU is one of  the treaty provisions relied upon in the decision adopting CETA.
However, the Council decision applying the 2017 EU–Swiss agreement to link their
emissions trading systems is solely based on the same article, reflecting the primacy of
environmental and climate change issues in that agreement.85
2.7 THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
The EU’s interaction with 16 states on or close to its borders is governed through the
ENP. The states involved are divided into the south (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia) and east (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). The differences in the needs of  the two separate
groups would see the subsequent creation of  two regional-specific programmes in 2008–
2009, discussed below.86 The ENP originated on the basis of  a Commission
Communication in 2004.87 However, its status was given a legal base within the EU
treaties at Lisbon, where Article 8(1) TEU states: 
The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries,
aiming to establish an area of  prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on
the values of  the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based
on cooperation.
The positioning of  the legal basis for the ENP as a separate article outside of  the external
action title has been noted as indicating that it is not necessarily linked to any of  the
specific fields outlined in that title.88
The Commission has suggested that trade relations with ENP states should be
pursued in the context of  DCFTAs.89 These have been achieved in the context of  the
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bilateral Association Agreements signed between the EU and Moldova, Ukraine and
Georgia. Even in the absence of  Association Agreements, the model of  working within
the ENP is seen as strongly bilateral.90 The key components of  the EU’s interaction with
each state is outlined within an action plan which sets out that state’s agenda for political
and economic reforms over a three- to five-year period.91 Environmental law and policy
measures feature as a section of  action plans, with a focus on convergence, both with
international law measures and the EU acquis.92 However, it has been recognised that the
environmental elements of  action plans have not been implemented very diligently, due
to a range of  reasons, including the fact that the environment is not a priority in the
context of  the ENP, the consequent unwillingness to take strong action against states not
implementing their environmental commitments, and the non-mandatory language
generally used in the environmental sections of  action plans, making it difficult to
establish if  a state is implementing the measures.93
2.7.1 Union for the Mediterranean
The EU Member States engage with countries from the southern and eastern
Mediterranean, along with the European Commission, through the Union for the
Mediterranean (UfM).94 The UfM is described as an ‘intergovernmental organisation . . .
to enhance regional cooperation and dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region’.95 It is
operated by a Secretariat with a separate legal personality.96 The UfM works to
complement the bilateral legal relations established by many states in the region with the
EU through Association Agreements.97
Two of  the six ‘priority areas’ identified for the UfM’s work include Energy & Climate
Action and Water & Environment. The Mediterranean Solar Plan seeks to create a
common regulatory approach as regards solar energy between EU and non-EU
Mediterranean states and create a regional renewable energy market, while the
Depollution of  the Mediterranean project works to reduce pollution of  sea water.98 While
there has been some progress in these areas, it has been recognised that environmental
concerns do not form a central feature of  the Euro-Mediterranean policies.99
2.7.2 Eastern Partnership
Formed in 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) sees the EU engage with six eastern states
– Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. At the time, it was seen
as a method of  differentiating elements of  the ENP by creating a separate entity for post-
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soviet states.100 Within these six countries, the nature of  the relationship with the EU
varies, with three having indicated a desire for EU membership, and the others pursuing
different alignments.101
Like the UfM, the EaP is seen as primarily for the creation of  bilateral relations
between the EU and the six states.102 They meet with the EU in the context of  annual
EaP summits. The results of  such bilateral engagement, primarily Association
Agreements, contain the most significant measures towards improving environmental
quality and addressing climate change within these states.103 Along with the principle
bilateral element, the EaP also has a number of  multilateral platforms.104 The Economic
Integration and Convergence with EU Policies platform includes a panel addressing
‘Environment and Climate Change’.105
2.8 Relationship models and their level of consistency with 
EU environmental law
In examining the models outlined here for their ability to maintain the consistency of  the
EU’s environmental protection regime, considerations of  breadth of  coverage,
compliance and enforcement are paramount. Clearly, EEA membership is the only one
that comes anywhere close to replicating the coverage of  EU environmental law, and even
that omits some of  the most successful measures in the areas of  nature protection and
water quality. The incorporation of  pieces of  EU environmental law not excluded from
the EEA Agreement into Annex XX on an ongoing basis as EEA Acts would ensure their
applicability within the UK. While issues of  environmental law do come before both the
EFTA Court and Surveillance Authority, obviously these do not possess the same level of
institutional enforcement capacity as exists across the CJEU and the European
Commission, nor are they applying rules that benefit from supremacy over domestic
legislation. Nevertheless, EEA membership represents adherence to a substantial body of
EU environmental law and a sophisticated set of  enforcement institutions.
This institutional element would be missing if  the UK followed the Swiss model of
EFTA-only membership. Also absent would be the certainty as to what legislation would
apply. Rather, the requirement to negotiate individual bilateral agreements would be time-
consuming and would mean that it would be virtually impossible to create as
comprehensive a system of  multi-sectoral environmental protection as exists under EU
law. Further, the non-dynamic nature of  many of  the existing agreements limits their
efficacy and it is suggested that this is particularly relevant in a field such as environmental
law where standards may need to be adjusted with some regularity. However, even where
a bilateral agreement is not present, the close trade links between the EU and Switzerland
have meant that the latter is often in a position where it must replicate EU legislation
within its national law, including in fields as complex as chemical regulation. Here, the EU
again is in the position of  rule-setter, thus ensuring the diffusion of  its environmental
standards. Significantly, this situation lacks any institutional enforcement mechanism.
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If  the UK was to maintain its membership of  the Customs Union, even if  only for a
transitionary period, it would continue to be bound by all the EU acquis covering the
Customs Union. Should it depart but subsequently seek to enter into a new bespoke CUA,
it would likewise be bound in totality by that. This will require compliance with EU
standards in all areas covered by the agreement and as such a substantial range of
environmental laws as regards the content and manufacturing of  goods would be binding
upon the UK. In the event that agriculture products were included in a CUA, the
environmental impact would be even broader. However, the requirement for compliance
and any enforcement structures set up under the agreement would not apply beyond
those tradeable goods covered. 
The Association Agreements and the free trade agreements discussed here have all
included some reference to environmental concerns. In the field of  the environment,
existing Association Agreements have required the non-EU party to harmonise its laws
with listed pieces of  EU environmental legislation, thus facilitating the spread of  EU
norms. As Association Agreements are often used as a precursor to EU membership, the
desirability of  this objective enables the EU to raise its requirement for what it expects
of  signatory states. It has been less demanding in the environmental requirements which
it has negotiated into free trade agreements with states where accession is not a
consideration. The goal of  pre-accession Association Agreements has been to advance
the process of  approximating national law with EU norms. Within the free trade
agreements, there has to be much greater room for regulatory divergence between the EU
regime and that of  the other state. This difference in approach can be seen when
comparing the free trade agreements entered into with both Korea and Canada and that
signed with Moldova. Both Association Agreements and free trade agreements provide a
mechanism for resolving compliance issues specifically related to the environment,
though the approach is primarily one of  negotiation and arbitration.
Thematic cooperation on regional-specific issues with non-EU neighbouring states is
encouraged under the ENP, and the environment does feature as one of  these themes.
While the action plans for each state form a basis for environmental improvement, the
examples cited above indicate that this cooperation works best in specific project-based
interactions which, while undoubtedly positive, are narrow in focus and are a long way
from the broad environmental regimes that EU legislation seeks to create. The common
theme in the EU’s relations with states in the ENP is that they take place in the context
of  economic disparity, with the EU supporting specific projects, as opposed to large-scale
cooperation on environmental policies. It is unlikely that the model as currently practised
would work in the context of  a developed economy and political system such as that of
the UK. 
3 Which model for the UK’s relationship with the EU?
3.1 WORKING BETWEEN ‘RED LINES’ AND ‘CLOSING DOORS’
Efforts to conceptualise the new legal relationship between the EU and the UK, and the
position of  environmental law and policy within this, must, for the time being at least,
operate within the boundaries of  the so-called ‘red lines’ articulated by Prime Minister
Theresa May at her Lancaster House speech in early 2017.106 These self-declared
prerequisites for any deal – taking back powers from the CJEU, control over immigration
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policy and the pursuit of  an independent trade policy – clearly limit what sort of  new
arrangement is possible. Nevertheless, in both the Lancaster House speech and her
subsequent Florence speech, Prime Minister May stated a desire to create a
comprehensive and ambitious economic partnership between the UK and the EU.107 It is
significant to note that she also expressed a clear desire to go beyond the economic realm
and form a new relationship in the sphere of  security – ‘a bold new strategic agreement
that provides a comprehensive framework for future security, law enforcement and
criminal justice co-operation’.108 Such an arrangement would not match any of  the
existing models of  how the EU engages with its neighbours and would require a new
form of  relationship, or at minimum a combination of  some of  the options outlined. 
At the same time, the insistence on the ‘red lines’ has led Michel Barnier, the EU’s
chief  Brexit negotiator, to state that the UK is ‘closing doors’ and limiting the EU’s offer
to a free trade agreement.109 It is clear that absolute maintenance of  the current British
negotiating position would lead to a comparatively restricted new relationship, solely in
the field of  trade. Barnier has also spoken about the EU’s goals for the relationship in the
specific context of  environmental policy, where he linked the UK desire for an ambitious
partnership to compatibility with the European regulatory model, including in the field of
environmental standards.110 He specified the need for a non-retrogression clause, which
would mean the maintenance by the UK of  ‘key pre-Brexit standards’. He cited the
example of  the model used in CETA, but stated it should go further. He also made
reference to the need for ‘effective oversight and enforcement of  environmental rules’.
Environmental concerns have also featured in the stance of  the European Parliament,
which has stated that it will only endorse a future relationship where the UK continues to
meet standards set down internationally and in EU legislation in a range of  fields,
including climate change and the environment.111 The Parliament also stresses the need
for alignment with future EU legislation in these two fields.112
Another element that has some relevance is the position of  Northern Ireland within
the final agreement. In the March 2018 Draft Withdrawal Text, the UK agreed that there
would be no hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland and that Northern
Ireland would enjoy full alignment with the rules of  the EU’s Internal Market and the
Customs Union until an alternative scenario was agreed.113 Interestingly, this document
also states that EU environmental law relating to the control of  the import, export,
release, or transport within the EU of  substances, materials, plants or animals listed in an
Annex would apply to the UK in respect of  Northern Ireland.114
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3.2 A MODEL THAT FITS AND IS CONSISTENT WITH EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
As the model that requires the widest adherence to EU environmental regulations outside
of  membership, and which provides significant enforcement mechanisms, undoubtedly
EEA membership is the next best option for maintaining the coherence of  EU
environmental law. The British demand to regain control from the CJEU would be met,
and signing the EEA Agreement without also entering a Customs Union would allow for
the pursuit of  an independent trade policy. However, EEA membership would
immediately fall foul of  the British goal to regain control over immigration and, indeed,
the Prime Minister explicitly rejected this option in the Florence speech. While following
the Swiss option of  EFTA membership without acceding to the EEA Agreement would
also remove the role of  the CJEU and allow for an independent trade policy, it is
suggested that the prospect of  the UK being cast in the role of  a ‘rule-taker’ – practically
compelled to adopt EU laws while having no say in their drafting – would be vigorously
resisted by Brexit advocates.115 Both EEA and EFTA-only models also involve a financial
contribution from the Member States, a requirement unlikely to be welcomed considering
the resentment generated in the UK on foot of  its mandatory contributions to the EU
budget. In light of  the fact that the Swiss option has also been ruled out by the Prime
Minister and is one which, as described above, the EU itself  seeks to alter, it is unlikely
to provide a route suitable for the UK.116
In her Florence speech, the Prime Minister also ruled out a Customs Union with the
EU, a model that would significantly resolve issues in the context of  the land border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland. The principal issue with staying in the Customs
Union is that it would radically restrict the UK’s scope for a fully independent trade policy,
as the UK would be bound by the EU tariffs and thus be precluded from negotiating new
free trade agreements with third countries. The British Labour Party has now staked out
a clearly different approach on this point, committing to continued membership of  the
Customs Union during the transitional period after Brexit and to renegotiating a new
Customs Union arrangement following this.117 Support for at least exploring this option
was also demonstrated by a strong majority in the House of  Lords, which voted for an
amendment that would require the government to set out what would need to be done in
order to negotiate a new Customs Union,118 though a subsequent amendment to a
Customs Bill to make membership of  the Customs Union mandatory was narrowly
rejected in the House of  Commons.119 If  this option is adopted, it will mean that the UK
would continue to be bound by the measures outlined above in the short term. In any
negotiations for a new Customs Union arrangement, Barnier’s statement regarding the
EU view on the European regulatory model and the place of  environmental standards
within it would hopefully point to the inclusion of  these standards within any future
customs arrangement, with suitable institutional structures to ensure compliance. 
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The March 2018 European Council guidelines on the framework for post-Brexit
relations with the UK are particularly cognisant of  Prime Minister May’s rejection of  both
the Single Market and the Customs Union. In light of  this, they set out an EU offer based
primarily around a free trade agreement.120 The guidelines reference ‘specific
partnerships’ in fields such as law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters, and foreign, security and defence policy.121 They also state that the new
relationship should address global challenges like climate change, sustainable
development and cross-border pollution, with close cooperation between the EU and UK
in these areas.122 These guidelines suggest that the relationship will be no less than a free
trade agreement negotiated under the CCP. It has been shown that, where the EU has
already entered into such free trade agreements, they do contain environmental
provisions. Again, citing Barnier’s statement, there is reason for optimism that the EU will
insist on the maintenance of  the existing level of  environmental protections being written
into the agreement’s provisions.123
Assuming, in light of  the ‘Green Brexit’ comments, that the UK is serious about
undertaking some structured and coherent cooperation in the field of  the environment
and climate change, an Association Agreement would represent a more comprehensive
means of  achieving this, beyond a free trade agreement. EU statements to date place great
emphasis on a non-regression clause as regards environmental standards. In the context
of  the UK, initially at least this would be no more than recognising the status quo, as the
UK should already comply with existing EU measures. A key question from the point of
view of  future consistency between the EU and UK regimes will be whether the EU can
insist on the inclusion of  an ‘environmental advancement principle’ to ensure a drive for
continuously higher standards.124 This would leave the UK in the position of  a rule-taker
in the environmental field and it is highly questionable whether it would agree to this in
the context of  an Association Agreement. Much will hinge on whether, in the context of
the new relationship, the EU actually places a high enough priority on environmental
issues to insist upon a quid pro quo between these and the areas the UK places a premium
on, but it is significant that the European Parliament, which must approve the final Brexit
deal, has indicated support for the environmental advancement principle. 
In the event that an Association Agreement is not acceptable, the UK could form its
relationship with the EU in the context of  a free trade agreement and looser cooperation
through a new model based under the ENP – a potential ‘British Isles Partnership’. While
this would allow for cooperation in specified areas, it would require that this be done on
a bilateral basis, thus addressing British fears about the loss of  sovereignty. Such a
relationship could have an environmental dimension and may be particularly useful for
supporting specific cross-border environmental projects between Northern Ireland and
Ireland. However, this would require changes in the EU’s approach to the ENP to take
account of  the shared level of  economic and political development and the
environmental standards already existing.
One obvious mechanism for continued engagement between the EU and UK on
environmental issues would be for the latter to maintain its membership of  the European
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Environment Agency. Established in the early 1990s, the European Environment Agency
was tasked with providing Member States with ‘objective, reliable and comparable
information at European level enabling them to take the requisite measures to protect the
environment, to assess the results of  such measures and to ensure that the public is
properly informed about the state of  the environment’.125 All Member States of  the EU
are members, along with the three EEA states.126 Switzerland’s membership is governed
by a bilateral agreement with the EU.127 The European Environment Agency can also
engage with third countries and international organisations, under the heading of
‘International Cooperation’.128 Of  particular relevance here is the capacity for non-EU
countries to join the Agency and regional cooperation with states who are not members or
partnered with it, but which ‘cover geographical areas with close or transboundary
geographic or geo-political links to the EU, and where there are well-defined EU
policies’.129 Turkey, which joined as a member in 2003, offers a model for the UK in that
it demonstrates a working membership outside the context of  the EU, EEA or the
EFTA.130 As the Agency is primarily about the compilation of  information on the
environment and performs no regulatory, legislative or adjudicative functions, it is
submitted that retaining full membership would not cross any of  the red lines established
by the British Prime Minister. Such a development would allow the Agency to continue to
receive environmental information from the UK, maintaining the range of  its data sources. 
3.3 NO-DEAL SCENARIO
While this article focuses on the diverse options for the future relationship between the
EU and UK, the possibility of  there being no clear agreement has to be at least
considered. The Prime Minister’s statement in the Lancaster House speech that ‘no deal
for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain’ has continued to remain a mantra for her
government.131 The consequences of  such a situation would be immense, with major
implications for the environment as in all other fields. In the UK, there would be a need
to immediately enhance its regulatory capacity to meet the gap created by the removal of
EU equivalents in the event of  a no-deal situation, compared to the possibility of
equivalence or mutual recognition agreements being put in place as part of  a negotiated
agreement.132 As such, Brexit planning within the UK’s Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs is progressing on the basis of  a no-deal situation being a possible
scenario.133
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It has been noted that a no-deal scenario may make a political necessity of  the UK
entering into more liberal trade arrangements with third countries.134 Such arrangements
could necessitate reduced regulation and the lowering of  environmental standards.135
This so-called ‘Singapore-on-Thames’ model could pose a real difficulty for the EU
successfully competing for business.136 However, it has also been contended that due to
the extraterritoriality of  EU law – the so called ‘Brussels effect’ – the UK will find that
in trade negotiations with third countries there will be a political requirement to align
standards with those of  the EU, due to its influence and market power.137 The REACH
legislation, the Restriction of  Hazardous Substances Directive and the EU’s emission-
trading scheme have all been cited as examples of  where EU norms in the form of
legislation have become de facto international standards.138 The irony that, even
following a withdrawal with no replacement agreement, EU standards still impact upon
the UK, would hopefully not be lost on Brexiteers. 
In a no-deal scenario, and, indeed, irrespective of  the nature of  the UK’s relationship
with the EU, the UK will still be bound by the range of  international environmental
agreements that it has signed up to on an individual basis, most of  which would also be
binding within EU law. The obligations contained in these offer some prospect for the
maintenance of  coherence, at least initially, between the laws of  the EU27 and of  the UK,
though international rules are weaker and enforcement mechanisms are less effective.139
The extent of  these treaties is beyond the scope of  this article, but have been explored in
detail in a report by the UK Environmental Law Association.140
4 Conclusion
Although what exactly the UK desires its new relationship with the EU to be is still
unclear, it is obvious that it seeks a model different to any which exist to date. Close
integration on three of  the four freedoms (while keeping control over the admittance of
non-nationals), no scrutiny of  national decisions by supra-national courts, an
unencumbered ability to enter into free trade deals around the world, and a new security
agreement represent an à la carte list of  desires on behalf  of  the non-member state. The
current nature of  the EU’s relationship with non-member contiguous neighbours falls
into the category of  benefits and obligations without a voice in the case of  industrialised
states like Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, or a supportive engagement with prospective
members or non-applicant developing states through trading relationships and improving
their economic and social governance. The nature of  these existing relationships generally
is mirrored in each case in the context of  the specific field of  environmental law. 
EU environmental law and policy post-Brexit
134  Siyi Feng, Myles Patton, Julian Binfield and John David, ‘“Deal” or “No Deal”? Impacts of  Alternative Post-
Brexit Trade Agreements on UK Agriculture’ (2017) 16(3) EuroChoices 27, 32. 
135  Jonathan Gaventa, ‘Brexit and the EU Energy Union: Keeping Europe’s Energy and Climate Transition on
Track’ (E3G Working Paper, April 2017) 4. 
136  Jeevan Vasagar, ‘Singapore-on-Thames? This Is No Vision for Post-Brexit Britain’ The Guardian (London,
24 November 2017) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/24/singapore-on-thames-post-
brexit-britain-wealthy-city-state>.
137  Annegret Engel and Ludivine Petetin, ‘International Obligations and Devolved Powers: Ploughing through
Competences and GM Crops’ (2018) 20(1) Environmental Law Review 16–31, 29.
138  Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1–67, 26–31. 
139  Charlotte Burns, Andrew Jordan and Viviane Gravey, ‘The EU Referendum and the UK Environment: The
Future under a “Hard” and a “Soft” Brexit’ (ESRC UK in a Changing Europe Initiative 2016) 10. 
140  The UK and International Environmental Law after Brexit (Brexit and Environmental Law Series, UK
Environmental Law Association, September 2017).
345
The novel nature of  the arrangements that the UK is seeking opens the possibility
that it could look to make specific arrangements on discrete environmental issues. The
UK is recognised as one of  the EU states that has promoted strong policies to tackle
climate change.141 It may well wish to continue to be linked to some of  the EU’s policies
in this regard. This could be done through an agreement whereby it would remain part of
the European Trading Scheme, or link its system to that of  the EU, as Switzerland has
done.142 However, the indications as to the degree of  importance that the British
government is placing on environmental matters is mixed. A statement from a senior civil
servant in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that ‘[t]rade and growth are now
priorities for all posts . . . [s]ome economic security-related work like climate change and
illegal wildlife trade will be scaled down’ has raised concerns.143 Climate change and the
environment were each only referenced once in the Prime Minister’s Florence speech, the
latter in the context of  the future British environment and neither term featured in the
Lancaster House speech. The failure to reference these issues in two speeches seen as key
explanations of  British goals in the negotiating process is worrying. More positively, it is
worth nothing that the British Department for the Environment has hired almost 1200
new staff  to deal with the volume of  work created by British exit, which at least suggests
an understanding of  the scale of  the task ahead.144 Similarly, in the Prime Minister’s
Mansion House speech of  March 2018, she made a number of  references to strong
environmental protection, though this was again focused on the internal British regime
post-Brexit.145
All of  the scenarios outlined here represent a retreat from the existing set of
environmental protection regimes. In the medium term post-Brexit, the prospect of
ensuring consistency in standards and subsequent enforcement between the EU27 and
British environmental systems is significantly diminished, as the UK will lack the
accountability mechanisms previously provided by the European Commission and the
CJEU to ensure adherence to legislative requirements.146 Within the EU itself, the UK’s
departure has been noted as being a potential threat to its environmental ambition in
certain areas, particularly climate, with a shift in the balance of  power in the Council
towards states less inclined to support policies that seek continued cuts in emissions.147
At a time when coherent global and regional cooperation and ambitious action are
understood as key pillars in combatting environmental challenges like climate change and
transboundary pollution, there are few positives to be seen for EU environmental law
across the potential post-Brexit models for relations between it and the UK. 
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Abstract
Although Brexit has understandably been the primary focus of  much recent EU-related discussion, it is not
the only threat to the EU’s long-term stability. The growing impact of  populism has already influenced the
Brexit referendum result and an anti-liberal resurgence within the EU. Events in Poland have led to
criticism of  the EU’s apparent impotence in counteracting governments determined to implement an anti-
liberal, national-populist legislative agenda that threatens the rule of  law. This article offers a critical
analysis of  the mechanism contained in Article 7 TEU and the tools created by the European Commission
within its New Framework, viewed through the prism of  escalating violations of  the rule of  law in Poland,
with particular focus on the destabilisation of  the Constitutional Tribunal. It analyses whether such
criticisms are justified and, if  so, whether a more robust framework for addressing anti-liberal populism is
required. We compare the EU’s evolution into an organisation that protects individual human rights with
its fledgling evolution into an organisation that seeks to police the rule of  law. We argue that, in contrast to
its successful human rights evolution, the EU’s current efforts towards enforcing the rule of  law give little
cause for optimism. 
Keywords: EU; rule of  law; Article 7; New Framework; European law; democratic
backsliding; Polish Constitutional Court
1 Introduction
On 20 December 2017, the European Commission invoked the Article 7(1) procedureof  the Treaty on European Union (TEU) for the first time by submitting a Reasoned
Proposal for a Decision of  the Council on the determination of  a clear risk of  a serious
breach of  the rule of  law by Poland.1 However, at least until the time of  writing this
analysis, the procedure has not progressed beyond the initial stage and Poland’s hearing at
the European Council on 26 June 2018. Many factors influenced this process, some of
which will be discussed herein. Of  course, the confines of  this analysis do not allow every
interesting or relevant aspect to be taken into account, let alone analysed thoroughly.
Consequently, the scope of  this analysis is the result of  subjective choices made by the
authors – for this reason, certain aspects will be examined in greater depth (policing the rule
of  law in the EU; the inefficacy of  Article 7 TEU and the EU’s New Framework to
Strengthen the Rule of  Law (the New Framework); and the debilitation of  the Polish
NILQ autumn 2018
1     Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of  a clear risk of  a serious breach by the Republic of
Poland of  the rule of  law COM/2017/0835 final – 2017/0360 (NLE).
Constitutional Court), while some will merely be highlighted (the evolution of  the EU’s
human rights and rule of  law competences; and the growing impact of  populism), and others
will be omitted altogether.
This article argues that recent events in Poland highlight the inadequacy of  the EU’s
existing mechanisms for reacting to perceived rule of  law crises, namely Article 7 TEU
and the European Commission’s New Framework. It compares the EU’s evolution into
an organisation that protects human rights within its field of  jurisdiction with its fledgling
evolution into an organisation that also seeks to police the rule of  law. It concedes that
the evolution of  the EU’s role in protecting human rights has been lengthy and is subject
to an ongoing debate. While its journey towards efficient protection of  the rule of  law
cannot be expected to be less difficult, it is submitted that there is as yet little cause for
optimism that it will proceed as far as the human rights protection instrumentarium. 
As a case study to our discussion of  the EU’s current inability to deal effectively with
rule of  law crises, this article focuses on the Polish government’s reform of  the
Constitutional Tribunal. This is merely one of  numerous national reforms which have
sparked rule of  law concerns, including reforms which have enabled the government to
establish de facto control over the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), the state prosecutorial
agency, and public television and radio. We concur entirely with Ewa Łętowska, one of
Poland’s most renowned academics and a former judge of  the Constitutional Tribunal,
who notes that Poland’s current situation cannot be fully understood merely by
undertaking an isolated legal analysis of  the reforms implemented by the new
government.2 Nevertheless, we focus almost exclusively here on the government’s reform
of  the Constitutional Tribunal because this was only one of  the first significant reforms
to be implemented following the elections in 2015, but it was also a sine qua non to ensuring
that later reforms were not challenged as unconstitutional.
2 Comparisons between the evolution of the EU’s human rights competences
and rule of law competences
Since the 1950s,3 the institution currently known as the European Union has undergone
a radical transformation of  its institutional interests and competences regarding human
rights and the rule of  law. These two latter terms are not entirely synonymous, but they
are clearly interrelated. 
Any denial of  fundamental human rights which derives from a systemic failure to
protect principles such as equality before the law, legality of  executive power, legal
certainty and the independence of  the judiciary will also inevitably give rise to a systemic
threat to the rule of  law.4 Yet it must not be forgotten that, during its early years of
existence, the European Economic Community (EEC) was, from an organisational
perspective, clearly not one which concerned itself  with human rights at an individual
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level, and certainly played no role in policing systemic threats to the rule of  law per se.5
Human rights were effectively considered to be a matter of  national law and outside the
purview of  the EEC itself. Equally, the rule of  law was deemed to be a national matter
until the Treaty of  Amsterdam (1999) introduced this term into the lexicon of  EU law.
The current rule of  law crises present a comparable problem for the EU by posing a
threat to the EU’s core values, which, according to Article 2 TEU, include the rule of  law
and human rights. If  the EU is unable to prevent or redress rule of  law crises at a
systemic level, this brings into question its ability to ensure the Member States’
enforcement of  individual human rights. In turn, this undermines the proper functioning
of  numerous areas of  EU law. Thus, an inability to effectively deal with rule of  law crises
in individual Member States inevitably escalates into a threat to the credibility of
European integration on multiple levels. 
2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION BY THE EU
From a historical perspective, the EU’s growing influence, competences and membership
increased the pressure to develop mechanisms for protecting individual human rights.6 The
initial response of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) to the ‘human
rights predicament’ of  the 1960s was to develop the doctrine of  ‘general principles of  law’
which allowed it to subsume human rights principles and protect them as a matter of
European Community law. At first, this occurred via the ad hoc recognition of  certain human
rights principles derived primarily from the Member States’ national constitutions.7 Later,
it became slightly more structured and coherent by referring more frequently to rights
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to which all the
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Court of  Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?’ (2013) 2 Maastricht Journal of  European and Comparative
Law 168–84.
Member States were signatories.8 The Treaty of  Maastricht (1993) first introduced the
protection of  human rights as a principle for the EU into the Treaties. These
developments form the historical backdrop to two aspects of  the EU’s evolution into an
organisation which protects individual human rights within its field of  competence: firstly,
the stated desire (and then commitment) for the EU to accede as a member of  the ECHR
itself; and, secondly, the entry into force of  the EU’s own Charter of  Fundamental Rights.9
These essential characteristics of  EU law have given rise to a structured network of
principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its
Member States, and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged, as is
recalled in the second paragraph of  Article 1 TEU, in a ‘process of  creating an ever closer
union among the peoples of  Europe’. This legal structure is based on the fundamental
premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises
that they share with it, a set of  common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in
Article 2 TEU. That premise implies and justifies the existence of  mutual trust between
the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of  the
EU that implements them will be respected.10
Much has been written about both of  these developments, and there is no need to
explore them in depth here. Nevertheless, they demonstrate how the EU’s evolution into
an organisation that effectively protects human rights was, firstly, born from an initial
negative fear (regarding Member States’ support for the supremacy doctrine) and,
secondly, was the result of  ongoing Treaty developments and CJEU jurisprudence.11
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2.2 THE EU’S MOVE TOWARDS POLICING THE RULE OF LAW
Historically, the rule of  law principle was introduced into the EU legal framework by the
ruling in the Les Verts case,12 in which the CJEU explicitly recognised it as a founding
principle of  the EU. It follows from this ruling (in 1986!) that the EU is a community of
law, which implies that both the Member States and the institutions are subject to review
as regards their compliance with the Treaties, which were also classified as basic
constitutional texts in this judgment. Subsequently, the rule of  law was codified by the
Member States in the Treaty of  Amsterdam, and the Treaty of  Lisbon confirmed it as a
founding principle of  the EU, common to all the Member States (Article 2 TEU).
The amendments introduced by the Treaty of  Amsterdam enabled the EU to address
systemic deficits of  its Member States which threaten the rule of  law. Two main
developments are noteworthy in this context; firstly, the requirement for applicant states to
adhere to the rule of  law as a precondition for EU membership and, secondly, the possibility
to suspend certain rights (albeit not expel a Member State) and to impose sanctions in the
event of  a serious and persistent breach of  the rule of  law in a Member State.
The effectiveness of  the first development (the accession criteria) has, unsurprisingly,
been assessed positively by some13 and negatively by others.14 Certainly, the accession
criteria, and related decisions to acceptance (approval) of  the membership of  certain
candidate countries, have not been devoid of  controversy.15 However, since these criteria
were inapplicable to any countries which were already EU Member States at the time of
their adoption, and since they cease to be applicable per se to any candidate country that
acquires membership, there is no need to discuss the extent to which the accession criteria
are capable of  being used to deal with rule of  law crises in current EU Member States.
Indeed, the essence of  contemporary rule of  law crises has been described as democratic
backsliding,16 which aptly epitomises the manner in which Member States are capable of
sliding back (with the help of  some considerable legislative/executive pushing) from a
constitutional system which adequately protected the rule of  law into one which ceases
to do so.17 Nevertheless, the accession criteria remain a significant development in the
EU’s growing focus on systemic human rights failings, as opposed to merely individual
human rights per se.
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Backsliding’ (Legal Studies Research Paper No 18/01, Sydney Law School 2018) 17–31. 
The second aspect of  this shifting focus, and most relevant for the purposes of  the
present discussion, is the adoption of  Article 7 TEU, which purportedly enabled the EU
to flex its institutional muscles against existing EU Member States in the event of  a serious
and persistent breach of  the rule of  law. However, it will be argued that, just as it is
difficult for anyone to flex their muscles when their hands are tied behind their back,
Article 7 cannot seriously be expected to successfully deal with the political situation
currently facing the EU – namely where multiple Member States simultaneously exhibit
authoritarian tendencies and make rapid radical changes to their national constitutional
systems which threaten the rule of  law.
The adoption of, and the support given to, the Commission’s New Framework
demonstrates a perception, at both EU and Member State levels, that Article 7 by itself
is inadequate to remedy simultaneous threats to the rule of  law in multiple Member States
(and perhaps even in a single Member State). However, reliance on the New Framework
to date has done little to convince sceptical observers that it is any more likely to resolve
rule of  law crises than Article 7 itself. Thus far, Article 7 has not generated any tangible
signs of  preventing or reversing national constitutional reforms entailing rule of  law
concerns.
2.3 THE EU’S PROTECTION OF THE RULE OF LAW TODAY
An inability to redress threats to the rule of  law in certain Member States must be viewed
as an inability to ensure full human rights protection throughout the Union as a whole.
Nevertheless, the EU at present appears to be ill equipped to act as a forum for effectively
protecting the rule of  law within its Member States. The EU’s reputation as an
organisation which both respects and enforces human rights must surely be at risk if  it
proves unable to adequately respond to national reforms which threaten the rule of  law.
As noted above, despite the rule of  law and individual human rights operating at different
legal levels, the existence of  an independent judiciary and court system is a sine qua non for
the effective enforcement of  individual human rights. 
National courts are the first bastion for protecting the rule of  law. They are bound by
the Simmenthal rule, which lies at the heart of  the principle of  EU law supremacy and
provides an example of  the ‘EU mandate’ held by national courts. EU law permits
national courts inter alia the right to refuse to apply national law which conflicts with EU
law. However, it is not realistically possible for the EU to rely on national courts, in the
spirit of  the Simmenthal formula, when those courts have been subjugated to the
executive power, as is the case in Poland and Hungary.18
Despite the abundance of  material and analysis pointing towards the conclusion that
a serious threat to the rule of  law exists which entails a serious threat to the Union’s ability
to ensure the enforcement of  human rights in its Member States, the EU has been unable
to practically impact on the situation in Poland, or indeed Hungary. The reasons for this
lie in certain inherent weaknesses of  the EU law procedures and mechanisms designed to
address rule of  law crises. These weaknesses are considered next.
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3 The inefficacy of Article 7 TEU and the New Framework 
Article 7 TEU was intended to function as a corollary of  the Copenhagen criteria which
must be adhered to by any country wishing to accede to the EU, including stable
democratic institutions, guarantees for democracy, the rule of  law and human rights, and
respect for and protection of  minorities. Compliance with these criteria is not only a
prerequisite for accession but is also a duty which continues after accession.19 Having
been warned of  the potential for political extremism amidst its own Member States,
following the election of  Jörg Haider’s far-right Austrian government in 2000, the EU was
well aware of  the risks posed by the accession of  10 formerly communist countries from
Central and Eastern Europe. Accordingly, Article 7 TEU (which had originally been
introduced to EU law by the Treaty of  Amsterdam in 1999) was amended by the Treaty
of  Nice in 2001 and entered into force in February 2013, shortly before the A10
accessions took place, with the aim being for it to allow the Union to respond to any
democratic backsliding which threatened the EU’s fundamental values, as expressed in
Article 2 TEU.20
The situation in Austria in 2000 provided an occasion to launch the Article 7
procedure, but this was not taken. However, action taken by the EU outside the scope of
Article 7 (and non-EU actions) proved to be counterproductive and, in fact, intensified
nationalistic sentiment in Austria.21 This explains why the formation of  a similar coalition
government in Italy in 2001 was tacitly accepted by the EU. Equally, when it transpired
that a number of  EU Member States had participated in clearly unlawful political
activities such as the CIA-sponsored prisoner transfer programme, no decision was taken
to engage Article 7. Diplomatic efforts, combined with the broader cooperation between
European governments and the Bush administration, proved to be much more effective
in removing the threat than the difficult procedural requirements contained in Article 7.
Article 7 TEU appears to create a powerful weapon to be wielded against any Member
State which threatens to depart from the EU’s values, as outlined in Article 2 TEU,
including the rule of  law. It not only allows the European Council to ‘determine that there
is a clear risk of  a serious breach . . . of  the values referred to in Article 2’ and the Council
to determine that such a ‘serious and persistent breach’ exists, but also to ‘suspend certain
of  the rights deriving from the application of  the Treaties to the Member State in question,
including the voting rights of  the representative of  the government of  that Member State
in the Council’. Nevertheless, when faced with simultaneous rule of  law crises in multiple
Member States, the stringent voting requirements laid down by this Article vastly reduce
the likelihood that it will actually be put into practice. Such problems are evident in each
of  the constituent paragraphs of  Article 7, which will be examined next.
The EU’s role in policing the rule of law 353
19   Robert Grzeszczak, ‘The European Transformation of  the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Power in
Poland’ in Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski and Monika Sus (eds), The Transformative Power of  Europe (Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft 2015) 19; see Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Nicholas Hernanz, ‘The Triangular
Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of  Law in the EU, Towards an EU
Copenhagen Mechanism’ (Centre for European Policy Studies 2013)
<www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf>.
20   Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Facade: The Meaning and Structure of  the Copenhagen Political
Criterion of  Democracy and the Rule of  Law’ (2004) 8(10) European Integration Online Papers 1–24
<http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004–010.pdf>; Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of
Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of  Democracy and the Rule of  Law (Kluwer Law International
2008); see also Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of  Law Oversight in the European Union
(Cambridge University Press 2016).
21   Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to the Bark: The Story of  Article 7, EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ (2009)
16 Columbia Journal of  European Law 385–426.
3.1 PROBLEMS SURROUNDING ARTICLE 7: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
The first paragraph of  Article 7, which may result in the Council determining the
existence of  a ‘clear risk of  a serious breach’ of  the rule of  law, requires the Council to
act by a majority of  four-fifths of  its members (not including the recalcitrant Member
State). This translates into a requirement that 22 Member States support such a
determination. This does not seem to be an unduly arduous burden, given the highly
charged nature of  the allegations that such a determination entails. However, the absence
of  any such declaration to date has created a deafening silence that perhaps speaks more
than words. 
The problems surrounding Article 7(1) are essentially threefold. Firstly, so far, the
potential initiators of  this procedure have been reluctant to adopt a reasoned proposal.
Secondly, there is uncertainty as to whether the Council would agree with such a proposal.
Thirdly, even if  the Council would approve such a proposal it is unlikely to result in
constructive change. These issues will now be examined in turn. 
Firstly, the Council’s ability to determine the existence of  a ‘clear risk of  a serious
breach’ of  the rule of  law is made conditional upon the existence of  a ‘reasoned proposal
by one third of  the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European
Commission’. A worrying sign regarding the EU’s political will to deploy even the weakest
part of  Article 7 is that, despite the abundance of  evidence which pointed towards the
existence of  a serious threat to the rule of  law in Poland, none of  the potential initiators
of  the Article 7 procedure adopted a reasoned proposal until the Commission did so in
December 2017.22 This is an incredibly slow reaction time, given that a reasoned proposal
may be made by a mere nine Member States or by the European Parliament. As regards
Hungary, the European Parliament resolved in May 2017 to begin work on a reasoned
proposal.23 In November 2017, it also resolved to work on a proposal regarding Poland.24
However, no proposal materialised from the Parliament. It is rather difficult to avoid the
conclusion that both the Member States and the European Parliament seemed to delegate
entirely the task of  initiating the Article 7 procedure to the Commission which, in turn,
appeared overly determined to avoid Article 7 altogether and work within the auspices of
its New Framework, discussed below. 
Secondly, even once a reasoned proposal has been made by one of  the potential
initiators of  Article 7(1), there is no guarantee that the Council would confirm the
position(s) expressed in the proposal with the required majority. Given the unwillingness
of  even nine Member States to create a reasoned proposal themselves, it should not be
taken for granted that the support of  22 Member States will be forthcoming. Hungary’s
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Prime Minister has already declared that Hungary would not support any deployment of
Article 7 against Poland25 and the same would presumably prove true vice versa, although
the Polish government has not issued a comparable official statement. Other Member
States might also refrain from supporting Article 7 actions against Poland or Hungary for
a variety of  reasons relating to their own political agendas. The UK is currently engaged
in awkward negotiations with the EU regarding Brexit and future trade relations.
Although the ‘Brexit deal’ itself  can be approved by 20 of  the 27 remaining EU countries,
provided that such countries also represent 65 per cent of  the EU population, any future
trade deal between the UK and the EU will almost certainly require the unanimous
support of  all Member States and therefore be vulnerable to a veto by either Hungary or
Poland. Accordingly, the UK’s concerns for its own future trade relations may trump any
concerns it may otherwise have vocalised regarding the rule of  law situation in Poland and
Hungary. The point here is not to estimate the likely outcome of  any vote on Article 7(1)
but merely to emphasise that national political concerns may reduce the number of
Member States willing to vote in favour of  action against those states. A number of
recent political events, including the Brexit referendum and the most recent American
elections, (should) have taught us to be sceptical about claiming an ability to predict
voting results ex ante, and we submit that this may also apply to any vote on Article 7(1).
An additional issue concerning the Council’s approval of  a reasoned proposal is that
it will inevitably further delay any EU reaction to the rule of  law crises underway in
Hungary26 and Poland. The essence of  any constitutional capture is that it happens
rapidly and, if  unchecked, can quickly destabilise existing constitutional mechanisms in a
manner that makes it very difficult to restore the original balance.27 Nevertheless, aside
from the delays in formulating a reasoned proposal, the procedural requirement
contained in Article 7(1) for the Council to ‘hear the Member State in question’ before
voting on the proposal will invariably further delay the Council’s determination, not least
of  all because the manner in which such a ‘hearing’ would occur remains undefined and
would perhaps lead to disagreements amongst the Member States. Moreover, the
possibility for the Council to ‘address recommendations to [the recalcitrant State], acting
in accordance with the same procedure’ also opens the door to potentially extensive
delays in the Council voting on the proposal itself. We do not suggest that no procedural
safeguards should exist to protect a Member State accused of  violating the values in
Article 2, but merely wish to highlight the dichotomy between the delays caused by such
procedures and the need to ensure early intervention which prevents or at least limits the
extent of  any national constitutional capture. One may question whether, in light of  the
ongoing dialogue which occurs between the EU and the relevant Member State within the
scope of  the New Framework, the understandable desire to protect the et audi alteram
partem principle is not already sufficiently protected and need not be duplicated in the
manner envisaged in Article 7(1), which was drafted prior to the New Framework’s
existence. If  this were considered too radical a proposition, at least one should consider
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whether the ‘hearing’ envisaged in Article 7(1) should be organised as expeditiously as
possible, given the Member State’s ongoing ability to present its viewpoints within the
New Framework’s procedure.
The third, and perhaps most significant, observation regarding the likely inefficacy of
Article 7(1) is that, even if  a reasoned proposal is formulated and approved, we consider
that it would have little practical effect on a country accused of  having created a ‘clear risk
of  a serious breach’ of  the rule of  law, given the specific political situation which exists
in such countries. As regards the situation in Hungary and Poland, by the time any serious
thought was given to deploying Article 7, the nationalist governments in control of  those
countries had already built up political support based on radical reforms to their national
legal (and/or constitutional) systems. Any backtracking or delays regarding those radical
reforms, which lie at the heart of  the rule of  law crises in those countries, could have
catastrophic political consequences for those national governments. Accordingly, any
attempts by the EU to broker a political solution, at a time when such reforms were well
underway, seems doomed to failure.28 Accordingly, the first paragraph of  Article 7
appears unhelpful if  it will only be deployed against a Member State which has crossed
the political Rubicon and burned its diplomatic bridges.
Article 7(2) TEU states that:
The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of  the
Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of  the
European Parliament, may determine the existence of  a serious and persistent
breach by a Member State of  the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the
Member State in question to submit its observations.
The procedural difficulties of  this part of  Article 7 are so blatant as to require little or no
explanation. The unanimity requirement and the inherent unlikeliness of  fulfilling this
requirement have already been discussed above. 
If  a determination is unanimously approved under Article 7(2), the Council, acting by
a qualified majority, may decide to suspend ‘certain of  the rights deriving from the
application of  the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights
of  the representative of  the government of  that Member State in the Council’. 
Certain aspects of  Article 7(3) are relatively clear, such as the fact that the suspension
of  a Member State’s right to vote in the Council would also result in the simultaneous
suspension of  its participation at all levels (working groups, Permanent Representatives
Committee) which are responsible for making the real arrangements regarding EU law.
Other possible sanctions may include the suspension of  the right to participate in the
election of  Commissioners or the suspension from structural funds and assistance
programmes within the Common Agricultural Policy, which may prove extremely painful
for Poland.29 Equally, it is clear that the imposition of  sanctions does not release a
Member State from its duty to continue fulfilling its obligations under EU law. 
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However, the full extent and nature of  such sanctions is not clear and it is regrettable
that an Article concerning the rule of  law should leave such an apparently wide scope of
discretion to a political body, with no clear boundaries drawn by the legislation itself. 
3.2 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK
The inherent problems contained within the various parts of  Article 7 led José Manuel
Barroso, the then President of  the European Commission, to state: ‘we need a better
developed range of  instruments – it is no longer enough to choose between the soft
power of  political persuasion and the radical solution of  Article 7 of  the Treaty’.30 In a
resolution in 2013 the European Parliament called upon the EU institutions to create a
new mechanism to ensure that all Member States continued to adhere to the EU’s
common values and the Copenhagen accession criteria.31 As a result, the foreign
ministers of  four Member States (Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Finland)
proposed a special mechanism to monitor the protection of  the rule of  law in EU
countries.32 In March 2014, the European Commission presented the Communication
‘A new EU framework to strengthen the rule of  law’.33
The adoption of  the New Framework was not without controversy. An opinion
prepared by the Legal Service of  the EU Council in May 2014 stated that the New
Framework was inconsistent with the principle of  conferral contained in Article 5 TEU,
according to which the EU only has such competences as have been conferred on it by
the Member States. However, this opinion has been widely criticised.34
The New Framework procedure consists of  three stages. In the first stage, the
European Commission assesses whether there is a real systemic threat to the protection
of  the rule of  law in a given country. In this respect, the Commission relies on the analysis
of  its own materials, the opinions of  independent institutions (such as the Venice
Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) and information
from Member States and other available sources. If  the Commission considers that such
a threat really exists, it starts a ‘structural dialogue’ with the country concerned.
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At the second stage of  the procedure (unless the matter has been clarified earlier), the
Commission publishes a ‘rule of  law recommendation’ addressed to the Member State
concerned based on the information collected and the government’s response. It is
difficult to predict what consequences such a recommendation might have on the
credibility of  a given Member State, in particular on issues that require mutual trust
between countries (e.g. an adequate level of  protection of  rights and freedoms in the
event of  a European arrest warrant being executed). As part of  the third stage of  the
procedure, the implementation of  recommendations is subject to control by the
Commission (so-called follow-up) both in terms of  how and when they have been carried
out (the recommendation will indicate a specific deadline for their completion). Only if
none of  these actions bring about the desired effect, in the third stage, the Commission
may request the Council to launch one of  the mechanisms specified in Article 7 TEU.
In general, the soft procedure aims to fill the gaps between the application of  the
procedures set out in Article 7 TEU and other soft forms of  guaranteeing the basic EU
principles. Although the rule of  law enforcement procedure is legally independent from
Article 7 TEU, this is called ‘preparation for article 7’. The practice of  initiating this
procedure for the first time in EU history certainly ensures that Poland features heavily
in textbooks on EU law. Conclusions from problems encountered by the European
Commission and probable ineffectiveness of  this procedure will affect its further shape.
And reform seems necessary and inevitable. The open question is whether it will take the
form of  a change to the EU Treaties or be an entirely new document and a new
procedure. Everything, so far, speaks for the first option.35
It is worth recalling that, even as regards the comparatively successful human rights
endeavour, an important leg of  this journey remains uncompleted – namely the EU’s formal
accession to the ECHR. A comparable development regarding rule of  law is unlikely for the
reasons explained here. Neither of  these features is likely to be repeated with any degree of
success as regards the current rule of  law crises. Any proposed amendments to the
founding Treaties, designed to strengthen the EU’s capacity to react to rule of  law crises,
would be extremely unlikely to garner the necessary unanimity amongst the Member States.
Accordingly, the evolution of  the EU’s capacity to deal with rule of  law crises is likely to be
a lengthier and bumpier ride than the equivalent journey when it acquired human rights
competences. The accession has been made legally possible following the Lisbon Treaty’s
enactment of  Article 6(2) TEU to overcome the obstacle created by the CJEU in its
Opinion 2/94 on European Community Accession to the ECHR (1996 ECR 1–01759) and
following the ratification of  Protocol 14 to the ECHR by all Member States of  the Council
of  Europe. Article 17 of  Protocol 14 declares that the ECHR is to be amended to provide
that the ‘European Union may accede to this Convention’.36 The inter-institutional
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complexities and political vagaries associated with journeys of  this kind should not be
underestimated. 
It was not clear as to whether the provisions of  EU law which concern the rule of
law are capable of  forming the subject matter of  references to the CJEU or will be
sufficient basis for the successful launch procedure under Article 258 TFEU. Since the
judgment in the Celmer case, it is already clear that this material is applicable to
proceedings before the CJEU.37 Also, the political stakes are far higher when discussing
threats to the rule of  law than when discussing individual human rights breaches.
Furthermore, when implementing and enforcing its human rights regime, the EU has
relied heavily on the assistance and support of  national courts, either as the source of
preliminary references (which allowed the CJEU to develop the EU’s human rights
mandate) or as the mechanism for enforcing the CJEU’s judgments at a national level.
Conversely, in situations where the rule of  law is threatened, it is highly likely that the
national court system forms part of  the problem, as opposed to part of  the solution.
When national courts have been brought under the de facto control of  a government
whose actions threaten the rule of  law, the EU and the CJEU are deprived of  an
important piece of  the jigsaw for developing EU law. 
The EU’s inability to rely on national courts when policing the rule of  law means that
it will be compelled to rely almost exclusively upon its own institutions and mechanisms.
However, these mechanisms are much weaker than those which apply to individual
human rights enforcement. Both Article 7 TEU and the Commission’s New Framework
contain procedural limitations making them unlikely to successfully resolve rule of  law
crises, especially if  they occur simultaneously in multiple Member States.
4 Mechanisms to protect the rule of law within the EU ‘in action’: 
the debilitation of the Polish Constitutional Court 
Since the Polish parliamentary elections of  2015 were won by the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
(Law and Justice) party, it has implemented a series of  reforms which it claimed were
necessary to ‘de-communise’ the country – namely to remove all aspects of  the Soviet
system which, in its view, continued to exist despite the fall of  communism in 1989. The
government has sought to legitimise many of  its reforms by comparing them with legal
institutions, mechanisms or procedures which function in other European countries and
by claiming that such reforms are required in Poland in order to improve the overall
efficiency of  the justice system. 
These reforms should be viewed systemically and holistically to appreciate the full
extent to which the justice system has become entwined with executive power. Viewed as
a whole, these reforms constitute wide-reaching restrictions on the scope of  individual
freedom. They lay the groundwork for an increasingly arbitrary, non-transparent executive
which is not subject to any effective judicial supervision.38 However, as noted above, this
article focuses solely on the debilitation of  the Constitutional Tribunal as the fundamental
reform which represented a sine qua non for implementing subsequent reforms, particularly
because the Polish government has implemented de facto changes to the Polish
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37   In the Celmer case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality v Artur Celmer, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, the CJEU was
asked by the Irish High Court to address one of  the most serious current legal challenges of  the EU: the
consequences of  restrictions imposed upon judicial independence in one Member State for other Member
States of  the Union. 
38   Position of  the Helsinki Committee in Poland – February 2018 <www.hfhr.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/HCiP_statemenet_15022018.pdf>. 
Constitution without possessing the necessary parliamentary majority that would entitle it
to enact de jure constitutional amendments.39
The fact that the Polish government sought to paralyse the Constitutional Tribunal’s
functionality almost immediately upon taking office is not coincidental. The clear aim was
to establish control over the Tribunal and thereby preclude any successful challenges to
subsequent legislation that would de facto implement constitutional reforms on a wide
range of  areas without formally amending the constitution. The Polish government had
no intention of  accepting delays to its legislative agenda that the Tribunal might cause by
negative judgments and quickly sought to render the Tribunal toothless by adopting two
separate Constitutional Tribunal Amendment Acts (on 19 November and 22 December
2015). The latter of  these was the most controversial but, for the sake of  simplicity, they
will be considered together. The essence of  the reforms contained in these two amending
Acts was twofold. 
Firstly, the government focused on personal (or personnel) reforms. The early termination
of  a Tribunal judge’s mandate would no longer be decided upon by the Tribunal’s General
Assembly but by the Sejm (i.e. the lower chamber of  Parliament). Disciplinary
proceedings, as a precursor to dismissal, would be capable of  bring initiated against a
Tribunal judge by the President of  Poland or the Minister of  Justice. The reforms
terminated the tenure of  the incumbent President and Vice President and introduced a
three-year tenure for the Tribunal’s presidency, renewable only once. They stipulated that
a Tribunal judge’s term of  office would formally commence at the moment at which their
oath was accepted by the Polish President. Finally, the amendments removed certain core
provisions which had previously applied to the Tribunal’s judiciary, such as those
guaranteeing the independence of  Tribunal judges, those governing the composition of
the Tribunal and those concerning the preclusion on seeking re-election to the Tribunal. 
The second aspect of  the government’s reforms in the amending Act was to focus on
certain procedural characteristics of  the Tribunal, again with a view to hamstringing its
ability to delay the awaiting constitutional onslaught. Accordingly, the amendment Act
increased (from 9 to 13) the quorum of  judges required in the Tribunal’s most important
cases and introduced a two-thirds majority requirement for adopting a judgment.
Another debilitating procedural reform was the removal of  the Tribunal’s autonomy
to organise its own workload by prioritising the order in which it heard cases
(i.e. preventing the Tribunal from hearing cases in accordance with their importance). The
amendments required that the Tribunal should hear cases in a strictly chronological order,
according to the date on which they were filed. It also subjected all pending constitutional
proceedings to a six-month ‘suspensory period’, so that no hearing could occur until this
time-delay had passed. Even (unrealistically) assuming that the Tribunal had no backlog
of  cases on the date the new claim was filed, the effect of  these reforms was to guarantee
that controversial legislation would remain in force for a considerable period of  time
before it could be reviewed by the Tribunal. 
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39   Law and Justice received 37.6% of  the votes cast, which entitled it to 235 (i.e. 51%) of  the 460 seats in the
Sejm (the lower chamber of  the Polish Parliament) and 61% of  the seats in the Senate (the upper chamber).
Although these results were sufficient to enable it to form the first single-party government since the fall of
communism, this clearly fell short of  the two-thirds majority required by the Polish Constitution for
introducing constitutional amendments. As the Venice Commission noted in its Opinion on the Act on the
Constitutional Tribunal, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 108th Plenary Session, Opinion 860/2016,
CDL-AD(2016)026 (Venice, 14–15 October 2016) para 127: ‘the Polish Parliament assumed powers of
constitutional revision which it does not have when it acts as the ordinary legislature, without the requisite
majority for constitutional amendments’.
Ironically, the first litmus test of  the Tribunal’s ability to respond to unconstitutional
legislation was the new Constitutional Tribunal Amendment Act itself. Amongst the many
parts of  this Act which gave cause for significant concern, certain provisions appeared to
clearly contradict the unambiguous text of  the Polish Constitution. For example, the new
requirement for Tribunal judgments to be approved by a two-thirds majority does not sit
easily alongside a constitutional provision stating that: ‘Judgments of  the Constitutional
Tribunal shall be made by a majority of  votes.’40 Despite containing such clearly contra
legem provisions, the entry into force of  the amendment Act occurred instantly, without
the customary 14-day vacatio legis.41 This not only prevented the Tribunal from annulling
the statute before it entered into force, but it also led to a number of  practical problems
regarding whether, and how, its legality should be properly assessed.
Considerable disagreement arose regarding whether the constitutionality of  the
amendment Act should be reviewed in accordance with the new procedure it itself  had
laid down, or in accordance with the hitherto procedure. This created a catch-22-style
paradox.42 If  the Tribunal applied the new procedure, contained in the very Act whose
constitutionality it was reviewing, and concluded that the Act was unconstitutional (as it
ultimately did), critics of  the Tribunal would claim that this judgment was non-binding,
since it was based on unconstitutional statutory rules (i.e. the unlawful Act). Conversely,
if  the Tribunal applied the hitherto procedure and concluded that the amending Act was
unconstitutional, the judgment would be criticised as non-binding as it had not followed
the proper (new) procedure. 
After the Constitutional Tribunal was turned into an appendage of  the ruling party,
the next step was to restructure the ordinary courts, the National Council of  the Judiciary
and the Supreme Court, which was undertaken simultaneously by a law which was initially
adopted in 2017 and subject to a number of  amendments in 2018. On 29 July 2017 the
European Commission launched infringement proceedings against the Polish Law on the
Ordinary Courts inter alia as regards the legality of  its provisions governing the
retirement of  judges and their impact on the independence of  the judiciary. The
European Commission referred this case to the CJEU on 20 December 2017. 
Since early 2016, no significant government legislation has been found to be
unconstitutional and it appears likely that this will continue to be the case. Professor Ewa
Łętowska has aptly referred to the Tribunal’s emasculation as a Pyrrhic victory of  politics
over the law.43 Despite large-scale public demonstrations and protests being held, the
ultimate victor was the newly elected government. Having rendered toothless the
Constitutional Tribunal, the Polish government was able to move on to other significant
– and undoubtedly constitutional – reforms, safe in the knowledge that its legislation would
not be declared invalid, regardless of  its content, reach or impact. Such reforms
established political control over the Supreme Court, the common courts and the
judiciary as a whole, the prosecutorial authorities, the secret service and intelligence
agencies, the police, the national media and the right to organise mass protests. When
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40   The Constitution of  the Republic of  Poland of  2 April, 1997, as published in Dziennik Ustaw (1997) 78, item
483, Article 190(5).
41   The vacatio legis period of  a statute may only be shortened in the event of  ‘an important interest of  the state
necessitating immediate effectiveness’, Article 4 of  the Law on the publication of  normative acts and some
other legal acts, Dziennik Ustaw (2017) item 1523.
42   For a further discussion of  this paradox, see Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘A State of  Constitutional Necessity
Versus Standard Legal Reasoning’ (Verfassungsblog, 3 June 2017) <https://verfassungsblog.de/a-state-of-
constitutional-necessity-versus-standard-legal-reasoning>.
43   Ewa Łętowska and Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska, ‘A “Good” Change in the Polish Constitutional
Tribunal?’ (2016) 1 Osteuropa Recht 79–93.
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reviewing this package of  reforms, during the assessment of  an application to surrender
a person to Poland pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant, the Irish High Court
described them as a ‘deliberate, calculated and provocative legislative dismantling by
Poland of  the independence of  the judiciary, a key component of  the rule of  law’. On
the basis of  the information in the reasoned proposal of  the European Commission and
of  the findings of  the Commission for Democracy through Law and taking into account
the effects of  the recent legislative reforms to the polish system of  justice, the referring
court has concluded that, as a result of  the cumulative impact of  the legislative changes
that have taken place in Poland since 2015 concerning, in particular, the Constitutional
Court, Supreme Court, the National Council for the Judiciary, the organisation of  the
ordinary courts, the National School of  Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the
rule of  law has been breached in that Member State. The referring court bases that
conclusion on changes found by it to be particularly significant: 
• the changes to the constitutional role of  the National Council for the
Judiciary in safeguarding independence of  the judiciary, in combination with
the Polish government’s invalid appointments to Constitutional Tribunal and
its refusal to publish certain judgments; 
• the fact that the Minister for Justice is now the Public Prosecutor and is
entitled to play an active role in prosecutions and that he has a disciplinary
role in respect of  presidents of  courts, which has the potential for a chilling
effect on those presidents, with consequential impact on the administration
of  justice; 
• the fact that the Supreme Court is affected by compulsory retirement and
future appointments and that the new composition of  the National Council
for the Judiciary will be largely dominated by political appointees; 
• and, lastly, the fact that the integrity and effectiveness of  the Constitutional
Court have been greatly interfered with in that there is no guarantee that laws
in Poland will comply with the Polish Constitution, which is sufficient in
itself  to have effects throughout the criminal justice system.44
It is virtually inconceivable that a fully functioning Tribunal would have permitted this
package of  reforms to enter into force unchallenged. The extent to which the Polish
court system has regressed from traditional European values of  judicial independence is
perhaps best indicated by the refusal to implement an interim injunction imposed by the
CJEU on the continuation of  tree felling in the Białowieża primeval forest.45
The current controversies surrounding the reform of  Poland’s Supreme Court
resemble the conflict over the Constitutional Tribunal in 2015 to 2016 to some extent.
However, the Supreme Court took new steps on 2 August 2018, when it referred five
questions to the CJEU and requested a preliminary ruling. All five questions relate (more
or less directly) to the principles of  (1) independence of  the courts and (2) the judicial
independence under the circumstances of  the rule of  law crisis in Poland and thus have
a potential of  becoming a key aspect of  the Polish rule of  law crisis.46
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44   Judgment C-216/18 Celmer (n 37) paras 123 and 21.
45   Robert Grzeszczak and Mateusz Muchel, ‘Provisional Measures against EU Member States: An Example of
the Białowieża Forest’ (2018) 2(2) Eastern European Journal of  Transnational Relations 21–35
<http://hdl.handle.net/11320/6819>.
46   For more see Robert Grzeszczak and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, ‘The Rule of  Law Crisis in Poland: A New
Chapter’ (Verfassungsblog, 8 August 2018) <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rule-of-law-crisis-in-poland-a-new-
chapter>. 
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There can be no real doubt as to the fact that the recent reforms in Poland represent
a considerable threat to the rule of  law. This much has been made clear in the various
opinions of  the Venice Commission. In March 2016, when evaluating the aforementioned
amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal, the Venice Commission concluded that they
had had ‘severe consequences on the proper functioning of  the Constitutional Tribunal
[which] will make the Tribunal ineffective as a guarantor of  the Constitution’.47 A
separate opinion noted that ‘numerous other provisions of  the adopted Act would
considerably delay and obstruct the work of  the Tribunal and make its work ineffective,
as well as undermine its independence by exercising excessive legislative and executive
control over its functioning’.48 This meant that the Tribunal ‘cannot play its constitutional
role as the guardian of  democracy, the rule of  law and human rights’.49 When reviewing
the government’s extension of  secret surveillance powers available to Poland’s law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, the Venice Commission concluded that ‘the
procedural safeguards and material conditions set in the Police Act for implementing
secret surveillance are still insufficient to prevent its excessive use and unjustified
interference with the privacy of  individuals’.50 Likewise, when reviewing other aspects of
the government’s reform package, the Venice Commission concluded that:
. . . the merger of  the office of  the Minister of  Justice and that of  the Public
Prosecutor General, the increased powers of  the Public Prosecutor General vis-
à-vis the prosecution system, the increased powers of  the Minister of  Justice in
respect of  the judiciary (Act on the Organisation of  Common Courts) and the
weak position of  checks to these powers (National Council of  Public
Prosecutors) result in the accumulation of  too many powers for one person. This
has direct negative consequences for the independence of  the prosecutorial
system from political sphere, but also for the independence of  the judiciary and
hence the separation of  powers and the rule of  law in Poland.’51
Subsequent reforms to the Polish Supreme Court and common courts were described as
creating ‘a serious risk for the functioning of  Polish democracy’ and, at least to some degree,
‘the proposed system is even worse than its Soviet predecessor’52 and ‘jeopardises the stability
of  the Polish legal order’.53 Accordingly, it is patently clear that the Venice Commission
considered the situation in Poland to represent a serious threat to the rule of  law. 
The negative opinion of  Poland’s legislative reforms was also shared by the European
Commission in a number of  Opinions regarding the rule of  law in Poland. The
Commission has noted that the reforms ‘prevented [the Polish Constitutional Tribunal]
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47   See Opinion on amendments to the Act of  25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of  Poland, adopted
by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session, Opinion 833/2015, CDL-AD(2016)001 (Venice, 11–
12 March 2016) para 88.
48   See Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 108th
Plenary Session, Opinion 860/2016, para 123. 
49   Ibid para 128.
50   See Opinion on the Act of  15 January 2016 amending the Police Act and certain other Acts, adopted by the
Venice Commission at its 107th Plenary Session, Opinion 839/2016, CDL-AD(2016)012 (Venice, 10–11 June
2016) para 132.
51   See Opinion on the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s office, as amended, adopted by the Venice Commission at
its 113th Plenary Session, Opinion 892/2017, CDL-AD(2017)028 (Venice, 8–9 December 2017) para 115. 
52   See Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of  the Judiciary; on the Draft Act
amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of  Poland, and on the Act on the
Organisation of  Ordinary Courts, adopted by the Commission at its 113th Plenary Session, Opinion
904/2017, CDL-AD(2017)031 (Venice, 8–9 December 2017) paras 43 and 61.
53   Ibid para 63.
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from fully ensuring an effective constitutional review [so that] there will be no effective
scrutiny of  compliance with fundamental rights of  legislative acts. This raises serious
concerns in regard of  the rule of  law’.54 As early as July 2016 the European Commission
had officially declared that ‘there is a situation of  a systemic threat to the rule of  law in
Poland.’55 This clear acknowledgment of  the seriousness of  the situation in Poland was
repeated in other Commission Recommendations made in December 2016,56 July 201757
and December 2017.58
5 Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the ineffectiveness of  instruments designed to
compel respect for and compliance with the EU’s core values. Such inefficacy limits the
possibility of  adequate responses in the event that those values are violated and prevents
the effective protection of  a vital EU interest – maintaining the integrity of  its value.
The EU’s transformation, from being an institution which essentially dealt with purely
economic matters into one which has developed and implemented its own human rights
regime, has been complex and impressive. However, its evolution into an organisation
capable of  reacting to, and remedying, threats to the rule of  law represents a far more
complex and difficult transition. This article began by arguing that certain comparisons
can be made between the EU’s development into an institution which effectively enforces
individual human rights and the first tentative steps towards becoming an effective policer
of  the rule of  law. Perhaps history will show the two developments to have ended with
an equally satisfying denouement. At present, however, whereas the EU’s first tentative
steps towards policing the rule of  law may bear some superficial similarity to its journey
into human rights protection, the differences between these two excursions are more
apparent than the similarities. 
Firstly, whereas some initial wariness undeniably existed amongst the Member States
as the EU began to enforce human rights as an issue of  supranational European law, there
did not exist the extent of  uncertainty or opposition to human rights protection as exists
regarding rule of  law issues at the heart of  a state’s constitutional arrangements. In fact,
the CJEU’s first steps towards human rights protection were taken precisely because
certain Member States, notably Germany, had criticised the absence of  such protection at
a European level. 
Secondly, whereas the EU’s human rights competences were progressively developed
by the CJEU’s jurisprudence, no such possibility exists in relation to the New Framework
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54   See Commission Opinion of  1 June 2016 regarding the Rule of  Law in Poland, Brussels, 1 June 2016 C(2016)
3500 final <http://phavi.umcs.pl/at/attachments/2016/1001/122909-ruleof-law-opinion-poland-1-6-
2016.pdf>.
55   See Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of  27 July 2016 regarding the rule of  law in Poland,
Brussels, 27 July 2016 C(2016) 5703 final [2016] OJ L 217/53 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016H1374&from=EN>.
56   See Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 of  21 December 2016 regarding the rule of  law in Poland
complementary to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 [2017] OJ L 22/65 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017H0146&from=EN>.
57   See Commission Recommendation of  26 July 2017 regarding the rule of  law in Poland, complementary to
Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146, C(2017) 5320 final
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/rule-law/rule-law-
framework_en>.
58   See Commission Recommendation of  20 December 2017 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complementary
to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520, C(2017) 9050 final
<http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49107>.
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or Article 7, since the CJEU is effectively unable to rule on the core aspects of  those
mechanisms. 
Thirdly, as a corollary of  the point above, whereas the EU’s adoption of  the Charter
of  Fundamental Rights heavily relied upon, and often codified, the CJEU’s case law
developments, very little scope exists as regards developing the content of  the rule of  law.
It remains unlikely that the Member States would be capable of  adopting EU legislation
to provide a clearer, European-wide definition of  this principle. 
The EU’s present inability to remedy rule of  law crises seems unquestionable. Viktor
Orban’s dismantling of  the Hungarian constitutional system has been ongoing since 2014.
The rule of  law in Poland has been progressively undermined since the elections of  2015.
The EU’s long-term inability to prevent, revert or even hinder perturbing reforms within
its Member States clearly demonstrates the absence of  any effective EU law weapons for
reacting to such crises. This does not mean that the EU has become ineffective as an
organisation for enforcing individual human rights – the rule of  law and individual human
rights are not entirely synonymous concepts. However, they are clearly interrelated. An
important aspect of  human rights protection is to prevent the arbitrary use of  state power
against individuals. When the national courts are brought under the control of  the
national government, their ability and willingness to protect individuals against such
arbitrary state power are clearly undermined. The absence of  national judicial
independence may, like a cancer, eat away at the checks and balances which are crucial to
the healthy functioning of  any democracy. With time, the erosion of  the rule of  law
inevitably erodes the protection of  individual human rights. Accordingly, for the EU to
continue operating effectively at the level of  individual human rights, it is crucial that it
develops the capacity to prevent rule of  law crises at a systemic level. Currently, however,
the prognosis does not look promising.
Accordingly, at the time of  writing, it seems unlikely that neither Article 7 nor the
New Framework will offer any workable solution to rule of  law crises that occur in
multiple (even if  only two) Member States simultaneously. Both mechanisms rely upon an
unlikely degree of  cooperation on the part of  the wayward Member State or, alternatively,
upon securing a seemingly unachievable level of  consensus amongst the Member States.
The authors accept that no one could have predicted the existence of  simultaneous
rule of  law crises in multiple Member States. Certainly, this does not appear to have been
taken into account when drafting Article 7. Bitter experience has taught us that, given the
EU’s current level of  legal integration, it is improperly equipped to police the rule of  law
per se. An equally depressing conclusion (based on the experiences in Poland and
Hungary) is that Member States’ internal mechanisms, designed to guarantee the rule of
law, can be relatively easily dismantled by a government which is determined to do so. The
practical results of  the EU’s attempts to police the rule of  law have fallen far short of  the
sublime rhetoric surrounding its potential to do so. The participation of  other actors,
such as the Council of  Europe (Venice Commission) and the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, also appear to have had limited practical significance.
The above essentially leaves the EU with three main policy options. Firstly, it could
develop a procedure which enables a more effective response to rule of  law crises.
However, this is extremely unlikely since it would invariably require Treaty amendments
that require unanimity and are therefore impractical at the present moment. Secondly, the
EU could resign altogether from its journey towards offering effective protection of  the
rule of  law. However, this would be a political, legal and image disaster for the EU itself
and would raise questions about its legitimacy and efficacy at a time of  already
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unprecedented EU scepticism. Thirdly, the EU could simply choose to wait out the storm
until the currently wayward governments are replaced with ones that are less likely to
block Treaty amendments needed to render Article 7 workable in practice. No one,
including the authors, can be sure which of  these approaches will be adopted by the EU.
The greatest danger lies in the possibility that, by such time, the constitutional and
political arrangements of  certain Member States may have been altered and captured to
the point that it becomes extremely difficult to implement a reversal.
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This article offers an original analysis of  Ireland’s and the UK’s common EU membership in the light of
Brexit, identifies socio-economic decline and threats to the functionality of  the Good Friday Agreement as
decisive threats emanating from Brexit, and suggests that these can be counteracted by providing a
sustainable legal framework for hybridity of  Northern Ireland in the categories of  citizenship and territory,
as well as for deepening socio-economic and civic integration on the island of  Ireland, alongside securing
antidiscrimination law in Northern Ireland. Instead of  protecting these elements, the Draft Protocol on
Ireland/Northern Ireland to the EU–UK Draft Withdrawal Agreement sacrifices the indivisibility of  the
Internal Market by limiting Northern Ireland’s access to markets in goods. Concise changes to the draft are
proposed to address these shortcomings and to secure participation of  Northern Ireland’s representatives in
its implementation.
Keywords: Ireland/Northern Ireland; Brexit; European Union law; Draft 
Protocol Ireland/Northern Ireland Withdrawal Agreement; hybrid citizenship;
antidiscrimination law
1 Introduction
The position of  the island of  Ireland – comprising Ireland and Northern Ireland – hasgained prominent recognition in negotiating the first ever departure of  a Member State
from the European Union (EU). A special task force of  the EU Commission and the UK
negotiating teams on the withdrawal process addressed the ‘unique circumstances on the
island of  Ireland’,1 and a special chapter in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement is dedicated to
them. Initially, the Commission had even pledged not to negotiate as much as the outline
of  the EU–UK future relationship before these unique circumstances were addressed.
However, the ‘Irish question’ has since escaped any agreed solution, although the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement has reduced it to the aim of  avoiding two ills: a hard border between
NILQ autumn 2018
*     Thanks go to feedback by the anonymous referees and discussants of  these thoughts at the conference from
which this work originates, as well as in the context of  the TREUP project (see also introduction to this issue).
All internet sources were last accessed on 28 August.
1     This term was included in the European Council’s (Article 50 TEU) negotiation mandate for the EU
Commission of  22 May 2017 (Council of  the European Union, XT 21016/17
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-negotiation-xt21016-ad01re02en17.pdf>. 
Ireland and Northern Ireland and the diminution of  rights in the context of  the Good
Friday Agreement.
This article argues that the unique circumstances on the island of  Ireland are of
pivotal relevance to the EU as a whole. Since the UK and Ireland acceded to the
European Economic Community (EEC) without being required to address human rights
violations or territorial conflicts first, their EU membership has been based on the
assumption that such problems would be solved by membership itself. The ‘Irish
question’ thus highlights the potency of  the EU’s socio-economic integration project for
enabling sustainably peaceful relations between the peoples of  Europe. It is thus
imperative for the EU to solve the ‘Irish question’. Accordingly, the temptation may
become compelling to redefine it narrowly and/or to agree to a feigned solution. Both
strategies not only fail to solve the ‘Irish question’, but also have the potential to
undermine the EU integration project as a whole.
In order to develop this argument, the article proceeds as follows: section two recalls
the state of  affairs on the island of  Ireland at the time of  UK and Irish accession to the
EEC, identifying the unresolved status of  Northern Ireland as the core problem. Next, it
considers the relevance of  common EU membership for the Good Friday Agreement,
which after all is viewed as having resolved that problem. This part concludes that EU law
is indispensable for the realisation of  two central ambitions of  the Agreement, namely a
hybrid position of  Northern Ireland in terms of  territory and citizenship and the
improvement of  the socio-economic position in Northern Ireland. Section three
summarises how the ‘Irish question’ has been reflected upon academically and politically
in relation to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. This part concludes with an analysis of
the relevant parts of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement in relation to the two central areas
where EU membership remains a pivotal precondition for the Good Friday Agreement.
The fourth part discusses how far the Draft Withdrawal Agreement must be considered
as betraying the indivisibility of  the Internal Market as a central EU value, and how this
is likely to impact on the conclusion of  the withdrawal process. In conclusion, tentative
perspectives to overcome its shortcomings will be offered.
2 The UK and Ireland in the EEC, EC and EU
It is worthwhile to recall the concurrent accession of  Ireland and the UK to the EEC in
order to identify the specific problems caused for the island of  Ireland by the UK’s
unilateral withdrawal from today’s EU.2
2.1 JOINING THE EEC: NORTHERN IRELAND AS A CORE ISSUE
While both states joined at the same time, their motives could not have been more
different.3 For Ireland, EEC membership constituted a further step towards full
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2     Today’s EU started out as European Economic Community in 1957, which was its name when the UK and
Ireland acceded. The Maastricht Treaty (1993), in force when the Good Friday Agreement was negotiated,
renamed the EEC to EC, while also creating the EU as a roof  over three pillars, the EC (to which the EEC
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3     Anthony M Collins, ‘EU Law in Ireland Post-Brexit’(2018) 21 Trinity College Law Review 9–30, 8.
international recognition of  the young state,4 as well as the opportunity to overcome the
structural disadvantages of  a small state through pooling of  sovereignty.5 Joining the
EEC underlined its aspiration to open up the country to international trade, and offered
the opportunity to lessen the pressure of  external competition as a lever to
modernisation, an aim that would also be eased by access to EEC structural funds and
agricultural subsidies. The concern of  losing access to the UK market competed with the
aim of  overcoming an ‘unbalanced economic relationship with Britain’,6 while the option
to soften the division of  the island of  Ireland constituted an added advantage.7 The
accession process was accompanied by a public debate, stressing the progressive nature
of  European integration, and completed by a referendum, just as any future Treaty
change,8 resulting in a relatively high level of  public awareness of  the EEC, EC and EU.
By contrast, the UK is viewed as a reluctant applicant.9 It rejected the offer to
participate in the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the EEC (1957) on the
grounds that it wished to retain preferential trade relations with the Commonwealth
countries and could not succumb to free movement of  workers. It aspired to a free trade
association of  the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation states with the
new EEC, which would allow it to access the Common Market without such obligations.
When the EEC states refused such an arrangement, the UK supported the Norwegian
initiative to form a European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which did not cover factor
mobility and had no judicial authority. The ink under the 1960 EFTA agreement had
barely dried when the UK applied for EEC membership in 1961: the access to the EEC
Common Market appeared more relevant due to its size. These economic motives to
accede to the EEC became more pressing with a weakening economy, forcing the UK to
apply for International Monetary Fund support in 1967, and inflating unemployment
figures at the turn of  the next decade.10 The accession was portrayed as merely related to
the Common Market. When acceptance by a referendum was sought in 1975, this was for
internal political reasons rather than as a constitutional requirement.
While joining the EEC, the UK and Ireland had an ongoing territorial disagreement:
The UK claimed Northern Ireland as part of  its territory, and also effectively governed
the province, while the Irish Constitution of  1937 stated in Article 2 that Ireland
encompassed all 32 counties on the island of  Ireland, though Article 3 conceded that
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4     Ireland had only became formally independent from the UK in 1922, i.e. 50 years before joining the EEC, at
the price of  giving up sovereignty over six of  its 32 counties. It fully surpassed its status as a UK dominion
and Member of  the British Commonwealth as late as 1949. Its membership application to the UN only
succeeded in 1955. See further Birgit Laffan and Jane O’Mahoney, Ireland and the European Union (Palgrave
Macmillan 2008) 12–17.
5     Laffan and O’Mahoney (ibid) refer to sharing (13) or pooling of  sovereignty (31), while Katy Hayward
wonders why Ireland would give up sovereignty to the EU: Katy Hayward, Irish Nationalism and European
Integration (Manchester University Press 2009) 11, 45.
6     Collins (n 3) 13.
7     This motive is stressed by Adrian Guelke, ‘Britain after Brexit: The Risk to Northern Ireland’ (2017) 28
Journal of  Democracy 42–52, 43; see also Hayward (n 5) who depicts the accession to the EU as (among
others) motivated by feeding a new narrative for Irish nationalism which would include the North. 
8     Gavin Barrett, Why Does Ireland Have All Those EU Referendums? (Institute for International and European
Affairs 2012). See, on the rejection of  the Treaty of  Lisbon, Anthony Arnull, ‘Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty:
All’s Well that Ends Well?’, in Anthony Arnull (ed), A Constitutional Order of  States? (Hart 2011) 77–91.
9     See for a summary with hindsight, Simon Bulmer and Lucia Quaglia, ‘The Politics and Economics of  Brexit’
(2018) 25 Journal of  European Public Policy 1089–98, 1090–2; from a contemporary perspective, see Lee
Burke, ‘Britain and the EEC’ (1967) 130 World Affairs 163–76.
10   Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of  the European Union (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 99–100,
with further references. 
Irish parliamentary legislation would not encompass Northern Ireland. In Northern
Ireland, the dispute was one of  the bases for a paramilitary conflict between two ethno-
political groups: the Unionists (often of  Protestant affiliation) supported the union
between Britain and Northern Ireland, while Nationalists (predominantly Catholic)
endeavoured a united Ireland.11 British rule in Northern Ireland was punctuated by state
activities provoking litigation under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), with the practice of  imprisoning persons without trial (‘internment’) as a
prominent example.12 There were also considerable socio-economic problems in
Northern Ireland, with poverty and destitution particularly pronounced among the
Catholic population.13
Today, a dubious human rights record would prevent any accession to the EU under
Articles 6, 48 and 49 of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU),14 and border disputes
presently halt accession of  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.15 However, in 1972, the EEC
was just developing human rights protection,16 and territorial disputes between applicant
countries were not discussed at all.
Since the EEC was, as the EU is today, a peace project based on the equality and
cooperation of  its Member States, the conflict had to be overcome, however. One can
only assume in hindsight that the optimism for the effectiveness of  the European
integration project outweighed any concern that the EEC had just acquired two
potentially warring Member States.
2.2. IMPACT OF EEC MEMBERSHIP IN IRELAND AND THE UK AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Common EEC membership benefitted both Ireland and the UK through offering a larger
market and triggering expansion and efficiency gains, while both countries became net
recipients through the EEC structural funds. Both countries profited from free
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11   Terminology is fraught with ideology here. The term conflict competes with the term ‘Troubles’ (with and
without capital ‘T’), while some classified the conflict as civil war, and claimed that any prisoners were
prisoners of  war under the UN’s Geneva Convention. See, for an extensive explication, Brice Dickson, The
European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford University Press 2010) 5–6). The
conflict is not fundamentally religious, and reference to Protestants and Catholics does not include adherents
of  those religions who came to Northern Ireland from countries other than the UK and Ireland. On the
erroneous classification of  the so-called sectarian conflict as neither ethnic nor racial, see Chris Gilligan,
Northern Ireland and the Crisis of  Anti-Racism (Manchester University Press 2017) in particular 23–44. Nowadays,
when Islamophobia becomes an accepted and EU-funded field of  study (see, for example, Ian Law, Amina
Easat-Daas and Salman Sayyid, Dominant Counter-narratives to Islamophobia: Comparative Report (CIK Working
Paper, University of  Leeds2018); there is a whole new dimension in which analysis of  Northern Ireland could
once again become leading in antidiscrimination law.
12   For a thorough discussion of  the only partially successful challenges under the ECHR, see Dickson (n 11);
Onder Bakircioglu and Brice Dickson, ‘The European Convention in Conflicted Societies: The Experience of
Northern Ireland and Turkey’ (2017) 66 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 263–94.
13   John Coakely, ‘The British–Irish Relationship in the Twenty-First Century’ (2018) 17 Ethnopolitics 306–24,
315.
14   See on the example of  Serbia Beata Huszka, ‘Human Rights on the Losing End of  EU Enlargement: The
Case of  Serbia’ (2018) 56 Journal of  Common Market Studies 352–67.
15   While the absence of  border conflicts is not formally an accession criterion, the recent dispute between
Croatia and Slovenia over their common border, a heritage of  the dissolution of  Yugoslavia, before the 
Court of  Justice (case number C-457/18) has motivated the EU Commission to insist on any other border
issues to be resolved before accession of  other former Yugoslavian sub-states (see answer of  Mr Hahn for
the Commission to a question in the European Parliament of  6 May 2018
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2018–001063&language=EN>.
16   On the relation of  the EU to human rights, see Marton Varju, European Union Human Rights Law: The Dynamics
of  Interpretation and Context (Edward Elgar 2014).
movement of  workers initially by being able to ‘export’ their work-force, often through
temporary works agencies. Irish workers moving between Ireland and the UK saw their
rights underpinned by EU law and its predecessors, which had enormous practical
consequences in particular for cross-border workers, a category most relevant on the
island of  Ireland. 
For Ireland, modernisation meant moving from a mainly agricultural country towards
an industrialised and high-tech one with a significant financial sector.17 Ireland managed
its industrial modernisation through a social partnership policy, among others, while also
introducing social benefits for the first time.18 It achieved a remarkable degree of  trade
diversification, reducing the UK-share of  its exports from over 55 per cent in 1973 to a
mere 18 per cent in 2004.19
In the case of  the UK, the access to the Common Market offset the decline of  its
industrial base. In most EU Member States, state social policy (in most cases underpinned
by rights) softened the negative impact of  the restructuring of  industries on citizens’
livelihoods, by instruments such as expensive redundancy plans by employers and
employment agencies, which increasingly also had retraining programmes. In the UK,
there was no such cushioning, and from 1979 the Conservative Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher ran roughshod over any remaining social consciousness with her explicit disdain
for society at large.20
Socio-economic developments on the island of  Ireland were contradictory, though.
While the Ireland of  the 26 countries transformed through modernisation beyond
industrialisation, the establishment of  an effective service and financial sector, and a
differentiation of  trade to reduce dependency from the UK, Northern Ireland suffered
from economic decline. The former industrial strength of  the six counties, depending on
shipyards and other heavy industry, became a victim of  the fundamental shifts in the
global economy. Further, the continuing conflict, with paramilitary violence and an
extensive presence of  British troops, caused widespread destruction and impacted on the
economy as a whole, while business retreated from the province and left behind mainly
the agricultural and the public sectors, the latter with a certain emphasis on security. Thus,
upon entering the EEC, the socio-economic discrepancy between Ireland and Northern
Ireland diminished, while at the same time economic exchange became formally easier. In
spite of  those frictions, overall concurrent Common Market access emerged as
instrumental to deepen the economic integration on the island of  Ireland.
At the same time, regular meetings of  Irish and UK government representatives in the
monthly meetings of  the Council of  Ministers offered ample opportunities for diplomatic
rapprochement, facilitating negotiations resulting in improving the governance of
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17   The 26 counties, prior to joining the EU, were even referred to as an ‘agricultural backwater’, while the six
counties were the most industrialised and advanced until the early 1960s, which came with a certain regional
price: Collins ( n 3) 14. 
18   Laffan and O’Mahoney (n 4). 
19   Central Statistical Office Ireland, Ireland and the EU 1973–2003 Economic and Social Change (2004), table 8.
20   The impact of  some of  the Conservative government’s social policy on the result of  the UK’s EU referendum
is debated in a special issue of  the Journal of  Social Security Law; see Charlotte O’Brien, ‘Brexit, Social
Security and EU Nationals in the UK: A Recent History of  Welfare Segregation, and an Administrative Storm
Brewing’ (2018) 25 Journal of  Social Security Law 1–3.
Northern Ireland.21 Incrementally, specific negotiations between the UK and Ireland
succeeded, for example, enabling common transport and energy sectors in the island of
Ireland. They relied on the legal framework provided by the EEC and later the EU.
2.3 RELEVANCE OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS SUPRANATIONAL QUALITY
The relevance or the specific character of  Community law is difficult to quantify, but it
certainly constituted a factor in the success of  all this. It rendered the EEC and renders
the EU much more than a negotiation space.
In 1972, the supranational character of  the then EEC was not just a slogan used in its
initial negotiation. Instead the Court of  Justice had developed the doctrine of  direct
effect and supremacy of  Community law, starting with the pivotal judgments in Van Gend
en Loes and Costa v ENEL.22 The effects of  EU law comprise direct effects – i.e. the ability
of  citizens to rely on the relevant provisions before national courts – and supremacy –
i.e. the capacity of  overruling national law. Direct effect, while only explicitly demanded
for regulations and decisions (Article 288 TFEU) also encompasses Treaty provisions and
Directives if  these are phrased in such a way as to be applicable by judges without
legislative implementation, though for Directives only in relations between citizens and
the state or its emanations. Supremacy comprises indirect and incident effects of  all EU
law, also such which has no direct effect through the principles of  interpretation of
national law in line with EU law and of  non-applicability of  provisions breaching EU law.
As a last resort, the citizen can also claim damages from the Member State which did not
implement an EU Directive or any other source of  EU law correctly. This is relevant,
because both states have a dualist disposition towards international law generally.
Nevertheless, Irish23 and UK24 courts generally accepted the EU law doctrine of
supranationality, and also engaged in extensive judicial dialogue with the Court of  Justice.
Without these supranational elements, the EEC Treaty would not have had the capacity
to become a legally binding and practically reliable basis for cross-border cooperation.
This legal regime had multiple effects on the relations between Ireland and the UK on
the island of  Ireland. One important example is the EEC’s programme to legislate in
order to obfuscate physical borders in the Community. While the Treaty created directly
effective and supreme provisions guaranteeing free movement of  goods, services, persons
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21   For an early example, see John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland (Blackwell 1996)
279–82, 302–6; see also Elizabeth Meehan, ‘“Britain’s Irish Question: Britain’s European Question?’ British–
Irish Relations in the Context of  European Union and the Belfast Agreement’ (2000) 26 Review of
International Studies 83–97.
22   ECJ 5 February 1963 Van Gend & Loes Case 26/62 ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; ECJ 15 June 1964 Costa v ENEL Case
6/64 ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; for standard textbook coverage on this see Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca,
European Union Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 185–315.
23   This even held for the disputed austerity measures, see Peter Charleton and Angelina Cox, ‘Accepting the
Judgements of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU as Authoritative: The Supreme Court of  Ireland, the European
Stability Mechanism and the Importance of  Legal Certainty’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of  Comparative and
European Law 204–15.
24   Paul Craig, ‘Britain in the European Union’ in by J Jowell, D Oliver and Colm O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing
Constitution (Oxford University Press 2015) ch 4; Anthony Arnull, ‘Keeping their Heads Above Water?
European Law in the House of  Lords’ in James Lee (ed), From House of  Lords to the Supreme Court (Oxford
University Press 2011) 129–48. The UK Supreme Court ruling in Miller (on which see below text to n 42),
though contestable in relation to the Good Friday Agreement, is a model case demonstrating how the
Supreme Court follows the doctrine of  supremacy and direct effect of  EU law. 
and capital by the end of  the transitional period in 1965,25 the existence of  different
national systems for VAT and the absence of  a uniform pre-declaration of  customs
consignments meant that border controls remained necessary in the Community, and also
on the island of  Ireland. The first ever Treaty Reform, the Single European Act of  1987,
facilitated adoption of  legislation realising Commission President Jacques Delors’
ambitious Internal Market programme, which contained the Community Customs Code,
adopted in 1992.26 It was this code that eliminated the necessity for controlling goods
crossing the borders within the Internal Market, since all levies as well as VAT could be
administered after the border crossing. Together with the Schengen Agreement on free
movement of  persons without passport controls, this code removed the necessity of
border posts in the EU. While the UK rejected the relaxation of  person borders through
the Schengen agreement, and Ireland followed this policy, the Common Travel Area
(CTA) in practice replaced this instrument – with the related weaknesses resulting from
its informality and complete lack of  legal enforceability.27 Taken together, the Customs
Code and CTA, which was expressly acknowledged as compatible with Community law
in a Treaty Protocol, made border controls superfluous. Any further checks on the Irish
border were purely motivated by security concerns.28
2.4 EU MEMBERSHIP AND THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
These decisive contributions of  EEC membership for normalisation of  the situation on the
island of  Ireland are not usually considered.29 Instead, the Good Friday Agreement30 is
often viewed as the high point and provisional culmination of  a ‘peace process’, in which
the contribution of  the EU is recognised, though not viewed as decisive.31 Accordingly,
when the EU Commission’s negotiation mandate on ‘Brexit’ as issued by the European
Council (Article 50 TEU) included a commitment to upholding the Good Friday
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25   Dating the Internal Market’s substantive creation to 1993 (e.g. C McCall, ‘Brexit, Bordering and Bodies on the
Island of  Ireland’ (2018) Ethnopolitics 17(3), 292–305) is factually wrong. 
26   Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of  12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, OJ
L 302/1–50 of  19 October 1992, and Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of  2 July 1993 laying down
provisions for the implementation of  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community
Customs Code, OJ L 253/1 of  11 October 1993, 1. This framework has now been replaced by the Union
Customs Code (Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  9 October
2013 laying down the Union Customs Code, 2013), which entered into force in two stages in 2013 (to enable
daughter regulations) and in 2016 (for application at national levels). The new code aims at completely
modernising customs procedures for importing into and exporting from the EU, and is still progressively
implemented (see for an official explainer <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/807e82ea-52ab-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search>. 
27   See also John Doyle and Eileen Connoly, ‘Brexit and the Northern Ireland Question’ in Federico Fabbrini (ed),
The Law and Politics of  Brexit Oxford University Press 2017) 145–7; on the CTA’s insufficiency as legal frame,
see Bernhard Ryan, The Implications of  UK Withdrawal for Immigration Policy and Nationality Law: Irish Aspects
(Immigration Law Practitioners Association 2016).
28   See on these and the symbolic relevance of  the border, Mary Daly, Brexit and the Irish Border: Historical Context
(Royal Irish Academy and British Academy 2017); on internal constitutional determinants, see Gordon
Anthony, Brexit and the Irish Border: Legal and Political Questions (Royal Irish Academy 2017).
29   For exceptions, see Meehan (n 21); Mary Murphy, Northern Ireland and the European Union (Manchester
University Press 2014), though from a political science and not from a socio-legal perspective.
30   Terminology around this Agreement is ideologically loaded. While those in Northern Ireland referred to as
Nationalists or Catholics usually use Good Friday Agreement, those referred to as Unionists or Protestant
often prefer ‘Belfast Agreement’: Guelke (n 7) . The EU Commission has opted for ‘1998 Agreement’, while
the European Council, in its negotiation mandate for this same Commission (below n 41), uses Good Friday
Agreement. This notion shall be used in the remainder of  the article. 
31   Guelke (n 7) 46; Katy Hayward and Mary Murphy, ‘The EU’s Influence on the Peace Process and Agreement
in Northern Ireland in the Light of  Brexit’ (2018) 17 Ethnopolitics 276–92, 278.
Agreement,32 some noted their surprise on this development.33 However, common EEC
membership had been stressed by the UK government as a reason to ensure new
arrangements for Northern Ireland consensually with Ireland as early as 1972, and the first
framework document for negotiating the Good Friday Agreement of  1994 again stressed
that EU-related matters should be discussed in the North–South bodies. Subsequently,
because of  opposition of  the Unionist parties to a strong role of  common bodies of
Ireland and the UK in governing Northern Ireland, the EU aspect was given less
prominence.34 In order to gauge how the EU should react to the Northern Ireland conflict
and its remainder in dealing with the UK’s withdrawal, it is vital to recognise how EU
membership underpins the Good Friday Agreement at every corner.
2.4.1 Short overview of the Good Friday Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement35 mainly establishes an institutional framework to manage
the fallout from the contestation of  Northern Ireland as a territory within its society,
attempting to induce peace through governance. The Agreement provides three levels of
institutions for governing Northern Ireland: the Northern Irish level (consisting of
Legislative Assembly and Executive – Strand One), the North–South level (consisting of
the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) – Strand Two) and the East–West dimension
(consisting of  the British Irish Council (BIC) and the British Irish Intergovernmental
Conference (BIIC)36 – Strand Three).37 Strand One is characterised by the requirement to
share power between Unionists and Nationalists, referring to the two communities at
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32   Para 11 of  the negotiation guidelines of  April 2017, which remain unchanged: EUCO XT 20004/17
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21763/29-euco-art50-guidelinesen.pdf>. See also n 94 below.
33   Colin Harvey, ‘Brexit, Human Rights and the Constitutional Future on These Islands’ (2018) European
Human Rights Law Review 10–12, 10.
34   Guelke (n 7).
35   For introductory coverage with further references, there are ample recent publications by political 
scientists Guelke (n 7); Hayward and Murphy (n 31) 6; David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward, UK Withdrawal 
(‘Brexit’) and the Good Friday Agreement (European Parliament 2017); and some by legal experts as well, see 
Brice Dickson, Law in Northern Ireland (3rd edn, Hart 2018) 1.27–37; Richard Humphreys, Beyond the 
Border. The Good Friday Agreement and Irish Unity after Brexit (Merrion Press 2018). The Agreement text can 
be found on the web pages of  the Irish and UK governments
<www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-
agreement.pdf> and <www.gov.co.uk/governmentpublications/the-belfast-agreement> as well as on the UN
peacemaker webpage, where some editing has removed duplicate headings contained in the signed version
<https://peacemaker.un.org/uk-ireland-good-friday98>.
36   In contrast to the BIC (see n 41 below) the BIIC was established by a specific Treaty between Ireland and the
UK <www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/treatyseries/uploads/documents/treaties/docs/200027.pdf>.
This very short Treaty reaffirms the commitment of  both governments to the Multiparty Agreement (Good
Friday Agreement). When common EU membership of  Ireland and the UK ceases, the BIIC remains as the
only forum where ‘in recognition of  the Irish Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland and of  the
extent to which issues of  mutual concern arise in relation to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and
frequent meetings of  the Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on which the
Irish government may put forward views and proposals’ (BIIC, No 5).
37   The Three Strand Architecture and the power-sharing principles between the two communities and 
‘neutrals’ were not an entirely new invention: in 1973 the British government had introduced these 
same principles, and these were later confirmed in the Sunningdale Agreement based on cross-
community negotiations under participation of  the Irish and British governments. At the time, they were
opposed by Unionists, who called a general strike (which was enforced by paramilitaries) and intensified
paramilitary activity. See Gordon Gillespie, ‘Northern Ireland 1963–1998’
<www.qub.ac.uk/sites/irishhistorylive/IrishHistoryResources/Articlesandlecturesbyourteachingstaff/Northe
rnIreland1963–1998/#d.en.189201>; Paul Dixon, ‘Why the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland Is
not Consociational’ (2005) 76 The Political Quarterly 357–67; Siobhán Fenton, The Good Friday Agreement
(Biteback Publishing 2018) 500–52. 
several places in the Agreement. It also establishes the principle that some powers are
‘devolved’ to the Northern Irish institutions. These three strands are framed by a chapter
on Constitutional Questions (see below) and chapter 6 on ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality
of  Opportunity’ (also see below), as well as chapters 7 to 10 on decommissioning, security,
policing and justice, prisoners and validation implementation and review. The governance
arrangements are not discussed here, with the exception of  the principle to govern
Northern Ireland under the tenet of  cross-community consent; nor are chapters 7 to 10
considered. This reductionist view is justified by the focus on those provisions for which
common EU membership of  Ireland and the UK is formally relevant.
2.4.2 Explicit reference to common EU membership in the Good Friday Agreement
Despite some efforts to downplay its relevance in the negotiations, common EU
membership of  the UK and Ireland was prominently underlined in the Good Friday
Agreement, and even more so in the International Agreement between the governments
of  the UK and Ireland to which it is annexed. While the former agreement is frequently
characterised as merely political,38 the latter is an agreement under international law39 and
as such registered with the United Nations.40 It should thus be of  some significance that
the British and Irish governments concluded this agreement ‘wishing to develop still
further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between
their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union’. The Good
Friday Agreement itself  refers to the EU in the three strands dedicated to the institutions
governing Northern Ireland. For Strand One, which establishes the democratic
institutions in Northern Ireland, paragraph 31 demands that Assembly representatives
and the UK government will agree terms ensuring effective coordination and policy input
including on EU issues. The NSMC (to be established under Strand Two) shall ‘consider
the European Union dimension of  relevant matters’, while arrangements are made to
ensure that its views are represented at the relevant EU meetings (paragraph 17). An
annex to Strand Two identifies relevant EU programmes as one of  the areas covered by
the NSMC. The British Irish Council (BIC), to be established under a new British Irish
Agreement under Strand Three,41 should discuss ‘approaches to EU issues’ (paragraph 5).
2.4.3 Brexit and the Good Friday Agreement: the UK constitutional law perspective
Despite this prominence of  the EU in the International Agreement between the UK and
Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement itself, the UK Supreme Court in its Miller
judgement42 rejected the argument that the UK’s withdrawal of  Northern Ireland from
the EU constitutes a ‘change in the status of  Northern Ireland’. Such a change would
legally require the consent of  the majority of  the people of  Northern Ireland under
Article I(iii) of  the UK–Ireland International Agreement.43 The UK government has
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39   Ibid. See also Colin Murray, Aoife O’Donoghue and Ben Warwick, Policy Paper: The Place of  Northern Ireland
within UK Human Rights Reform (Durham University/Newcastle University 2015) 16–22.
40   As ‘Agreement between the Government of  the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of  Ireland (with annexes). Belfast, 10 April 1998’, 2114 UNTS 473.
41   The British–Irish International Agreement, to which the Good Friday Agreement is annexed, is deemed to be
the basis for the BIC from the point in time when it entered into force. The BIC establishes a forum for
cooperation between all parts of  the British Islands, except for England, which has neither the status of  a
region with devolved powers nor of  a Crown Dependency (as the Isle of  Man and the Channel Islands).
42   R (Miller) v Secretary of  State for Exiting the European Union [2018] AC 61.
43   According to that provision the ‘two Governments . . . acknowledge that . . . it would be wrong to make any
change in the status of  Northern Ireland save with the consent of  a majority of  its people’. 
consistently stressed that in leaving the EU it would not respect the regional referendum
result in Northern Ireland, which returned a 55.5 per cent majority for remain. Instead,
the UK should leave the EU as one.44 This position would seem to be violating the
Agreement’s provision just cited. The Supreme Court ruling constitutes a contestable45
reflection of  the UK constitutional approach, which – as mentioned – includes a dualist
position to international agreements, rendering their legal effects within the UK wholly
dependent on the decision of  the UK institutions. This municipal legal perspective is
beyond the scope of  this article, except for illustrating the superiority of  common EU
membership or the endurance of  supranational law on another basis to any other
international agreement between the UK and Ireland.
2.4.4 EU membership and substantive aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
Beyond the explicit references to common EU membership of  the UK and Ireland, the
EU was and is decisive for the effectiveness of  two themes central to the Good Friday
Agreement: the hybrid status of  Northern Ireland and its citizens, and the Agreement’s
mission to promote socio-economic prosperity in Northern Ireland, as well as the role of
all-island socio-economic processes for achieving and underpinning both.
2.4.4.1 Hybridity of territories and citizenship
The endeavour to establish a hybrid identity for Northern Ireland is expressed in
chapter 2 of  the Good Friday Agreement. Article 2 of  the legally binding agreement
between the UK and Ireland confirms this by committing the ‘British and Irish
Governments’ to accepting as legitimate any choice by the majority of  the people of
Northern Ireland between supporting the Union with Great Britain and a sovereign
united Ireland. The fifth paragraph of  the chapter ensures that any sovereign government
with jurisdiction over Northern Ireland will govern with rigorous impartiality and respect
for equality of  civil, political, social and cultural rights, as well as freedom of
discrimination for all citizens. In addition, there is a specific obligation to govern with
parity of  esteem for identity, ethos and aspirations of  both communities, defined by their
wish to either retain the Union with Great Britain or aspire to a sovereign united Ireland.
This is followed by the commitment to recognise the birthright of  all the people of
Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as British or Irish or both, which
includes the right to either or dual citizenship, irrespective of  any future change of
Northern Ireland’s status. The Good Friday Agreement under the heading ‘Constitutional
Issues’ asserts that the participants of  the negotiations endorse the governments’
commitments and also pledge that they will recognise any free choice by the peoples of
Northern Ireland and Ireland as to whether Northern Ireland remains a part of  the UK
or joins Ireland, while also supporting the principle of  governing the province with
rigorous impartiality.
Strand Three of  the Good Friday Agreement further underlines this hybridity in
paragraph 5 under ‘British–Irish Intergovernmental Conference’ (BIIC), according to
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45   Christopher McCrudden and Daniel Halberstam, ‘Miller and Northern Ireland: A Critical Constitutional
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which the ‘Irish Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland’ is recognised and
regular and frequent meetings of  the BIIC are demanded on non-devolved Northern
Ireland matters, on which the Irish government may put forward views and proposals.
The BIIC may also ‘contribute as appropriate’ to ‘any review of  the overall political
agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations’, without any power to ‘override the
democratic arrangements set up by (it)’, namely the rules on Strand One. Since anything
coming close to joint government of  the UK and Ireland over Northern Ireland is
rejected by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the BIIC has not met since 2007, when
the Strand One institutions were restored after a 10-year lapse under the joint leadership
of  the DUP (Ian Paisley sr) and Sinn Fein (Martin McGuinness). It resumed its activities
in July 2018, following the relapse of  the Strand One institutions in early 2017, stressing
explicitly that the ‘bilateral co-operation’ enabled by the conference ‘needed to be
maintained and, where possible, strengthened following the departure of  the United
Kingdom from the European Union’.46
Though not explicitly referred to, common EU membership arguably constitutes a
precondition of  the hybrid status of  regions as well as of  persons. Hybridity of  regions
is facilitated by the possibility of  establishing common administrative units and processes
by the states for regions which, although formally divided by a state border, constitute a
natural and/or socio-economic unit. Such regions are officially referred to as ‘border
regions’, and subject to extensive EU research and funding.47 This funding is based on
the opportunities provided by common EU membership. These include the option of
pooling resources in order to establish transport systems, educational or health services
or upgrade the e-communication infrastructure for regions.
Hybridity of  people’s allegiances (to avoid the contested term identity) is at the core
of  the EU’s socio-economic project, which relies on cooperation of  people and
businesses even more than on state cooperation. The process of  European integration
was designed to stabilise transnational interaction between socio-economic actors in
order to engender solidarity between the peoples of  Europe and thus perpetuate peace
between their states.48 Early integration theory defined European integration as the
changing of  socio-economic and civic actors’ allegiances from merely resting with the
nation states to encompassing European-level activities,49 relying on the idea that
transactions between individuals would foster identification of  citizens with the wider
project.50 Today’s revival of  transactionalist approaches to European integration51 offers
Brexit on the island of Ireland: beyond unique circumstances 377
46   <www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-communique-of-the-british-irish-intergovernmental-conference-25-
july-2018> 
47   See European Commission, Boosting Growth and Cohesion in EU Border Regions COM (2017) 534 (European
Union 2017).
48   Robert Schuman, ‘CVCE.eu’ <www.cvce.eu/en/obj/declaration_by_robert_schuman_paris_9_may_1950-
en-fa872cf5–67fa-4848-ae00-fbc4d4715e96.html> (Jean Monnet Memoires, Fayard, 1976) 323. 
49   Ernest B Haas, The Uniting of  Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (2nd edn, University of
Notre Dame Press 1968 [1958]), known as neofunctionalism originally, and today also informing theories of
federalism and social constructivism. 
50   These are known as transactionalist approaches, founded in the 1950s: Karl Deutsch, ‘The Growth of
Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of  Political and Social Integration’ (1953) 5 World Politics168–95; Karl W
Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of  Historical
Experience (1st edn, Princeton University Press 1957).
51   Sabine Israel et al, ‘Connected Europe(ans): Does Economic Integration Foster Social Interaction?’ (2016) 26
Journal of  Contemporary European Studies 1–19; Theresa Kuhn, Experiencing European Identity: Transnational
Lives and European Identity (Oxford University Press 2014); Steffen Mau and Jan Mewes, ‘Horizontal
Europeanisation in Contextual Perspective: What Drives Cross Border Activities within the European Union?’
(2012) 14 European Societies 7–34.
empirical evidence of  whether and in how far these assumptions can be confirmed. As
the EU is constituted as a Community of  Law, these aspirations are pursued by
guaranteeing judicially enforceable rights. Primary EU law, established by the Treaties,
provides rights of  economic actors related to free movement of  goods, services, persons
(as workers and entrepreneurs) and capital, alongside some rights conventionally classified
as social rights (free movement for EU citizens irrespective of  their economic status
under Article 21 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU),
employees’ rights to equal pay irrespective of  sex under Article 157 TFEU). Rights to free
movement of  natural persons (Articles 45 and 49 TFEU) also have a social dimension in
that they entail rights to equal treatment in the host country, which provides equal
employment rights and secures access to social institutions such as healthcare, education,
social services and social benefits. Secondary EU law creates the frameworks for utilising
these rights, including, but not limited to their social dimensions.
It is worth noting that in enabling hybrid citizenship, the rights to free movement of
persons as self-employed entrepreneurs, employees, service providers and recipients, and
in a civic capacity are possibly more relevant than the right to trade across borders. While
it is cross-border trade which triggers immediate control needs through border posts in
the absence of  the EU Customs Code, transnational identities are – if  at all – encouraged
by the option of  cross-border lives (i.e. the right to work, shop, convene and stroll across
borders). EU law underpins these activities by rights which are – by contrast to the Good
Friday Agreement – enforceable in UK and Irish courts, with the European Court of
Justice as an arbitrator. In a region where human rights abuses were a daily occurrence,
this is not negligible. Further, the regulatory service of  the EU, in areas such as social
security coordination, access to healthcare, education and social benefits for frontier
workers and EU citizens in general, is invaluable in a region with a largely dysfunctional
Parliament which is mostly served by orders, rather than dedicated legislation issued by
the central Parliament.
2.4.4.2 Socio-economic improvement in Northern Ireland
Chapter 6 of  the multiparty agreement contains a number of  substantive guarantees,
under two identical (repeated) headings ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of
Opportunity’.52 The first paragraphs are focused on governing Northern Ireland, and
demand that this government actively protects human rights, in particular: the right of
free political thought, freedom and expression of  religion; the right to pursue
democratically national and political aspirations; the right to seek constitutional change by
peaceful and legitimate means; the right to freely choose one’s place of  residence; the
right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of  class, creed,
disability, gender or ethnicity; the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and the
right of  women to full political participation.
The second section, with the subheading ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Issues’,
requires for the UK government to promote ‘sustained economic growth and stability’ in
Northern Ireland, as well as promoting social inclusion ‘including in particular community
development and the advancement of  women in public life’. This is underlined by specific
political commitments to devise a regional development strategy for Northern Ireland,
which addresses the ‘divided society’, alongside strengthening the physical infrastructure of
the region, an obligation to adopt measures guaranteeing employment equality, including
through antidiscrimination legislation, as well as measures to combat unemployment with
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specific attention to eliminating the difference in unemployment rates between ‘the two
communities’. The UK and Ireland are both required to support linguistic diversity,
consisting of  the Irish language, Ulster Scots and languages of  the various ethnic
communities, with an emphasis on promoting the Irish language and the signing of  the
Council of  Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Rights.
These guarantees are only partly paralleled by hard guarantees under EU law. These
parallels are strongest in relation to two complexes: first, the right to freely choose one’s
place of  residence is underpinned by EU Treaty rights – the four economic freedoms
proscribe any detriments deriving from working (as employee or self-employed) in
another EU Member States or across a formal state border in the EU; and EU citizenship
rights partly extend this to those who are still in education, retired or not working for
other reasons. Second, socio-economic equal opportunity regardless of  religion and
belief, disability, gender and ethnic or racial origin is the aim of  EU antidiscrimination law
and policy, based on today’s Articles 19 and 157(3) TFEU53 and incorporating Articles
21–26 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union.
Beyond any explicit parallelism of  rights, there is also a more general common thread
running through the Good Friday Agreement and the EU Treaties. All aim to engender
integrated societies: the former across the ethno-political-cultural divide, as well as across
a border; the latter through making national borders permeable and superfluous, as well
as through creating European-level socio-economic institutions. The conviction that
social change can and must be driven through rights-based socio-economic integration
underpins both the EU and the Good Friday Agreement.54
Bradley55 recalls that, while the Good Friday Agreement was being negotiated, little
attention was dedicated to the socio-economic conditions of  ensuring prosperity and thus
securing peace in Northern Ireland, criticising in particular the limited scope of  the socio-
economic authority of  the Strand One institutions, as well as the ill thought-through list
of  matters to which the BIIC should direct its attention (transport, agriculture, education,
health, the environment and tourism). However, one could argue that the lack of  more
extensive deliberation on socio-economic policies during the negotiations was due to the
recognition that common EU membership would alleviate the problems related to the
necessity of  including Northern Ireland in an all-island economy: the Common Market
would support such an economy regardless of  the exact terms of  the Good Friday
Agreement.
2.4.5 Relevance of common EU membership for Ireland, the UK and 
Northern Ireland
Overall, common EU membership is not only explicitly specified as informing the
bilateral International Agreement to which the Good Friday Agreement is annexed, but
also referred to in each of  the three institutional strands of  the Good Friday Agreement
as such. The Good Friday Agreement’s substantive provisions presuppose common EU
membership in so far as the ‘Constitutional Issues’ establish Northern Ireland as a hybrid
territory and its citizens as hybrid citizens, and the section ‘Rights, Safeguards and
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Equality and Opportunity’ demands the improvement of  the socio-economic situation in
Northern Ireland, as well as creating conditions of  equal treatment irrespective of  race,
ethnicity and religion within society.
Rights and political processes established as legally binding concepts by the UK’s and
Ireland’s common EU membership enable the realisation of  socio-economic and civic
projects to be extended into the whole of  both regions though artificially separated by
state borders. Guaranteed rights of  free movement and equal treatment irrespective of
nationality presently bolster the socio-economic position of  Irish citizens in Northern
Ireland, as they would have bolstered the socio-economic position of  UK citizens after a
future choice of  Northern Ireland to become part of  Ireland had the UK not decided to
withdraw. The rights basis of  more diverse and modern societies, as epitomised by Ireland
perhaps more than by Northern Ireland, are also served by EU law, in particular in its
legislation requiring Member States to adopt antidiscrimination legislation in employment
and beyond.
Accordingly, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU fundamentally challenges the
functionality of  the Good Friday Agreement, amounting to a change of  the basis of
Northern Ireland as a socio-economic and political entity. The preamble of  the
International Agreement seems even to suggest that the UK should have consulted
Ireland before lodging its application for withdrawal from the EU. All this would lead us
to expect that the question of  how the functionality of  the Good Friday Agreement can
be maintained even though the UK plans to withdraw from the EU would be addressed
in the negotiations of  the withdrawal agreement. Moreover, because the EU’s
fundamental ethos is mirrored in the rights-based construction of  the Good Friday
Agreement, the centrality of  maintaining its functionality in the withdrawal negotiations
is not surprising at all. The next section analyses how far these expectations are met by
the debate about the withdrawal process and its implementation.
3 The challenge of Brexit for the island of Ireland
If  EU membership resulted in socio-economic improvement on the island of  Ireland,
providing the preconditions for the Good Friday Agreement and for socio-economic
integration across the island, as well as between Britain and Northern Ireland, how will
Brexit factually affect this?
3.1 IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGE: ACADEMIC WRITING AND THINK-TANKS
3.1.1 Socio-economic risks
From 2015, well before the referendum closed, there have been stark warnings on the
specific consequences for Ireland,56 which have been confirmed by studies in 2018.57
One cluster of  problems arises from the island’s geographic position on the Western
outskirts of  the Union: it will be cut off  from the rest of  the EU by the UK as a third
country. This poses logistical problems for the trade in goods with the rest of  the EU.
The EU’s initiatives aimed at alleviating this problem include providing funding for
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increased sea transport from Ireland directly to other EU countries58 and to agree to the
control-free transport of  sealed containers with goods.59
The economic consequences of  Brexit for the island also result from the pertaining
orientation of  trade to the UK (or Britain in the case of  Northern Ireland).60 While those
studies are sometimes quoted to support the argument that trade with Britain is more
important than trade across the inner-Irish border, such a conclusion disregards the
existence of  all-island supply chains, which would be interrupted by eliminating the legal
framework of  the Internal Market.61 Maintaining supply chains in the absence of  the
Internal Market requires additional bureaucracy and thus time-lags and costs impeding
competitiveness. These economic issues are amplified for Northern Ireland through the
economic detriment of  its small size, which renders a close relationship towards if  not
actual reunification with Ireland an economically valuable option.62
Even positive impacts of  Brexit, such as the enhanced traction of  Ireland as a base
for financial and legal service providers in the light of  so-called passporting rights into
the EU,63 entail economic risk due to an already stretched housing market64 and
challenges for recruiting qualified and low-skilled workers.65 For Northern Ireland, the
latter risk is particularly austere, since its economy may lose access to the EU labour
market.66 Accordingly, to enable socio-economic prosperity in the far-eastern corner of
Ireland, an integration with an all-island economy, as well as an outward-looking
orientation beyond the UK are all viewed as necessary,67 alongside overcoming persistent
infrastructure deficiencies and counteracting outward movement of  young and qualified
populations.68 An additional risk emerges from the fact that EU funding, relating to
agricultural policy and regional and social funds, has favoured Northern Ireland more
starkly than the other areas of  the UK, due to differing policy preferences of  the EU and
the UK respectively.
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While it is recognised that economic aspects are not the sole factor to be considered
here, these aspects alone support the argument for Northern Ireland to remain part of
the EU if  possible,69 or at least in the European Economic Area (EEA).70 They further
would justify enhanced state aid for the island of  Ireland, and possibly even a specific
status aligned to outermost territories, in order to perpetuate a specific state-aid regime.71
3.1.2 Mainly a border problem?
While these challenges are undisputable, current academic and think-tank reflection72
tends to focus on the ‘border issue’. This is related to the characterisation of  the Good
Friday Agreement’s main achievement as the resolution of  a border conflict,73 which
results in defining socio-economic measures, such as maintaining free movement of
goods and persons into Northern Ireland, as border issues only.74 Similarly, a
Europeanisation perspective on the inner-Irish border may identify the achievements of
the EU as a mere restructuring of  the border, culminating in the warning that free
movement of  workers contributes to the UK’s preoccupation with border security.75 Such
contributions provoke the legal critique that the Good Friday Agreement does not
formally require the elimination of  an inner-Irish border, while it establishes institutions
to manage cross-border cooperation.76 Such thinking can be complemented by elaborate
proposals for smart border technology to make border crossings run more smoothly.77
However, even high-tech border posts are expected to bring back traumatising memories
of  the past abuse of  the border for intimidating those crossing it,78 to re-enforce the
border in the mind,79 and potentially provoke a re-emergence of  tensions between
Unionists and Nationalists, which some believe have been overcome.80 Legal scholars81
may also differentiate the border into different subject areas, such as a goods border, a
person border and a non-physical border, emerging from withdrawing mutual residency
rights of  UK citizens in Ireland and vice versa post-Brexit.
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3.1.3 Human rights, equality and ‘rights’
The human rights dimension of  Brexit in a Northern Irish context is another focus of
literature, including studies by and for Irish and Northern Irish human rights
organisations. Gordon Anthony goes as far as arguing that the threat to withdraw from
the ECHR is more fatal for the Good Friday Agreement than Brexit;82 and Donoghue
and Warwick have discussed how the idea to withdraw from the ECHR as a complement
to EU withdrawal constitutes a violation of  international law in this very journal long
before the referendum.83 The focus on human rights and equality is not surprising, as the
related guarantees differentiate the Good Friday Agreement from power-sharing
arrangements in the 1970s. Convincingly, the authors referred to so far recognise that
human rights protection as required by the Good Friday Agreement is not necessarily
impacted upon negatively by Brexit. A number of  authors stress the fact that the motives
which resulted in the overall UK majority for withdrawing from the EU may well be
indicative of  a heightened need for protection of  human rights, in particular from ethnic
and racist discrimination and human rights violation in the context of  immigration policy.
In this regard, Harvey, and Smith, McWilliams and Yarnell agree that Brexit may have the
advantage of  rejuvenating discussions on a human rights Bill for Northern Ireland, which
had already been envisaged in the Good Friday Agreement. They admit that this is not
required by EU law, and thus not directly impacted upon by Brexit.84
As already mentioned, there is some overlap of  general human rights policies and
rights guaranteed under EU law, as well as some rights to which the parties underwriting
the Good Friday Agreement are committed. On this basis, the Joint Committee of  the
Irish Human Rights Commission and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
have raised far-reaching concerns on the potential ‘diminution of  rights’, encompassing
the scope of  antidiscrimination law, data protection rights, the emerging inequality of
those citizens of  Northern Ireland who, as Irish citizens, remain EU citizens and those
who do not wish to claim an Irish passport for that reason, as well as a range of  EU-
derived rights for cross-border workers. Based on an academic report,85 the Joint
Committee takes the view that citizens in practice rely on rights derived from multiple
sources to support and protect their lives on the island of  Ireland. They also define as
their remit the protection of  citizens, irrespective of  whether they are British, Irish, other
EU citizens or indeed non-EU citizens. Under this logic would fall EU Treaty rights and
secondary instruments, such as Directives underpinning the antidiscrimination acquis,
Treaty rights, regulations and Directives protecting frontier workers, as well as the EU
Services Directive, which can be used as a basis for parents living in Northern Ireland and
working in Ireland to use tax credits received in the UK for funding childcare in Ireland.
The Joint Committee thus raises the point that EU-guaranteed rights, even if  they are not
human rights strictu sensu, are useful to challenge administrative hurdles and even national
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legislation due to their supranational character.86 The EU economic freedoms and
citizenship rights, though not an element of  human rights, thus emerge as functionally
equivalent to constitutional rights in the UK without a formal constitution, while they
complement the Irish Constitution where it does not guarantee those rights. A similar
point is made by McCrudden87 and the Northern Irish Human Rights Consortium.88
3.2 IRELAND/NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS
3.2.1 August 2016: an early positioning of the Northern Ireland executive
While the institutional arrangements of  the Good Friday Agreement and its national
implementation have not been sufficient to establish a government in Northern Ireland
for a period of  more than a year now, it is worthwhile pointing out that the former First
Minister, Arlene Foster, and the late Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, did
communicate a common position to the UK Prime Minister by a letter of  10 August
2016.89 The letter opened with a demand that the border must not impede free movement
of  persons, goods and services, thus stressing its socio-economic relevance. Next, it
stated the necessity of  avoiding a situation in which the border could develop into a focal
point for criminal activity, or a complication in the lives of  citizens. The next paragraphs
address Northern Ireland’s economy: business in Northern Ireland (whether indigenous
or based on foreign direct investment) should not lose the ease of  trade with nor access
to labour from the EU, both skilled and unskilled, emphasising that the public sector too
is dependent on the ability to employ EU citizens and non-EU citizens on the terms
generated by EU law. The letter also highlighted that the common electricity sector and
the all-island agri-food industry required a reliable legal framework, and stressed the
relevance of  agricultural funds for Northern Ireland (10% of  the EU agricultural funds
for the UK being allocated to farmers in Northern Ireland), pointing out that agricultural
products are predominantly exported to the EU and non-EU countries, which meant that
partaking in inner EU trade as well as profiting from EU trade agreements with third
countries were of  utter relevance. Given the fact that policy-making in Northern Ireland
should be based on cross-community consent, there are very good reasons under the
Good Friday Agreement to take this positioning as a starting point for identifying the
position of  Northern Ireland towards the EU after the UK withdraws from the Union.
3.2.2 UK and Irish position
The UK government has focused on avoiding physical infrastructures at the border
between Ireland and Northern Ireland,90 the continuation of  the CTA as well as the
Common Electricity Market and payments of  ‘Peace Money’ (programmed to expire in
2020) to Northern Ireland. It has launched its position paper on Northern Ireland, later
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complemented by the White Paper on the Future Relationship to the European Union.91
The White Paper on the future relationship repeats the principles established around
February 2017: the UK will leave the EU Customs Union and its Internal Market
(referred to as the Single Market), and no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of  the
Court of  Justice. In particular, there will be no free movement of  persons into the UK,
and any EU citizens accepted will have no claim to equal treatment with UK citizens. This
position has been branded as making a hard border inevitable, at the very least for goods
crossing a border. As regards movement of  persons and services, it will require controls
within the UK (and Northern Ireland) which will disrupt economic and civic activity not
only if  and when borders are actually crossed, but in Northern Ireland generally.
The Irish government has undertaken intensive consultation within Ireland on the
position of  the island post-Brexit, and early on positioned itself  with the aim of
maintaining the option of  uniting Ireland without the need to undergo an accession
process for the whole or part of  the country, as well as to avoid a so-called hard border
on the island of  Ireland. In this context the current Taoiseach has promised that ‘no
government will ever again leave North behind’.92 It chimes with the adoption of  a cross-
party motion in the Dail calling on the government to pursue a special designated status
for Northern Ireland in the EU in February 2017, and the overarching focus on
addressing socio-economic risks emerging from Brexit by the government, as well as key
interest organisations in Ireland.93 Nevertheless, the Irish policy is not wholly focused on
Northern Ireland. The government also aims at avoiding any restrictions on trade
between Britain and Ireland. That position has more in common with the UK
government’s than one would think, as the rhetoric is focused on trade in goods and
services, but not on free movement of  workers without a border. The Irish government
is also seriously concerned that violence might resurge in Northern Ireland.
3.2.3 EU Council negotiation mandate
The EU perspective on the Irish problem was first evidenced by the European Council
(Article 50) statement to the minutes of  its meeting on 29 April 2017, relating to
Article I(i), (ii) and (iv) of  the UK–Ireland International Agreement, which taken together
confirm the option of  the people of  Northern Ireland to opt for a ‘sovereign united
Ireland’. The Council:
. . . acknowledges that the Good Friday Agreement expressly provides for an
agreed mechanism whereby a united Ireland may be brought about . . . and . . .
that, in accordance with international law, the entire territory of  such a united
Ireland would thus be part of  the European Union.93a
The prominence of  the ‘Irish question’ is further mirrored in the negotiation guidelines
for the EU Commission regarding the agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
In paragraph 11, it states:
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The Union has consistently supported the goal of  peace and reconciliation
enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, and continuing to
support and protect the achievements, benefits and commitments of  the Peace
Process will remain of  paramount importance. In view of  the unique
circumstances on the island of  Ireland, flexible and imaginative solutions will be
required, including with the aim of  avoiding a hard border, while respecting the
integrity of  the Union legal order. In this context, the Union should also
recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United
Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.94
The ‘Irish question’ was among those to be resolved in the agreement on the UK’s
withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 TFEU. The staged process proscribed by
Article 50 TFEU means that the future relationship between the EU and a former
Member State is not fully addressed in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, though the
withdrawal agreement has to be negotiated in view of  the future relationship. Maintaining
this distinction is important from legal perspectives, inter alia because the withdrawal
agreement has the same quality as EU law, and arguably also falls under the jurisdiction
of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU.95
3.2.4 Joint declaration of negotiating parties of December 2017
On 15 December, the European Council, sitting without the UK in accordance with
Article 50 TEU, was satisfied that the negotiations between the EU Commission and the
UK96 had reached a stage where the negotiations could proceed to consider the outlines
of  the future relationship between the UK and the EU. In the preceding negotiations, the
EU Commission has stressed that the solution of  the Irish problem was a precondition
for that progress. However, now the Commission recognised the provisional character of
the 15 paragraphs addressing the unique circumstances of  the island of  Ireland,97
demanding continuation of  negotiations on the ‘Irish question’ in a specific strand of
discussions.
The ‘December compromise’ reconfirmed the EU and UK’s commitment to honour
the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement (‘1998 Agreement’, paras 42–44), defining the
‘hard border’ – which is to be avoided – as ‘including any physical infrastructure or related
checks and controls’ (para 43). Also, the right of  people of  Northern Ireland to identify
as British, Irish or both was mentioned, alongside the commitment to EU
antidiscrimination law, maintaining the CTA without affecting Ireland’s obligations under
EU law and free movement of  all EU citizens (para 52–54), and a promise to honour the
current PEACE and INTERREG programme, while any future funding beyond 2020 is
subject to negotiation (para 55). Both parties specifically committed to recognise the
constitutional status of  Northern Ireland and the principle of  consent (para 44). In
addition, the UK pledged to respect Ireland’s place within the EU’s Single Market while
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95   Collins (n 3).
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progress during phase 1 of  negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal




97   COM (2017) 784 final <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/1_en_act_communication.pdf>. 
it leaves the EU. The UK also unilaterally committed to ‘preserving the integrity of  its
internal market and Northern Ireland’s place within it’ (para 45).
The agreement that safeguarding Ireland/Northern Ireland will not be contingent on
the EU–UK future relationship (para 46) was elaborated by paragraphs 49 and 50, whose
convoluted language bears witness to late-night negotiations. These offer the UK the
concession that a ‘hard border’ on the island of  Ireland may be avoided through its future
relationship to the EU. Failing that, there are three fall-back options: first, ‘specific
solutions to address the unique circumstances on the island of  Ireland’ to be proposed by
the UK; failing that, the UK committed unilaterally to maintain ‘full alignment’ with
aspects of  the Internal Market and the Customs Union supporting North–South
cooperation, an all-island economy and the Good Friday Agreement, while also ensuring
that ‘no new regulatory barriers’ between Northern Ireland and Ireland develop, unless
the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree such new barriers, respecting the
principle of  consensus. Irrespective of  such consensus, the UK ensured access for
Northern Ireland’s business to the UK internal market.
Finally, there was recognition that Ireland’s unique geographic situation requires more
than maintaining the Good Friday Agreement in relation to transit of  goods to and from
Ireland via the UK is concerned.
3.3 DRAFT PROTOCOL ON IRELAND/NORTHERN IRELAND (EU WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT)
While the debate continues, the Draft Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement’s version of  19 March 2018 constitutes the last specified point of
reference.98 Its analysis reveals that the focus on the border, which is shared by a large
portion of  the academic discussion and the UK government’s position, has acquired
exceptional prominence, while the demand to avoid diminution of  rights is also
addressed. Socio-economic concerns beyond avoiding hard border posts are delegated to
a subsection of  the Joint Committee to be established under the withdrawal agreement,
without any attention to representation of  Northern Ireland on this committee, nor
consideration of  the power-sharing principles.
3.3.1 Content summary
The Draft Protocol consists of  five chapters with varying scope. Chapter I, headed ‘rights
of  individuals’, commits the UK to ensuring that ‘rights, safeguards and equality of
opportunity as set out in that part of  the 1998 Agreement’ are not diminished as a result
of  its withdrawal from the EU. It also puts the UK under an obligation to facilitate the
work of  institutions and bodies set up under the Good Friday Agreement, including those
dedicated to the protection of  human rights and equality. Paragraph 1 either commits the
UK to something it cannot achieve, or is void of  legal content: the ambitions of  the
Good Friday Agreement’s two sections headed ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of
Opportunity’ contain commitments to uphold rights that go beyond the realm of  the EU.
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98   European Commission, TF50 (2018) 33: Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of  the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (European
Union 2018): this version highlights those provisions which are agreed (Articles 2, 8 and 10 out of  15 
Articles of  the Draft Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland) or partly agreed (Articles 1, 6, 9 and 13 
out of  15 Articles of  that same Protocol). For first commentaries see Sylvia de Mars et al, Commentary on the
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of  Birmingham/Newcastle University 2018); House of  Commons Library, Brexit: The Draft Withdrawal
Agreement (Parliament 2018) 67–80; Dagmar Schiek, ‘The Island of  Ireland and “Brexit”: A Legal-
political Critique of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement’ (1 April 2018)
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3150394>.
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Those rights that are within the EU’s ambit are partly of  such a nature that the UK is
unable to uphold them on its own. For example, the right to choose a place to live is partly
underpinned by the EU economic freedoms, as any national legislation placing an EU
citizen under a detriment on the basis of  his or her place of  residence while exercising
one of  those freedoms is in breach of  EU law.99 These rights are, however, are reciprocal.
Since the UK is unable to guarantee that EU Member States maintain rights to free
movement for EU citizens, this obligation is overbearing. The provision may still have
legal content in relation to EU antidiscrimination law, which is mainly secondary law. The
UK can commit to maintaining the implementing legislation.
Chapter II’s sole Article 2 states that the UK and Ireland may continue the CTA as
long as it respects citizens’ rights under EU law, and also obliges the UK to ensure that
the CTA and associated rights can continue to operate without compromising Ireland’s
obligations under EU law. This has been read to prevent the UK from requiring Ireland
to operate UK immigration control of  EU citizens at the Irish border.100 Again this
provision is hardly of  major importance.
Chapter III introduces a Common Regulatory Area, which has been interpreted in the
media as including Northern Ireland in the Internal Market.101 However, the Common
Regulatory Area only maintains free movement of  goods – including electricity and
agricultural products – for Northern Ireland, as well as extending the frontiers of  the EU
Customs Union to include Northern Ireland.102 This has been smugly identified as
contrasting with the indivisibility of  the Internal Market, which the EU insists on
upholding as a principle103 – but for Northern Ireland. In a rather illogical fashion, the
Protocol also proposes to subject the Northern Irish economy to the EU’s state-aid
regime, while not mentioning the other provisions of  the Treaty chapter on competition
law (Article 9). This is most probably triggered by the 2015 legislation on enabling the
Northern Irish institutions to reduce corporate tax, which is viewed as potentially
violating state-aid rules.104 However, as this inclusion would also apply to companies
providing services and thus remaining excluded from the EU Internal Market with all the
accompanying risks, this could be viewed as an unfair allocation of  burdens. Chapter III
Article 8 demands that the conditions for North–South cooperation in the areas specified
in the Good Friday Agreement105 must be maintained in the course of  implementing the
Protocol and empowers the Joint Committee with its specialised Committee on
Ireland/Northern Ireland (Article 157, 158 of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement’s main
body) to make appropriate recommendation to the EU and the UK in this respect. Those
areas include fields belonging to the service sector, such as healthcare,
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99   For example, free movement of  workers is interpreted as preventing a Member State to withhold a tax credit
for acquiring a family home from a frontier worker on the basis of  her place of  residence (ECJ 16 October
2008 C-527/06 Renneberg ECLI:EU:C:2008:566).
100  de Mars et al (n 98).
101  See, for example, Pat Lehay in the Irish Times of  28 August 2018 <www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/brexit-
progress-on-future-relationship-key-to-backstop-says-coveney-1.3609400>.
102  On the exact legal technique to achieve that, see Schiek (n 98) 6–7.
103  Anand Menon, The Guardian (London 28 February 2018)
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/28/brexit-eu-draft-agreement-britain>.
104  See with extensive references also to the EU Commission’s position, Anthony Seeley, Corporation Tax in
Northern Ireland (House of  Commons Library 2018); from a comparative perspective see Alberto Vega, ‘The
Impact of  European Union Law on Regional Autonomy in Corporate and Value Added Taxation’ (2016) 24
REAF 11–45 <www.raco.cat/index.php/REAF/article/download/314595/405125>. It should be noted that
the interpretation is not necessarily the only one possible, and that no attempt has been made to explore
options of  justifying state aid on the grounds of  Northern Ireland’s extremely weak socio-economic position. 
105  See above text around n 55.
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telecommunications and tourism, as well as areas where an all-island economy depends
on freedom of  establishment (justice, if  comprising the services of  solicitors). Further,
employers and trade unions in those very sectors have pointed out that they depend on
continuation of  free movement of  workers. Thus, one wonders whether, through
implementing the Protocol, the Joint Committee is empowered to extend the coverage of
Chapter III to encompass freedom to provide services and freedom of  establishment, as
well as free movement of  workers.106
Chapter IV provides two different routes to enforcing the Protocol: under Article 10,
the Specialised Committee for Ireland/Northern Ireland should cooperate with the
NSMC established under the Good Friday Agreement, but not with the Northern Ireland
institutions or the BIC. Article 11 ensures that the EU institutions execute their powers
in relation to Chapter III as under EU law, and that any acts adopted in this regard will
have the same effect in the UK as EU law. Thus, the part-inclusion of  Northern Ireland
in the Internal Market encompasses retaining a supranational legal order thus far.
Chapter V includes those provisions of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement’s main body
which relate to the role of  the Court of  Justice, though extending the authority of  the
Court of  Justice case law beyond the point in time when the UK leaves the EU (Article
12(2) and (3)). This allows for the ‘backstop’ to continue functioning until the future
relationship between the EU and the UK makes its continued existence superfluous.
Article 12 also enables representatives of  the UK to participate in the EU’s comitology
procedures if  necessary in relation to the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol (Article 12
(4)), and extends EU data protection law and the Treaty reservation in favour of  national
security (Article 346 and 347) to the UK in respect of  Northern Ireland. All this is
complemented by more traditional international law-type safeguards, allowing the UK to
take rebalancing measures.
3.3.2 Avoiding a hard border and ‘diminishing of rights’
While the draft explicitly focuses on the issues defined as material during the academic
and policy advice debate, it is actually doubtful whether it addresses the related problems
adequately.
The inclusion of  Northern Ireland in the EU Customs Union and the Internal Market
for goods, including agricultural goods and electricity, will go a long way to eliminate the
necessity to control movements of  goods across the island of  Ireland. Thus, for this
purpose border posts will not be needed. However, the movement of  persons is fully
entrusted to the CTA and its continued operation, which is totally reliant on national law
and not based on any formal agreement between Ireland and the UK. As a consequence,
even the immigration status of  Irish citizens in the UK is not addressed properly. Further,
the CTA only extends to UK and Irish citizens. In the era of  free movement of  persons,
and some openness of  the EU to immigration from beyond its borders, there is a
considerable proportion of  EU citizens from other Member States and of  non-EU citizens
on both parts of  the island. Certainly, these populations are also targeted as tourists and
business visitors post-Brexit. Thus, the question arises how free movement of  EU citizens
into Ireland will be secured after Brexit, without compromising the immigration targets of
the UK. Article 2 of  the Protocol lays the burden on the UK to achieve this: there can be
no requirement to limit movement into Ireland in order to assert UK immigration targets.
All these controls must be established by the UK, either at its own shores or in Northern
Ireland. There is no barrier in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement to this.
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In so far as ‘diminishing of  rights’ is addressed, the Protocol operates a high degree
of  trust towards the UK. Article 1 does not refer to concepts of  Union law, and thus is
not encompassed by the jurisdiction of  the European Court of  Justice  under Article
12(2). While the UK remains bound to maintain all EU law protections during the
transition phase, there is no protection for the time thereafter at all. In so far as the rights
addressed by the Good Friday Agreement go beyond the EU’s limited remit in the field
of  human rights, this limitation is justified. However, the extensive human rights
protection required by the 1998 Agreement continues to demand specific measures by the
UK and Irish governments irrespective of  EU law.107
However, antidiscrimination law constitutes a policy field in which the Good Friday
Agreement’s demands reflect EU legislation: in 1998, the Treaty of  Amsterdam had just
been adopted, and with it the explicit competence for the EU to legislate in the field of
antidiscrimination law (today Articles 19 and159(3) TFEU). The institutions were already
discussing drafts of  the relevant Directives protecting from discrimination other than sex
discrimination, building on their extensive experience in this field.108 Interestingly, the
UK insisted on inserting an exception for the discrimination on grounds of  religion for
Northern Ireland because, on a conservative reading of  the EU Directives, positive action
would constitute a violation. This exception would arguably not cover the most
widespread discrimination in Northern Ireland, which is based on ethno-political
allegiance rather than religion. However, UK legislation has implemented the principles
of  ‘Fair Employment’ into Northern Ireland with reference to religion and political
opinion independently from EU pressures. Both the Fair Employment legislation and the
antidiscrimination Directives were implemented in Northern Ireland by order, namely
without the consent of  the Northern Ireland Assembly. These pieces of  legislation are
retained by the EU Withdrawal Act for the time being, while not excluding future change.
Further, the authority of  the Court of  Justice on their interpretation ends, alongside the
option to make references to the Court for national courts. As the supranational character
of  EU law ends as well, there will be no remedy (such as interpretation in conformity,
limited horizontal effect or damage claims against state authorities) in case of  incomplete
implementation or inadequate interpretation of  implementing law. This constitutes a
diminishing of  rights in this area, which is so important for Northern Ireland and
correspondingly spelled out in the Good Friday Agreement. The Draft Withdrawal
Agreement would not require any change whatsoever. Such change could easily be
achieved by replacing the words ‘As regards Chapter III’ in Article 11 by ‘As regards
Chapters I, II and III’. As the draft stands, it does not meet the expectations raised in the
academic discourse on the protection of  rights so far.
3.3.3 Hybridity of Northern Ireland: territory and citizenship
There is considerable doubt whether the Draft Withdrawal Agreement and Protocol
sufficiently safeguard hybridity of  identities and territories underlying the Good Friday
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108  It is safe to assume that the as yet unspecified annex will refer to a set of  EU Directives obliging Member
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and men in employment and occupation (recasting Directives first originating in 1975 and 1976)
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Agreement in the same way as EU law. While EU citizenship of  Irish citizens in Northern
Ireland is protected in principle, UK citizens will lose their EU citizenship. The fact that
those who fall into the category of  ‘citizen of  Northern Ireland’ are entitled to claim Irish
citizenship does not fully alleviate this concern: under the Good Friday Agreement there
should be no nudging into an identity not aspired to by the citizens of  Northern Ireland.
More importantly, the hybridity of  identities relies on the full ambit of  EU citizenship
rights, comprising economic citizenship and its civic aspects. Economic citizenship
comprises the right to move for work and consumption, as well as providing services
across borders. Presently, the draft agreements do not allow the continuation of  cross-
border services, or for service providers to maintain or create establishments in Ireland
and Northern Ireland. While the latter is encompassed by the CTA, the legal reliability of
this instrument is dubious. Civic citizenship encompasses the right to move to and stay in
other countries for purposes other than economic ones, for example, participating in
charitable activity, political association or for educational purposes. As far as the CTA
protects some of  the related rights for Irish and UK citizens, it lacks legal enforceability.
Further, those citizens who have moved to Northern Ireland and Ireland from elsewhere
would not have the legally protected right to engage in those activities, and thus civil
society would be thrown back on a narrow definition of  the citizenry, depending on
where a person was born (only those born in Northern Ireland are citizens of  Northern
Ireland)109 and the residence status of  their parents.
The Good Friday Agreement also safeguards hybridity of  identities and territories
through the principle of  consent, in particular between Unionists and Nationalists. This
is established through the requirement of  consensual government in Northern Ireland
and the role of  both Ireland and the UK in the NSMC and the British–Irish institutions.
The Draft Withdrawal Agreement creates new competences of  the UK in relation to
Northern Ireland without ensuring that the people of  Northern Ireland are represented
in accordance with these principles. Thus, there is no requirement on the UK to ensure
that the members of  the Northern Ireland/Ireland subcommittee of  the Joint Committee
are appointed in such ways that Northern Ireland is represented in accordance with the
two communities. Similarly, where the UK participates in EU comitology institutions for
Northern Ireland, there is no guarantee that this participation is actually by
representatives for Northern Ireland. The institutional elements of  the Good Friday
Agreement have only ever functioned for limited periods of  time, and are presently
dysfunctional. If  the Draft Protocol was factually committed to power-sharing, it should
have established its own modalities to ensure that Northern Ireland representation for the
purposes of  implementing the Protocol is not actually UK representation without
reflecting this principle.
3.3.4 Socio-economic improvement
The sectorial access of  Northern Ireland to the Internal Market (reduced to goods,
including agricultural goods, and electricity) is also problematic with regards to the
commitment to develop the Northern Irish economy to approximate a mature developed
economy. The all-island economy, mentioned in the joint negotiator report in December
2017, is actually characterised by significant divergence between the Irish and Northern
Irish economies.110 The Northern Irish economy has not yet compensated for the loss of
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109  This is not part of  the Good Friday Agreement, but instead established by an agreed interpretation annexed
to the British–Irish International Agreement (see above nn 38–40).
110  Gosling (n 62).
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traditional industrial sectors, such as shipbuilding and shirt-making, by developing a
service economy. Instead, replacement industrial sectors could be stimulated while the
agricultural and public sectors provide additional employment and growth. While in
recent years some progress in expanding the service economy has been made,111 being
excluded from the integrated EU market in services is likely to have an additional
stymying effect, not only on growth in this important sector, but also on the desired
rebalancing of  the Northern Ireland economy and the creation of  employment
opportunities in a more inclusive way than possible by growing public sector,
manufacturing and agricultural employment. Depriving Northern Ireland of  access to the
EU service sector (which also requires freedom of  establishment and free movement of
labour) will continue to limit its adequate economic development.
4 Betraying the EU’s mission?
The Draft Protocol constitutes an even more problematic inroad into the EU’s resolve to
safeguard the integrity of  its legal order, and in particular of  the Internal Market. This is
duly mirrored in the European Council’s (Article 50) negotiation mandate for the EU
Commission, which states:
Preserving the integrity of  the Single Market excludes participation based on a
sector-by-sector-approach. A non-member of  the Union, that does not live up to
the same obligations as a member, cannot have the same rights and enjoy the
same benefits as a member. In this context, the European Council welcomes the
recognition by the British Government that the four freedoms of  the Single
Market are indivisible and that there can be no ‘cherry picking’.112
The Draft Northern Ireland/Ireland Protocol betrays this particular commitment by
offering to Northern Ireland the approach which is chastised as cherry-picking if  applied
to the whole of  the UK.
The indivisibility of  the Internal Market is increasingly questioned by UK-based EU
lawyers. Remarkably, even those who have dedicated their academic lives so far to free
movement of  persons in the EU partly demand a diminution of  individual rights,
conjuring the spectre of  fair movement as superior to free movement.113 Catherine
Barnard, for example, carefully exposes how the first drafts for the EEC Treaty did not
fully realise free movement of  labour. Instead, the Spaak Report, of  21 April 1956,114 did
envisage an incremental increase in the number of  workers allowed into the Member
States, which indicated that labour markets were still perceived as being under state
control. Barnard’s question of  how the gap between this approach and the guarantee of
free movement of  workers under the condition of  equal treatment at their destination
was closed can be answered, though: the conference of  Messina was accompanied by
dialogue of  management and labour, at the location of  Val Duchesse.115 The recently
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111  Eoin Murphy, Michael Scholes and Aidan Stennet, The Executive’s Forthcoming Revised Economic Strategy for
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112  European Council (n 94).
113  Catherine Barnard, ‘Free Movement vs Fair Movement: Brexit and Managed Migration’ (2018) 55 Common
Market Law Review 203–26.
114  The full text of  169 pages is only available in French: for example, from
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115  See the historical documents available at <www.cvce.eu>, under <www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-
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documented openness of  post-war Western-European social democracy for international
trade116 did not go as far as supporting a common market for capitalists only, as a
contemporary caricature summarised it.117 This was the reason why the Common Market
already entailed factor mobility, notably committing the founding states to free movement
of  workers by the end of  the transition period (1965), while free movement of  capital was
conceptually postponed.
Barnard is correct in highlighting that each accession round saw the Member States
waver in their resolve to maintain the indivisibility of  the Internal Market: free movement
of  workers was curtailed by extensive transition periods in 1985/1987 (accession of
Greece, Portugal and Spain) and 2004, 2007 and 2013 (‘Eastern Enlargement’, lastly with
the accession of  Croatia). However, this should not be a reason to support the factually
incorrect media narrative that the UK has been subjected to higher rates of  mobility by
EU citizens than other Member States.118 A number of  Member States, including Ireland,
host a higher share of  EU citizens in relation to the size of  their populations.
The present Treaties uphold the principle of  economic free movement rights as
indivisible, while allocating slightly less generous rights to EU citizens moving for
purposes other than participating in the Internal Market.119 Nevertheless, this prominent
critique highlights the necessity to analyse the normative justification for the Internal
Market’s indivisibility. The creation of  the Common Market, and later the Internal
Market, constituted an alternative model to traditional liberal free-trade expansion:
instead of  only offering free trade to producers of  goods and services, those whose
labour is contracted in producing those goods were granted equal liberty, alongside
individual entrepreneurs who wished to move to other states. As evidenced by the amount
of  initial EU social legislation, this infused the Common Market with social policy
elements from the start. The principle of  equal treatment of  free movers (whether
employed or self-employed) in their country of  destination constitutes a measure to
protect those already labouring in that country of  destination from exposure to
exploitative competition and a downgrading of  their livelihoods. Demanding to give up
on equal treatment may be in line with the increasingly conservative, and even right-wing,
inclination of  the EU’s electorates. However, it is not appropriate to alleviate the
concerns of  those ‘feeling threatened’ by free movement at any substantive level.120
The EU Commission itself  has given up the indivisibility in its proposal for or against
Northern Ireland. One could conclude that an EU Commission and Irish government,
both dominated by conservative parties, pursue the same agenda as the Conservative
Party of  the UK: to truncate free movement of  workers, and eliminate equal treatment
rights of  those who seek better pastures.
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119  See the extensive analysis by Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Reconnecting Free Movement of  Workers and Equal
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120  For a more elaborate discussion with further references see Dagmar Schiek et al (n 118) 21–4, 49–52.
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5 Conclusion: is there any way forward?
It is difficult to conclude in any constructive way on the eve of  yet another round of
negotiations, previous iterations of  which did not bring substantive progress. It seems
highly unlikely that the UK will be able to address the ‘Irish question’ with any ingenuity.
The present government’s dependence on a sectarian Unionist party from Northern
Ireland defies the imagination that a balanced proposal on this difficult project will be
received in time for any compromise before November 2018. Thus, any solution will have
to come from the EU. The EU will have to consider the specific positioning of  the UK
with regard to the support and supply agreement between the DUP and the Conservative
government. This very situation makes it advisable to not offer anything to Northern
Ireland which is not available for the ‘Union’ (between Britain and Northern Ireland) as
a whole. This strategic consideration alone should have deterred the Commission from
drafting a partial inclusion of  Northern Ireland within the Internal Market.
As has been argued above, limiting Northern Ireland’s Internal Market access to free
movement of  goods does not even satisfy the minimum necessary for its socio-economic
recovery. It arguably also falls short of  protecting those elements of  the Good Friday
Agreement which originally relied on and were underpinned by common EEC
membership of  the UK and Ireland. The EU Commission should thus revise the Draft
Protocol to include the full ambit of  the Internal Market, maintaining its commitment to
its indivisibility as required by the negotiation mandate. The UK could then still request
that its whole territory is encompassed by what is offered to Northern Ireland alone, and
the EU could accept this request. This would also have the advantage of  providing a
model of  maintaining UK Internal Market membership without distortion of  the EEA
by the inclusion of  a new member much larger than the current EFTA states. Even if  it
is unlikely that the present UK government would commit to this strategy, a change in
direction would inflict less harm on the EU’s Internal Market project in itself.
Thus, the Draft Withdrawal Agreement should add free movement of  persons,
services and capital to the common regulatory area (Article 3). This would require
inserting additional Articles into Chapter III, as well as the expansion of  the suggested
Annex by all the legislation in this area, in particular the legislation on mutual recognition
of  professional qualifications, on free movement of  workers including the coordination
of  social security and those partitions of  Directive 2004/48 relating to economically
active citizens, as well as the Services Directive and Directives in the area of  financial and
online services.
As mentioned above, the Good Friday Agreement’s functionality is further threatened
by eliminating the institution of  EU citizenship from Northern Ireland. Presently, Irish
citizens will remain protected if  they already use their free movement rights, but the
protection of  those who do not in their future lives in the UK (including Northern
Ireland) relies on a legally non-binding CTA. In order to address this, Chapter II of  the
Draft Protocol could be enhanced by establishing that the people of  Northern Ireland, as
well as EU citizens who wish to move to Northern Ireland, continue to enjoy EU
citizenship rights, in particular under Directive 2004/38, by an addition to Article 2. This
would relieve the UK from undergoing a commitment which is impossible to fulfil,
namely to magically ensure that no diminution of  rights results from withdrawing EU
citizenship rights from a part of  Northern Ireland’s population.
Further, as regards the first chapter, an additional sub-paragraph to Article 1 should
state that EU Treaty provisions and secondary law guaranteeing equal treatment on the
grounds of  sex, ethnic and racial origin, religion and belief, disability, sexual orientation
and age continues to apply in Northern Ireland.
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In order to ensure that the additional rights and protections partake in the specific
quality of  EU law, the jurisdiction of  the European Court of  Justice should be extended
to these chapters. This could be achieved by deleting the words ‘As regards Chapter III’
in Article 11, in addition to some editorial revisions in Article 2.
Finally, the lack of  representation of  the people of  Northern Ireland in the
administration and also adjudication of  the Protocol should be safeguarded. The Protocol
or the main text of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement should specify that UK members of
the subcommittee on Northern Ireland of  the Joint Committee must be recruited from
the institutions established by Strand One of  the Good Friday Agreement, and during
times of  their dysfunctionality by citizens of  Northern Ireland elected in accordance with
the principle of  community consent. Since the Court of  Justice of  the EU would acquire
a permanent role in Northern Ireland, measures to ensure a corresponding input should
be taken. For example, a permanent Advocate General from the island of  Ireland could
be installed, with the proviso that he or she always advises the Court in matters pertaining
to Northern Ireland. For the General Court, a similar provision could be made. All this
would require revising Articles 8 and 12 of  the Draft Protocol and Article 158 of  the
main part of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
All these issues would of  course only be a ‘back-stop’, as already specified in
Article 15 of  the Draft Protocol. However, that Article should specify that the safeguards
for the functioning of  the Good Friday Agreement and socio-economic prosperity in the
Draft Protocol must be in place before the Protocol becomes inapplicable.
The EU should also not forget the interests of  the larger part of  the island of  Ireland
in approaching Brexit. The commitment of  the Joint Declaration of  the negotiation
parties to alleviate the socio-economic threat of  Brexit for the island of  Ireland needs to
be addressed.
Brexit on the island of Ireland: beyond unique circumstances 395

